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What is a Feminist? 
This dissertation discusses the antecedents and consequences of identification 
with feminism. In order to do that it is important to define what a feminist actually is. 
Famous singer Beyoncé Knowles knows what a feminist is and in her lyrics from 
‘***Flawless’ she uses the definition by Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie and sings 
“Feminist: A person who believes in social, political, and economic equality of the 
sexes” (www.beyonce.com). More technically, the Oxford dictionary says that a 
feminist is “A person who supports feminism”, and feminism means “The belief that 
men and women should have equal rights and opportunities”. There are many 
definitions of feminism and individuals often define feminism differently. Scholars 
generally use a definition in which a reference to women’s equal rights, the need for 
social change on behalf of women, or acknowledgement of inequality between men 
and women is made (see also Robnett, Anderson & Hunter, 2012). 
There are many branches of feminism. Gender equity feminists argue that 
men and women should be treated the same and actively strive for equal (legal) rights 
(Sommers, 1994). Cultural feminists (Gilligan, 1982) argue that treating men and 
women the same will lead to disadvantages for especially women because inherently 
men and women are not the same. Therefore, they argue that we should celebrate the 
differences between men and women and take these differences into account when 
creating equality between men and women. Radical feminists (Mackinnon, 1987) 
argue that the main problem of gender inequality is that men have higher status and 
more power. Therefore men and women should not be treated as if they are the same 
because that maintains inequality. Hence, radical feminists challenge social norms 
and existing social institutions. Other subgroups of feminists call themselves socialist 
feminists, liberal feminists, lesbian feminists, or Black feminists (Swim & Hyers, 
2009; Szymanski, 2004). Despite their many differences, what all of these branches 
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of feminists have in common is that they are willing to label themselves as a feminist. 
Interestingly, some people believe that men and women should be equal, but do not 
identify as a feminist (e.g., ‘weak feminists’; Duncan, 2010). Others believe in gender 
equality based on individual values and self-determination, and therefore call 
themselves neo-liberals (Fitz, Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2012; Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 
2010), or egalitarians (Zucker, 2004).  
Some people argue that there is more to being a feminist than merely believing 
that men and women should be equal. For example, being a woman is sometimes 
seen as a requirement for being a feminist (Houvouras & Carter, 2008), as is being an 
activist and actively striving for equal rights (Houvouras & Carter, 2008; Suter & 
Toller, 2006). In fact, according to one feminist identity model (Downing & Roush, 
1985), active engagement in collective action is the final stage of developing a 
feminist identity (but see Liss & Erchull, 2010). To conclude, feminism (or feminist) 
is a multifaceted concept and there is not one definition. In all definitions though 
there is one corresponding aspect and that is that feminism is about the equality of 
the sexes. 
Is Identification with Feminism Important? 
When people identify with and are committed to a certain group, they are 
more likely to act on behalf of that group and to engage in collective action (Ellemers, 
Spears, & Doosje, 1997; Kelly, 1993; Stürmer & Simon, 2004; Yoder, Tobias, & Snell, 
2011). Hence, identification with feminism is important for people who believe in 
gender equality, because when men and women are willing to identify as a feminist, 
they are more likely to engage in collective action. This collective action is essential to 
facilitate progress toward gender equality (Klandermans, 1997; Klandermans & 
Oegema, 1987; Nelson et al., 2008; Yoder et al., 2011). And, unfortunately, collective 
action for progress toward women’s equality is still needed: Women are twice as often 
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illiterate than men (United Nations, 2010), are underrepresented in the top 
employment positions in business (Fortune, 2010; The Economist, 2014; United 
States Department of Labor, 2010; Vinnicombe & Sealy, 2013), are underrepresented 
at higher education institutions (League of European Research Universities, 2012), 
and receive less salary than men, on average (The Economist, 2014).  
A second reason why identification with feminism is important for those who 
value gender equality, is that men and women are still expected to behave according 
to their gender roles. That is, when men and women behave in violation of their 
respective gender roles, they experience backlash– negative consequences of 
behaving in gender violating ways (Moss-Racusin, Phelan, & Rudman, 2010; Prentice 
& Carranza, 2002; Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Phelan, & Nauts, 2012; Thomas, 1959; 
Vingerhoets, 2011). In Chapter 2 I investigate whether gender stereotype-inconsistent 
behavior can also be seen as acceptable behavior by looking at gender role violations 
of both male and female targets in the context of using this gender role violation in a 
clever way to get ahead. 
Although Chapter 2 gives first evidence that gender stereotype-inconsistency 
might be seen as acceptable behavior in some cases, in many instances it still evokes 
disapproval. This is especially the case for women who act in masculine ways. In our 
current society, men are seen as having more power than women (Eagly & Steffen, 
1984; Schneider, 2004) and high-power groups are allowed to behave in more 
variable and distinctive manners than low-power groups (Brauer, 2001; Guinote, 
Judd, & Brauer, 2002). These dominant groups are also less sensitive to acting in line 
with social norms (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008; 
Johnson & Lammers, 2012; Lammers, Stapel, & Galinsky, 2010; Piff, Stancato, Côté, 
Mendoza-Denton, & Keltner, 2012). Women’s behavior is more restricted because 
they are seen as a subordinate group (Dahrendorf, 1968; Foschi, 1996; 2000; Glick & 
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Fiske, 2001). However, if men and women are seen as equals—as the goal of many 
feminists is—this means that both genders are expected to follow social norms less 
and to behave less in accordance with their group’s behavior. Ultimately, the 
disapproval of gender roles violations might become less when men and women are 
seen more in equal terms. This resonates in the finding that intuitively feminism is 
associated with masculine women and feminine men (Suter & Toller, 2006). Because 
these counter-stereotypical exemplars are associated with feminism this could 
indicate that acceptance of feminism might in fact change expectations of gender 
roles. 
To conclude, identification with feminism is important and preferable for 
those who value gender equality, because engagement in collective action towards 
gender equality becomes more likely and stereotypical gender roles might become 
more lenient.  
Identification with Feminism 
It seems that identification with feminism is not chosen by some men and 
women who do believe in gender equality and do know what feminism is: Women are 
often unwilling to self-identify as feminist (Charter, 2015; McCabe, 2005; Robnett et 
al., 2012). In fact, of all the women who agree with at least some tenets of feminism, 
only 1 in 6 women in the United States is willing to identify as a feminist (Burn, 
Aboud, & Moyles, 2000). An analysis of qualitative interviews showed that both men 
and women eschew the feminist label (Suter & Toller, 2006). And this also holds for 
female celebrities: For example, when receiving the Billboard Women in Music 
Award in 2012, pop singer Katie Perry stated in her acceptance speech: “I am not a 
feminist, but I do believe in the strength of women” (Hampp, 2012). And Yahoo CEO 
Marissa Mayer said that she believes that “women are just as capable”, and she 
believes “in equal rights”, but that she does not identify as a feminist (Baker, 2012).  
12 
 
This trend of non-identification with feminism seems to imply that the 
antecedents of identification with feminism are different from merely agreeing with 
the values of feminism. In the remainder of the introduction of this dissertation I will 
discuss which antecedents of identification with feminism are already known in the 
literature and which two antecedents I focus on in my dissertation. Furthermore, I 
will discuss the known consequences of identification with feminism and which 
consequence is the focus of my dissertation. 
Antecedents of Identification with Feminism 
There are many reasons why women do or do not identify with feminism. 
First, people need to understand what feminism is. When people are given the 
definition of feminism as “someone who supports political, economic, and social 
equality for women” significantly more people identify as feminist (Huddy, Neely, & 
Lafay, 2000). Most obviously, agreeing with feminist values is an also important 
predictor in identification with feminism. Some women do not endorse gender 
equality and therefore do not identify as a feminist (Zucker, 2004; Zucker & Bay-
Cheng, 2010). Others who endorse gender equality, but do not see it as a feminist 
issue, are also less likely to identify than women who see gender equality as inherent 
to feminism (Fitz et al., 2012).  
But, some men and women who believe in gender equality and understand 
what feminism is also do not identify as a feminist. There are several reasons that are 
found for disidentification as a feminist. First, women who do not believe in the 
benefits of collective action are less likely to identify with feminism than are women 
who do believe (Williams & Wittig, 1997). Second, regarding life-experiences, it is 
found that women who have never been exposed to feminism, feminist ideas, or 
sexism are less likely to identify with feminism than women with more exposure 
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(Leaper & Arias, 2011; Nelson et al., 2008; Reid & Purcell, 2004; Williams & Wittig, 
1997). 
The last group of predictors is related to stereotyping. Feminists are strongly 
negatively stereotyped (Robnett et al., 2012) and are seen as being unattractive 
(Rudman & Fairchild, 2007) and as lesbian, bitchy, aggressive, and whiny 
(Houvouras & Carter, 2008). Even our implicit associations connect feminists to 
negativity and masculinity (Jenen, Winquist, Arkkelin, & Schuster, 2009). On the 
other hand, feminists are also seen in a positive light and are evaluated as being 
assertive, career-oriented, independent, and powerful (Berryman-Fink & Verderber, 
1985; Houvouras & Carter, 2008; Twenge & Zucker, 1999). Despite these positive 
characteristics feminists are seen as less positive than women in general (Twenge & 
Zucker, 1999). Having negative evaluations of feminists is related to less 
identification with feminism than having positive evaluations (Houvouras & Carter, 
2008; Leaper & Arias, 2011; Redford, Howell, Meijs, & Ratliff, 2015; Robnett et al., 
2012). However, having positive evaluations of feminists is not enough; crucial in 
identification with feminism is a feeling that others have positive evaluations of 
feminists as well (Ramsey et al., 2007; Twenge & Zucker, 1999; Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 
2010). Some women are reluctant to identify as feminists, because they are afraid 
that the negative consequences of the stereotype will be applied to them personally 
(Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2010). 
Hence, there are many reasons why men and women do not identify as a 
feminist even though they believe in gender equality and they understand what 
feminism is. I believe that two important processes have been overlooked as 
antecedents in identification with feminism. In Chapter 3 I will investigate the 
influence of perceived discrepancy between how women view themselves and how 
women view feminists on the dimensions of warmth and competence on the extent to 
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which they identify as feminists. Chapter 4 looks at the idea that women are 
becoming more motivated to be independent actors in their lives and that this 
motivated independence is an important reason for disidentification with feminism. 
Consequences of Identification with Feminism 
Research on the consequences of identification with feminism has shown that 
it brings advantages for women on a personal level: Identification with feminism is 
positively correlated with psychological well-being (Saunders & Kashubeck-West, 
2006), higher personal self-efficacy (Eisele & Stake, 2008), higher levels of self-
esteem (Hurt et al., 2007), better coping mechanisms for dealing with sexism and 
sexual harassment (Leaper & Arias, 2011), and better relationship health, relationship 
stability, and sexual satisfaction (Backus & Mahalik, 2011; Rudman & Phelan, 2007; 
Yoder, Perry, & Saal, 2007). Furthermore, feminist women are seen as confident, but 
only by other women (Anderson, 2009). 
On the other hand, there is also evidence that the consequences of 
identification with feminism are not so advantageous. For example, feminist men are 
seen as favorable, but low in attractiveness and masculinity and feminist women are 
seen as not favorable and as high in masculinity by both male and female raters 
(Anderson, 2009). More importantly, feminist women are taken less seriously when 
they are discriminated against—they are less seen as a victim and more of a 
complainer—compared to non-feminist women (Roy, Wieburst, & Miller, 2008). 
These negative consequences of identification with feminism are perhaps not so 
surprising given that the stereotype of feminists is so negative (Houvouras & Carter, 
2008; Jenen et al., 2009; Robnett et al., 2012; Rudman & Fairchild, 2007). 
This negativity towards feminists can also be experienced in our media 
landscape. A feminist reply to Robin Thicke’s number one song ‘Blurred Lines’ was 
removed from YouTube because of explicit content although it contained less nudity 
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than the original video (Coevert, 2013). After Emma Watson’s speech at the UN 
Women to promote feminism #RIPEmmaWatson was trending and there was a 
threat to make her nude pictures public (Hajema, 2014) and when women like 
Beyoncé, Emma Watson, and Jennifer Lopez talk about women’s rights, they are 
immediately ‘slut shamed’ and commented on their looks and sexuality (Van der Poel 
& Tuenter, 2014). 
Thus, the consequences of identification with feminism seem to be mixed. As 
mentioned before, some women focus on the negative consequences and are 
therefore reluctant to identify as feminists (Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2010). Therefore, in 
Chapter 5 I investigate whether this hesitation is justified by examining whether 
women who label themselves as feminists are judged more negatively than women 
who merely express gender equality beliefs. I do this by looking at the dimensions of 
warmth and competence.  
Chapter Overview 
With this dissertation I aim to better understand the psychological processes 
of identification with feminism by investigating why women are reluctant to identify 
with feminism and by examining whether the hesitation to identify with feminism is 
justified. In Chapter 2 I find that gender stereotype-inconsistency is not always 
experienced as a negative event, but that it can also be seen as a positive event. When 
observers see a man or a woman that behaves in a gender stereotype-inconsistent way 
(e.g., a woman behaving assertive or a man behaving flirtatious), they judge the 
behavior as acceptable: Only if the actor is a man (and thus acts in a stereotypical 
female way) and only if the behavior is seen as clever (e.g., to get away with a ticket or 
to persuade someone). Across four studies, these effects are driven by the evaluation 
of the gender stereotype-inconsistent acts as more clever and less trashy than the 
gender stereotype-consistent acts. In that same chapter, I propose that double 
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standards might play a role, because whereas men can benefit from gender 
stereotype-inconsistency, this is not the case for women.  
In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 I describe two reasons for why women do or do not 
identify as feminists. Specifically, Chapter 3 shows that the discrepancy between how 
women view themselves and how women view feminists is an important antecedent 
in identification with feminism. This is examined on the dimensions of warmth and 
competence. In this chapter I find that women do not identify with feminism if they 
see themselves as different in competence than feminists: The more women see 
feminists as differently in competence, the less they identify with feminists. Women 
also do not identify with feminism if they see themselves as higher in warmth than 
feminists. This chapter also shows that perceived discrepancy predicts identification 
with feminism even after controlling for women’s agreement with feminist values. 
In Chapter 4 I find that although women have become increasingly 
independent, this independence also has a down-side. Not labeling as a feminist is for 
some women a deliberate choice, because labeling themselves restricts their view of 
themselves as an independent individual. Women are becoming more independent 
and are motivated to be independent actors. Chapter 4 shows that both men and 
women experience motivated independence and that this is an important reason to 
not identify as a feminist. In addition, in this chapter I find that women with an 
independent mindset disagree more with a feminist message than with a non-
feminist message, but that this difference is not found for men or for women with a 
dependent mindset. 
Finally, Chapter 5 focuses on the effects of feminist labeling. In this chapter I 
find that the feminist label cues strength of feminist beliefs–women who label 
themselves as feminists are seen as having stronger feminist beliefs than women who 
merely express gender equality beliefs. The strength of these feminist beliefs causes a 
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decrease in warmth and an increase in competence evaluations: Feminist labelers are 
thus seen as less warm, but as more competent than women who do not use the 
feminist label, but do believe in gender equality. This chapter shows that women who 
label themselves as feminists are seen as more negative compared to women who 
merely express the same gender equality beliefs. This is the case because it is inferred 
that the feminist labeler in fact does not have the same, but stronger gender equality 
beliefs than the woman who beliefs in gender equality. 
Let me end this introduction with some comments about the following 
chapters. All chapters can be read individually and in a non-fixed order. They are 
written as separate journal articles and are or will be published individually. For that 
reason there might also be an overlap in the introductions of the chapters. In 
addition, I wrote this introduction and the final chapter using ‘I’ but in all the other 
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Imagine you are riding the subway when you see an attractive young person 
who does not have a valid ticket. The person flirts with the conductor and tries to use 
their physical attractiveness to charm their way out of the problem. How would you 
feel about the ticketless passenger? The current chapter suggests that the answer to 
this question depends on whether they are a man or a woman. Gender carries strong 
role expectations (Eagly, 1987; Fiske, Bersoff, Borgida, Deaux, & Heilman, 1991; 
Prentice & Carranza, 2002; Rudman & Fairchild, 2004; Rudman & Glick, 1999; 
Rudman & Glick, 2008; Wood & Eagly, 2009). Being flirtatious is prescriptive for 
women, who are expected to rely on their charms and attractiveness to influence 
others. Men, on the other hand, are expected to use more domineering strategies, 
such as relying on their status, assertiveness, or dominance to get their way (Eagly, 
1987; Prentice & Carranza, 2002; Rudman & Fairchild, 2004; Rudman & Glick, 
2008). Although different influence behaviors are prescriptive for men and women, 
the literature does not provide a clear answer to the question of when a target’s 
gender affects whether his or her behavior is found acceptable. In fact, the literature 
offers two different and opposite answers to this question.  
On one hand, research has shown that violating expectations can lead to more 
negative perceptions of behavior. Behaviors that are consistent with gender roles are 
often evaluated more positively than behaviors that are inconsistent with gender roles 
(Heilman, 2001; Schneider, 2004). In contrast with violation of descriptive gender 
norms (what men and women are), violations of prescriptive gender norms (how men 
and women should behave) in particular induce disapproval, negativity, and penalties 
for the violator (Heilman, 2012). People dislike transgressions of gender norms that 
are strongly associated with gender identity, such as female leadership (Rudman et 
al., 2012). Similarly, women who are arrogant (Prentice & Carranza, 2002) or 
promiscuous (Thomas, 1959), and men who are modest (Moss-Racusin et al., 2010) 
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or who cry (Vingerhoets, 2011) are all evaluated more negatively and experience the 
so-called ‘backlash effect’ (Rudman & Glick, 2001) than men and women who act in a 
way that is consistent with their gender roles. Such effects seem to be so robust that 
even young children criticize gender role-violating peers (Blakemore, 2003), although 
the extent to which violators are criticized depends greatly on the content of the 
violation. In summary, research suggests that the behavior of a woman who uses 
attractiveness to get by without a train ticket might be seen as relatively acceptable, 
but that the behavior of a man engaging in the same behavior (a violation of 
expectations) would be judged more harshly.  
There is, however, reason to believe that there are situations in which gender 
stereotype-inconsistency is seen as more acceptable than gender stereotype-
consistency. Behaving in a way that is gender stereotype-inconsistent demonstrates 
that one has the ability to play with expectations. This might be particularly seen as 
positive in Western European cultures where individualism is seen as a sign of 
success and emancipative values are encouraged (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 
2010; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Welzel & Inglehart, 2010). Although gender stereotype-
inconsistent behavior violates a prescriptive norm, it might also demonstrate that the 
target has behaved cleverly to gain an advantage over others who act in line with their 
gender roles. 
This link between positivity and gender stereotype-inconsistency is rooted in 
research showing that deviance is associated with creativity (Amabile, 1996; Barron, 
1955). Creative and clever people like artists and scientists stand out from the crowd 
and behave in ways that are unexpected and deviant from the norm (Sternberg, 
2001). Not surpringly, the stereotype of creative people is thus associated with 
deviance (Sternberg, 2001). Experimental studies have shown that exposure to a 
deviant target compared to exposure to a conformist target increases creativity 
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(Förster, Friedman, Butterbach, & Sassenberg, 2005) and that counter-stereotypical 
thinking leads to the generation of more creative ideas (Goclowska & Crisp, 2013; 
Goclowska, Crisp, & Labuschagne, 2013). Gender stereotype-inconsistent behaviors 
can also be seen as clever or creative because they demonstrate that one has the 
ability to approach a situation in a new, uncommon way and use that to one’s own 
advantage (Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008; Mayer, 1999).  
Although the ideas or behaviors of creative and clever people are often 
inconsistent with conventional ways of thinking and thus regularly experience 
exclusion or social rejection (Sternberg & Lubart, 1991; 1995), creativity is generally 
seen as a positive trait (e.g., Griskevicius, Cialdini, & Kenrick, 2006; Prokosch, Coss, 
Scheib, & Blozis, 2009). Creativity signals intelligence, motivation, and knowledge 
(Kaufman, Kozbelt, Bromley, & Miller, 2008; Nettle, 2008) and a recent study shows 
that eccentric artists were perceived to have a higher artistic skill and their art was 
appreciated more than (the art of) less eccentric artists (Van Tilburg & Igou, 2014).  
Creativity involves originality, novelty, and usefulness (Mayer, 1999) and 
deliberately switching gender roles is creative, not only because it is unexpected, but 
also because it is original and useful. Boys who play with a toy kitchen, for example, 
might only be criticized (Blakemore, 2003) until it is clear that there is a purpose for 
their behavior (e.g., they want to become a top chef); then the cleverness of their 
behavior is recognized and accepted. Put differently, using behaviors that are 
stereotypically associated with the other gender shows that one has the ability to 
approach a situation in a new, uncommon way (Baas et al., 2008). Such creative and 
useful gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior may evoke less negative backlash 
because it is enacted to effectively deal with a situation. In such cases, the negative 
consequences of gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior may be less strong 
(Heilman, 2012). After all, in such cases people do not act in a role inconsistent 
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manner to undermine the existing order, but merely do so to deal with the situation. 
In this chapter it is proposed that gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior will be 
seen as more acceptable than gender stereotype-consistent behavior if it is seen as 
clever or creative. This is in contrast to the backlash effect (negative evaluation of a 
gender stereotype-inconsistent target) that is expected if the behavior was seen as 
mundane or commonplace.  
In addition, using traits that are stereotypically associated with one’s own 
gender (gender stereotype-consistency) might be seen as a cheap and trashy attempt 
at influencing others and benefitting the self. This prediction is consistent with 
research showing that, although physically attractive people on average receive more 
lenient sentences (Downs & Lyons, 1991; Efrak, 1974; Mazzella & Feingold, 1994), 
they lose that advantage if their attractiveness is actually part of the crime (e.g., a 
woman who uses her beauty to swindle a rich man into giving her his wealth; Sigall & 
Ostrove, 1975). Similarly, research has shown that if male defendants are described as 
aggressive—suggesting that they used a stereotypical male trait in perpetrating their 
crimes—they are more readily seen as guilty (Alicke & Yurak, 1995). Furthermore, 
behaving consistently with expectations associated with one’s group is a sign of lack 
of status. People with power, class, and status are more inclined to take the privilege 
to act as they choose: They present themselves in a wider variety of different ways 
(Guinote et al., 2002). Slavishly following the roles associated with one’s group 
suggests that people lack the autonomy and freedom to make their own choices 
(Fiske, 1993). And having low social-economic status is associated with negativity, for 
example White poor Southeners are often called ‘white trash’ (Billings, Norman, & 
Ledford, 2000). 
In the present chapter the mediating role of perceptions of cleverness and 
trashiness in the relationship between gender stereotype-consistency and judgments 
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of acceptability (with greater perceived cleverness relating to higher judgments of 
acceptability and greater perceived trashiness leading to lower judgments of 
acceptability) is tested and demonstrated. In summary, existing research suggests 
that gender expectations in behavior should have strong effects on the degree to 
which people find such behaviors acceptable, opposite hypotheses may be formed on 
whether following or violating such gender expectations will lead to a lower 
judgments of acceptability. We predict that an individual who behaves in a way that is 
gender stereotype-inconsistent will be judged less negatively than an individual who 
behaves in a way that is gender stereotype-consistent. We propose that the positivity 
that is associated with gender stereotype-inconsistency (cleverness) and the 
negativity that is associated with gender stereotype-consistency (trashiness) will 
account for the respondents’ ratings of the acceptability of the behavior. To be more 
specific:  
Hypothesis 1: The behavior of a woman who behaves in a dominant (Study 
2.1.1, Study 2.1.2, Study 2.2) or aggressive (Study 2.3) way (gender stereotype-
inconsistent) will be seen as more clever and less trashy, and therefore more 
acceptable, than the behavior of a man who behaves in a similar (but gender 
stereotype-consistent) way. 
   
Hypothesis 2: The behavior of a man who uses attractiveness (Study 2.1.1, 
Study 2.1.2, Study 2.2) or behaves in a passive (Study 2.3) way (gender 
stereotype-inconsistent) will be seen as more clever and less trashy, and 
therefore more acceptable, than the behavior of a woman who behaves in a 




In Study 2.1.1 these hypotheses are tested by means of a scenario in which the 
male or the female target uses dominance (consistent with the male stereotype) or 
attractiveness (consistent with the female stereotype) to get their way out of a ticket. 
Study 2.1.2 uses the same paradigm with the techniques of dominance and 
attractiveness, but in a different scenario in order to increase generalizability. 
Specifically, the target here tries to delay a plane to allow a friend who is late to still 
board. In Study 2.2 it is tested whether gender stereotype-inconsistent behaviors are 
seen as more isolated events and are therefore seen as more acceptable. We aim to 
show this is not the case. Finally, in Study 2.3 it is tested whether the interpretation 
of the gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior as clever can explain when our effect 
(gender stereotype-inconsistency is seen as more acceptable than gender stereotype-
consistency) and when a backlash effect (gender stereotype-inconsistency is seen as 
less acceptable than gender stereotype-consistency) occurs. Throughout these 
studies, participant gender is taken into account as an independent variable. 
Although there were not any specific a priori predictions about the role of gender 
given the clear implications for gender relations and gender inequality, it could be 
that gender stereotype-inconsistency will be especially attractive for women because 
they have a stronger interest in a reversal or dissolution of traditional gender roles 
than men (Robnett et al., 2012). However, there is also evidence that there are no 
gender differences in a plethora of psychological traits (Hyde, 2005) and judgment of 
gender violations in particular (Heilman, 2012).  
Study 2.1.1 
Participants read a scenario in which a target was riding the subway without a 
valid ticket. The target either used dominance (prescriptive for men; Eagly, 1987; 
Prentice & Carranza, 2002) or attractiveness (prescriptive for women; Prentice & 
Carranza, 2002; Rudman & Fairchild, 2004) to avoid a fine from the conductor. We 
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expected that a woman who uses dominance (gender stereotype-inconsistent) would 
be rated less negatively than a man who uses dominance (gender stereotype-
consistent); we expected that a man who uses attractiveness (gender stereotype-
inconsistent) would be rated less negatively than a woman who uses attractiveness 
(gender-stereotype consistent).  
Method 
Participants and design. Two hundred and fifty respondents from the 
United States (92 women and 158 men, Mage = 30.9 years, SD = 11.4 years) were 
recruited on Amazon MTurk and participated in return for $0.40. A sample size of 
240 was chosen a priori to detect a Cohen’s d of 0.35 (based on the parameters from 
a pilot study) with 80% power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). Data from 
one participant was excluded from analysis because he entered garbled text. Data 
from another participant was excluded because he indicated that he did not take 
participation seriously. These exclusions did not influence any result. Participants 
were randomly assigned to one condition of a 2 (target gender: male target, female 
target) Χ 2 (scenario type: attractiveness, dominance) between-participants design 
with participant gender as an additional factor. 
Materials.  
Scenario (independent variable). Participants read a scenario about 
either a male target (Simon) or a female target (Sarah) who was riding the subway 
without a ticket. When approached by a conductor of the other gender, the target 
either relied on attractiveness (gender stereotype-consistent for female target; gender 
stereotype-inconsistent for male target) or on dominance (gender stereotype-
consistent for male target; gender stereotype-inconsistent for female target) to avoid 
a fine (see Appendix 2A for the full text).  
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Cleverness and trashiness (mediators). Perceived cleverness of the 
behavior (I think Simon’s/ Sarah’s behavior is … clever/ creative/ smart; α = .90), 
and perceived trashiness of the behavior (… cheap/ trashy/ classy (reversed), α = .75) 
was measured. The selection of these measures was based on a pilot study (N = 597) 
conducted on the Project Implicit research website (http://implicit.harvard.edu) in 
which participants answered 11 items regarding cleverness, trashiness, and 
acceptability using the same gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior as a 
manipulation. Using a factor analysis two scales (cleverness and trashiness) were 
designed by building on the items with the highest factor loadings (trashy, clever, 
creative) and adding close synonyms (cheap, classy, smart) in order to have three 
items per scale. All items were answered on seven-point-scales between 1 (strongly 
disagree) and 7 (strongly agree).  
Perceived acceptability (dependent variable). Participants responded 
to a measure of perceived acceptability of the target’s behavior (“How acceptable is 
Simon’s/Sarah’s behavior?”) on a seven-point-scale ranging from 1 (very 
unacceptable) to 7 (very acceptable). Before answering the measure of acceptability, 
participants were instructed to deliberate well about their response before answering. 
They were also asked to write down their thoughts on an open-response item.1 
Results 
Perceived acceptability. A 2 (target gender: male target, female target) Χ 2 
(scenario type: attractiveness, dominance) Χ 2 (participant gender: male, female) 
between-participants ANOVA on the degree to which respondents thought the 
                                                          
1 For exploratory purposes, participants responded to scales measuring perceptions of unexpectedness 
(Mayer, 1999; α = .89), identification with feminism (α = .94), and hostile sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996; 
α =.92). Participants found it more unexpected if a woman relied on dominance compared to when a 
man did so, p < .001, but less unexpected if a woman relied on attractiveness compared to when a man 
did so, p < .001. Repeating all analyses while controlling for identification with feminism and hostile 
sexism, did not affect the results. 
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target’s behavior to be acceptable, showed a main effect of scenario type, F(1, 240) = 
7.80, p = .006, η² = .03. More importantly, this main effect was qualified by the 
expected interaction effect between target gender and scenario type, F(1, 240) = 
20.69, p < .001, η² = .08. As expected, simple comparisons showed that participants 
thought it to be more acceptable for the male target to use attractiveness (M = 4.38, 
SD = 1.68) than for the female target (M = 3.48, SD = 1.67), t(124) = 3.01, p = .003, 
Cohen’s d = 0.54, but thought it more acceptable for the female target (M = 3.67, SD 
= 1.46) to use dominance than for the male target to do so (M = 2.95, SD = 1.57), 
t(120) = -2.64, p = .009, Cohen’s d = 0.48. This supports both Hypothesis 1 (the 
behavior a woman who behaves dominantly will be seen as more acceptable than that 
of a man who behaves similarly) and Hypothesis 2 (the behavior a man who behaves 
flirtatiously will be seen as more acceptable than that of a woman who behaves 
similarly). 
Finally, there was also an unexpected three-way interaction with participant 
gender, F(1, 240) = 6.37, p = .01, η² = .03. Analyses showed that the predicted two-
way interaction effect was strong and significant for female participants (p < .001, η² 
= .18) but much weaker and only a statistical trend among male participants (p = .10, 
η² = .02). We return to this issue in the General Discussion of this chapter. No other 
main or interaction effects were significant (p’s > .45). 
Cleverness. We expected that a gender stereotype-inconsistent act would be 
seen as more clever than a gender stereotype-consistent act. A 2 (target gender: male 
target, female target) Χ 2 (scenario type: attractiveness, dominance) Χ 2 (participant 
gender: male, female) between-participants ANOVA on the level of cleverness showed 
a main effect of scenario type, F(1, 240) = 5.39, p = .02, η² = .02, which was qualified 
by the predicted interaction effect between target gender and scenario type, F(1, 240) 
= 26.94, p < .001, η² = .10. Consistent with expectations, participants thought using 
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attractiveness was more clever for the male target (M = 4.82, SD = 1.53) than for the 
female target (M = 3.97, SD = 1.80), t(124) = 2.84, p = .005, Cohen’s d = 0.51, but 
that using dominance was more clever for the female target (M = 4.43, SD = 1.64) 
than for the male target (M = 3.28, SD = 1.60), t(120) = -3.90, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 
0.71. Not bearing on our predictions, we also found an interaction of target gender 
and participant gender, F(1, 240) = 5.57, p = .02, η² = .02. There were no differences 
in the evaluation of the female target, p = .43, but the behavior of the male target was 
seen as more acceptable by the male participants (M = 4.32, SD = 1.61) than by the 
female participants (M = 3.63, SD = 1.87), p = .04. No other main and interaction 
effects were significant, p’s > .06. 
Trashiness. We expected that a gender stereotype-inconsistent act would be 
seen as less trashy than a gender stereotype-consistent act. Consistent with this 
expectation, a 2 (target gender: male target, female target) Χ 2 (scenario type: 
attractiveness, dominance) Χ 2 (participant gender: male, female) between-
participants ANOVA on the level of trashiness showed the predicted interaction effect 
of target gender Χ scenario type, F(1, 240) = 24.92, p < .001, η² = .09. Consistent 
with expectations, simple effects showed that in the dominance scenario participants 
rated the perceived trashiness as higher for the male target (M = 5.36, SD = 1.26) 
than the female target (M = 4.63, SD = 1.27), t(120) = 3.21, p = .002, Cohen’s d = 
0.59, while in the attractiveness scenario the effect reversed and participants rated 
the perceived trashiness as higher for the female target (M = 5.18, SD = 1.36) than the 
male target (M = 4.32, SD = 1.40), t(124) = -3.52, p =.001, Cohen’s d = 0.63. No other 
main or interaction effects were significant, p’s > .11. 
Mediation. Finally, a mediation analyses was conducted to test the prediction 
that cleverness and trashiness would have opposite mediating effects. That is, we 
expected that the finding that a gender stereotype-inconsistent act is seen as more 
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clever and less trashy than a gender stereotype-consistent act, would help to explain 
why it is seen as more acceptable. To do so, we employed a regression analysis 
according to the specifications of PROCESS for SPSS using Model 4 with 5000 
bootstrap resamples (Hayes, 2013) and both mediators were simultaneously entered 
in the model. The analyses revealed that both cleverness and trashiness mediated the 
effect of the target gender Χ scenario type interaction on acceptability. Both the 
indirect effect through trashiness, B = -0.55, SE = 0.06, p < .001, CI = [-0.67, -0.43], 
and the indirect effect through cleverness, B = 0.37, SE = 0.05, p < .001, CI = [0.27, 
0.47], significantly mediated the scenario type Χ target gender interaction, whereas 
the direct effect of the target gender Χ scenario type interaction on acceptability 
turned not significant, B = 0.12, SE = 0.16, p = .45, CI = [-0.20, 0.45]. For 
correlations see Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 







- .63* -.66* 
Cleverness  - -.54* 
Trashiness   - 
Note. * = Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Study 2.1.2 
Study 2.1.2 uses the same paradigm of Study 2.1.1 with a new scenario. One problem 
with Study 2.1.1 was that in the scenario the conductor was described as easy to 
intimidate in the dominance scenario, but not as such in the attractiveness scenario. 
Therefore the conditions did not only differ in the behavior shown by the male or the 
female target, but also by the responder. Study 2.1.2 addresses this issue by providing 
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no information about the other actor in the story, thus making the two conditions 
equal in that respect. In addition, this study makes use of the same gender-associated 
behaviors (dominance for men; attractiveness for women), but in a completely 
different setting, making the findings more generalizable across different settings. 
Method 
Participants and design. Three hundred and eight respondents from the 
United States (102 women and 206 men, Mage = 33.4 years, SD = 10.5 years) were 
recruited on Amazon MTurk and participated in return for $0.40. Because it is 
especially recommended to have sufficient power for replication studies (Open 
Science Collaboration, 2012) we decided to increase the a priori power from 80% to 
95% and a sample size of 300 completed sessions was chosen a priori based on the 
parameters from Study 2.1.1 (Cohen’s d = 0.48; Faul et al., 2009). Participants were 
randomly assigned to one condition of a 2 (target gender: male target, female target) 
Χ 2 (scenario type: attractiveness, dominance) between-participants design with 
participant gender as an additional factor. 
Materials. 
Scenario (independent variable). Participants read a scenario about a 
target person who was described to be waiting on a plane for a friend to board. As the 
friend was late, the target person was trying to stop the plane from leaving. 
Depending on condition, the target person was either described as male or female 
(target gender) and was also described to either rely on attractiveness or dominance 
(scenario type). As in Study 2.1.1, attractiveness is considered gender stereotype-
consistent for female targets and inconsistent for male targets, while dominance is 
considered consistent for male targets and inconsistent for female targets. See 
Appendix 2B for the full text.  
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Perceived acceptability (dependent variable). Participants responded 
to the measure of perceived acceptability of the target’s behavior (“How acceptable is 
the man’s / woman’s behavior?”) on a seven-point-scale ranging from 1 (very 
unacceptable) to 7 (very acceptable).2 Finally, participants could fill in any 
comments they had on an open-response item.  
Results 
Perceived acceptability. A 2 (target gender: male target, female target) Χ 2 
(scenario type: attractiveness, dominance) Χ 2 (participant gender: male, female) 
between-participants ANOVA on the degree to which respondents thought the 
target’s behavior to be acceptable, showed a main effect of target gender, F(1, 296) = 
6.55, p = .01, η² = .02. More importantly, this main effect was qualified by the 
expected interaction effect between target gender and scenario type, F(1, 296) = 7.22, 
p = .008, η² = .02. As expected, simple comparisons showed that participants 
thought it to be more acceptable for the male target to use attractiveness (M = 3.44, 
SD = 1.39) than for the female target (M = 2.36, SD = 1.43), t(141) = 4.54, p < .001, 
Cohen’s d = 0.76. However, it was not more acceptable for the female target to use 
dominance (M = 2.84, SD = 1.49) than for the male target (M = 2.68, SD = 1.32), 
t(159) = -0.74, p = .46, Cohen’s d = 0.12. In other words, these results support for 
Hypothesis 2 (the behavior a man who behaves flirtatiously will be seen as more 
acceptable than that of a woman who behaves flirtatiously), but do not support for 
Hypothesis 1 (the behavior a woman who behaves dominantly will be seen as more 
acceptable than that of a man who behaves similarly). 
                                                          
2 Perceived cleverness and trashiness was also measured using the same items as in Study 2.1.1. 
Unfortunately, this data was lost for a large group of participants (N = 155). The data loss left some 
cells with such small numbers of participants (e.g., 6) that the data cannot be interpreted. 
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Finally, as in Study 2.1.1, there was also an unexpected three-way interaction 
with participant gender, F(1, 296) = 7.68, p = .006, η² = .03. But unlike in Study 
2.1.1, analyses now showed that the predicted two-way interaction effect was 
significant and in the expected direction among male participants, p < .001, η² = .10. 
However, the expected two-way interaction was fully absent among female 
participants, p = .96, η² < .001, meaning that for female participants neither 
Hypothesis 1 nor Hypothesis 2 was supported. No other main or interaction effects 
were significant (p’s > .11). We return to this in the General Discussion of this 
chapter. 
Discussion Study 2.1.1 and Study 2.1.2 
Study 2.1.1 demonstrated that, for both male and female targets, gender 
stereotype-inconsistent acts were seen as more acceptable than gender stereotype-
consistent acts. More specifically, the behavior of a man who relied on attractiveness 
was seen as more acceptable than the same behavior performed by a woman 
(Hypothesis 2). Further, the behavior of a woman who relied on dominance was seen 
as more acceptable than the same behavior performed by a man (Hypothesis 1). Also, 
gender stereotype-inconsistent acts were seen as more clever and less trashy than 
gender stereotype-consistent acts, and these ratings of cleverness and trashiness 
mediated the effect of the target gender and scenario type interaction on acceptability 
of the behavior.  
Study 2.1.2 replicated the finding that the behavior of the male target who used 
attractiveness was seen as more acceptable than the same behavior performed by a 
female target. However, unlike in Study 2.1.1, this result was only found among male 
participants, while the pattern was not significant for female participants (though was 
in the expected direction, using attractiveness for the male target (M = 3.23, SD = 
1.36) and for the female target (M = 2.80, SD = 1.36), p = .29). One possible 
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explanation is that there were fewer female participants (N = 102) than male 
participants (N = 201) and therefore post-hoc power for a Cohen’s d of 0.45 in the 
female participants sample was only 60%. 
Another difference between Studies 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 is that, in the first study 
participants saw the dominant behavior of the female as more acceptable than the 
same behavior of the male target, whereas in the second study, participants saw the 
dominant behavior of the female target not as more acceptable than the same 
behavior of a male target. This difference could possibly be explained by double 
standards: Whereas men can reap the benefits of gender stereotype-inconsistent 
behavior, this might be less possible for women. We return to this issue in the 
General Discussion of this chapter. 
Study 2.2 
The result of Study 2.1.1 confirmed that gender stereotype-inconsistent acts 
are rated as more acceptable than gender stereotype-consistent acts, and Study 2.1.2 
confirmed this finding, but only for male targets. Study 2.1.1 demonstrated that this 
advantage of gender stereotype-inconsistent acts could be explained by the fact that 
these acts were seen as more clever and less trashy. However, as an alternative to our 
explanation, it could be that people may infer from a gender stereotype-inconsistent 
act that it is an isolated, incidental event. That is, people may think that women who 
rely on dominance or men who rely on attractiveness are unlikely to show similar 
behavior in the near future, compared to those who stick to stereotypical gender 
roles. For example, men and women who behave in a gender stereotype-consistent 
manner receive higher punishments than those who behave in gender stereotype-
inconsistent ways, presumably because jurors think they are more dangerous and 
more likely to commit further violations (cf., Alicke & Yurak, 1995; Sigall & Ostrove, 
1975). People may see gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior as more acceptable 
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simply because they think it is a glitch and the target otherwise never behaves like 
this. To rule this out, in Study 2.2 it was manipulated whether the gender stereotype-
inconsistent act was an isolated event or a recurring event. We expect that this 
manipulation does not affect perceived acceptability, because the behavior of the 
target is judged as more clever regardless whether the behavior is recurring or an 
isolated event. 
Method 
Participants and design. Two hundred and fifty United States citizens (100 
women and 150 men, Mage = 31.6 years, SD = 9.7 years) were recruited on Amazon 
MTurk and participated in return for $0.40. A sample size of 240 was chosen a priori 
based on the parameters from Study 2.1.1 (Cohen’s d = 0.48) with 95% power (Faul et 
al., 2009). In Study 2.2, an instructional manipulation check was used to screen out 
inattentive participants (as recommended by Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 
2009). It consisted of three multiple choice questions about the scenario. Participants 
who failed to follow instructions were a priori excluded from analysis (N = 76) and 
left 174 respondents in the final sample. Fortunately, analyses not using these 
exclusion criteria lead to the same results. Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of the conditions of a 2 (target gender: male target, female target) Χ 2 (scenario 
type: attractiveness, dominance) Χ 2 (occurrence: recurring, isolated) between-
participants design with participant gender as an additional factor.  
Materials.  
Scenario (independent variable). The scenario was the same as in Study 
2.1.1. The only difference between this study and Study 2.1.1 is that in the recurring 
occurrence condition the following sentence was added: Simon/Sarah knows how to 
make use of attractiveness/dominance and he/she often does so. The scenario below 
describes an event that happened to Simon/Sarah last week, but things like this 
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happen to him/her more often. Simon/Sarah is sitting in the subway and he/she left 
his/her wallet at home. .…..he/she didn’t buy a ticket for the subway. The isolated 
occurrence condition was equivalent to the conditions in Study 2.1.1.  
Cleverness, trashiness, and usefulness (mediators). Participants 
completed the same measures of cleverness (α = .89) and trashiness (α = .74) as in 
Study 2.1.1. Whether the target’s behavior was perceived to be useful was also 
measured (“Is the target’s behavior useful/functional/goal directed?”; α = .86).3 
Perceived acceptability (dependent variable). Participants completed 
the same measures of perceived acceptability as in Study 2.1.1. 
Results 
Perceived acceptability. A 2 (target gender: male, female) Χ 2 (scenario 
type: attractiveness, dominance) Χ 2 (participant gender: male, female) Χ 2 
(occurrence: recurring, isolated) between-participants ANOVA on the level of 
acceptability showed a main effect of occurrence, F(1, 158) = 7.71, p = .006, η² = .05, 
in which the isolated event (M = 4.37, SD = 1.88) was seen as more acceptable than 
the recurring event (M = 3.50, SD = 1.92). There was also a main effect of target 
gender, F(1, 158) = 6.35, p = .01, η² = .04, that more importantly, was qualified by the 
predicted interaction effect between target gender and scenario type, F(1, 158) = 7.30, 
p = .008, η² = .04. As expected, simple comparisons showed that participants 
considered using attractiveness as more acceptable for the male target (M = 4.82, SD 
= 1.67) than for the female target (M = 3.34, SD = 1.83), t(94) = 4.12, p < .001, 
Cohen’s d = 0.85, but considered using dominance as equally acceptable for the male 
target (M = 3.71, SD = 2.07) and female target (M = 3.77, SD = 1.97), t(76) = -0.12, p 
                                                          
3 Participants also completed the same measure of experienced unexpectedness as in Study 2.1.1 (α = 
.63). Only a main effect of scenario type was found, F(1, 166) = 5.02, p = .03, η² = .03. 
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= .91, Cohen’s d = 0.03. In other words, as in Study 2.1.2, this again supports 
Hypothesis 2 (the behavior a woman who behaves flirtatious will be seen as less 
acceptable than that of a man who behaves flirtatious), but does not support 
Hypothesis 1 (the behavior a woman who behaves dominant will be seen as more 
acceptable than that of a man who behaves dominant). Importantly, the question 
whether this behavior was recurring or isolated did not moderate this effect, F(1, 158) 
= 2.28, p = .13, as expected. No other main or interaction effects were significant, p’s 
> .16. 
Cleverness. A 2 (target gender: male, female) Χ 2 (scenario type: 
attractiveness, dominance) Χ 2 (participant gender: male, female) Χ 2 (occurrence: 
recurring, isolated) between-participants ANOVA on the level of cleverness showed a 
main effect of occurrence, F(1, 166) = 17.78, p < .001, η² = .10, in which the isolated 
event (M = 5.36, SD = 1.23) was seen as more clever than the recurring event (M = 
4.42, SD = 1.67). More importantly, the predicted interaction effect between target 
gender and scenario type was found, F(1, 166) = 7.49, p = .007, η² = .04, showing as 
expected that participants saw attractiveness as more clever for the male target (M = 
5.50, SD = 1.27) than for the female target (M = 4.58, SD = 1.44), t(94) = 3.32, p = 
.001, Cohen’s d = 0.68, but that using dominance was not seen as less clever for the 
male target (M = 4.48, SD = 1.69) than for the female target (M = 4.91, SD = 1.58), 
t(76) = -1.16, p = .25, Cohen’s d = 0.27. No other effects were significant, p’s > .07. 
Trashiness. A 2 (target gender: male, female) Χ 2 (scenario type: 
attractiveness, dominance) Χ 2 (participant gender: male, female) Χ 2 (occurrence: 
recurring, isolated) between-participants ANOVA on the level of trashiness showed 
only a main effect of occurrence, F(1, 166) = 9.47, p = .002, η² = .05, in which the 
isolated event (M = 4.24, SD = 1.32) was seen as less trashy than the recurring event 
(M = 4.87, SD = 1.51). All other effects were not significant, p’s > .08. 
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Usefulness. A 2 (target gender: male, female) Χ 2 (scenario type: 
attractiveness, dominance) Χ 2 (participant gender: male, female) Χ 2 (occurrence: 
recurring, isolated) between-participants ANOVA on the level of usefulness showed a 
main effect of occurrence, F(1, 166) = 12.83, p < .001, η² = .07, in which the isolated 
event (M = 5.33, SD = 1.10) was seen as more useful than the recurring event (M = 
4.57, SD = 1.53). The predicted interaction effect between target gender and scenario 
type was also found, F(1, 166) = 14.56, p < .001, η² = .08, showing that participants 
saw attractiveness as more useful for the male target (M = 5.37, SD = 1.07) than for 
the female target (M = 4.49, SD = 1.52), t(94) = 3.33, p = .001, Cohen’s d = 0.69. 
Using dominance was seen as less useful for the male target (M = 4.61, SD = 1.65) 
than for the female target (M = 5.29, SD = 1.05), t(76) = -2.23, p = .03, Cohen’s d = 
0.51. No other effects were significant, p’s > .12. 
Mediation. Finally, we conducted a mediation analysis according to the 
specifications of PROCESS for SPSS using Model 5 with 5000 bootstrap resamples 
(Hayes, 2013) with both mediators entered simultaneously in the model. The 
analyses revealed that both cleverness and trashiness mediated the effect of the target 
gender Χ scenario type interaction on acceptability. Both the indirect effect through 
trashiness, B = -0.63, SE = 0.11, p < 0.001, CI = [-0.83, -0.43], and the indirect effect 
through cleverness, B = 0.45, SE = 0.08, p < 0.001, CI = [0.29, 0.61], significantly 
mediated the scenario type Χ target gender interaction. The direct effect of the target 
gender Χ scenario type interaction on acceptability was no longer significant, B = -
1.05, SE = 0.84, p = .21, CI = [-2.71, 0.60]. For correlations see Table 2.2. 
Discussion Study 2.2  
 Study 2.2 confirmed Hypothesis 2 and again showed that, as expected, a male 








Cleverness Trashiness Usefulness 
Perceived 
Acceptability 
- .57* -.61* .50* 
Cleverness  - -.44* .63* 
Trashiness   - -.35* 
Usefulness    - 
Note. * = Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
same behavior performed by a female target. Adding to previous studies, the results 
of Study 2.2 demonstrate that the effect is not affected by whether the behavior is 
recurring or is an isolated event; a male target’s gender stereotype-inconsistent 
behavior is seen as more positive regardless of whether the event occurs frequently or 
only once. Again there was no support for Hypothesis 1 that a female target’s gender 
stereotype-inconsistent would be seen as more acceptable than the same behavior of 
the male target. This provides evidence for the double standards explanation 
described previously. In short, whereas men can get away with gender stereotype-
inconsistent behavior, this is more difficult for women.  
Study 2.3 
The results of Studies 2.1.1, 2.1.2, and 2.2 showed that, in two different 
scenarios, male targets’ gender stereotype-inconsistent behaviors are seen as more 
acceptable than the same behavior of a female target. Conversely, female targets’ 
gender stereotype-inconsistent behaviors are not consistently more acceptable than 
the same behavior of a male target. Mediation patterns suggested this to be due to the 
fact that the gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior is seen as clever (Study 2.1.1, 
Study 2.2).  
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In order to more directly test the influence of cleverness on evaluations of 
individuals who engage in stereotype-inconsistent behaviors, cleverness is 
manipulated (rather than measured) in Study 2.3. This experimental causal chain 
design (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005) also allows us to reconcile the present 
findings with the literature on backlash effects (Rudman & Glick, 2001). We used a 
scenario previously used to demonstrate backlash (Costrich, Feinstein, Kidder, 
Marecek, & Pascale, 1975). In the original research, a female student who behaved 
aggressively (compared to a male student who behaved aggressively) and a male 
student who behaved passively (compared to a female student who behaved 
passively) faced backlash for breaking stereotypical gender roles (Costrich et al., 
1975).  
We expected to replicate that backlash effect and that gender stereotype-
inconsistent behavior will be seen as less acceptable than gender stereotype-
consistent behavior. However, this effect will reverse if participants are pointed to the 
fact that gender stereotype-inconsistency can be seen as clever. More specifically, we 
hypothesize that the behavior of a female target who behaves aggressively will be seen 
as more acceptable than the behavior of a male target who behaves aggressively 
(Hypothesis 1); conversely, the behavior of a male target who behaved passively will 
be seen as more acceptable than the behavior of a female target who behaves 
passively (Hypothesis 2). 
Method 
Participants and design. Participants were recruited on Amazon MTurk 
and participated in return for $0.30. A sample size of 300 was chosen a priori based 
on the parameters from the Study 2.1.1 (Cohen’s d = 0.48) with 95% power, but a 
total of 307 adult United States citizens (130 women, 177 men, Mage = 35.0 years, SD 
= 11.5 years) completed all study materials. Participants were randomly assigned to 
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one condition of a 2 (target gender: male target, female target) Χ 2 (scenario type: 
aggressive, passive) Χ 2 (framing: cleverness/trashiness frame, control frame) 
between-participants design. 
Materials. 
Scenario (independent variable). Participants read a scenario, adapted 
from Costrich et al. (1975). Specifically, in this scenario a student tries to get a better 
grade by approaching the student counselor and complains about having received a 
low grade. The student, who is either given a male name (Marc) or a female name 
(Mary), does so in either an aggressive manner (gender stereotype-consistent for men 
and stereotype-inconsistent for women) or in a passive manner (gender stereotype-
consistent for women and stereotype-inconsistent for men). The scenario in the 
cleverness/trashiness frame condition was adapted by pointing to the fact that gender 
stereotype-inconsistent behavior can be seen as clever (“Men (women) often behave 
aggressively (passively) and assertively (unassertively), but in this case the student 
decided to try something clever and creative, in other words, he (she) decided to act 
passively (aggressively) and unassertively (assertively) to try to get his (her) way”) 
and gender stereotype-consistent behavior as trashy (“Men (women) often behave 
aggressively (passively) and assertively (unassertively), and in this case the student 
decided to get his (her) way using the same, cheap strategy”), depending on 
condition. In the control condition, the same instruction as used by Costrich et al. 
(1975) was maintained.  
Cleverness and trashiness (manipulation check). As manipulation 
checks, the same measures of perceived cleverness (α = .92) and trashiness (α = .78) 
were used that were used as mediators in the previous studies. 
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Perceived acceptability (dependent variable). Participants completed 
the same seven-point measure of perceived acceptability of the target’s behavior as in 
the other studies.  
Results 
Manipulation check. For the purpose of the manipulation check the target 
gender and the scenario type factor were combined into a consistency factor. The 
scenario of the male target acting aggressive and the female target acting passive was 
coded as being gender stereotype-consistent, whereas the scenario of the male target 
acting passive and the female target acting aggressive was coded as being gender 
stereotype-inconsistent. It was expected that when the cleverness/trashiness frame 
was given the gender stereotype-consistent behavior was seen as more trashy and the 
gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior was seen as more clever, both compared to 
when no frame was given. 
A 2 (consistency type: consistent, inconsistent) Χ 2 (framing: 
cleverness/trashiness frame, control frame) between-participants ANOVA on the 
degree to which respondents thought the target’s behavior to be trashy showed a 
main effect of framing, F(1, 298) = 6.10, p = .01, η² = .02, that was qualified by a 
marginal significant interaction effect of framing and consistency type, F(1, 298) = 
3.57, p = .06, η² = .01. As expected, in the cleverness/trashiness frame condition (M 
= 4.08, SD = 1.23) gender stereotype-consistent behavior was seen as more trashy 
compared to the control frame condition (M = 3.46, SD = 1.12), t(149) = -3.28, p = 
.001, Cohen’s d = 0.54. Also as expected, for the gender stereotype-inconsistent 
behavior the cleverness/trashiness frame condition (M = 3.70, SD = 1.47) did not 
differ from the control frame condition (M = 3.62, SD = 1.16), t(149) = -0.39, p = .70, 
Cohen’s d = 0.06. No other main effect was significant (p’s > .45).  
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A 2 (consistency type: consistent, inconsistent) Χ 2 (framing: 
cleverness/trashiness frame, control frame) between-participants ANOVA on the 
degree to which respondents thought the target’s behavior to be clever did not show 
the expected interaction effect of framing and consistency type, F(1, 298) = 1.61, p = 
.21, η² = .005. For exploratory purposes simple effects were conducted. Although the 
means were in the expected direction, in the cleverness/trashiness frame condition 
(M = 3.36, SD = 1.53) gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior was not seen as more 
clever compared to the control frame condition (M = 3.01, SD = 1.43), t(149) = -1.48, 
p = .14, Cohen’s d = 0.24. As expected, for the gender stereotype-consistent behavior 
the cleverness/trashiness frame condition (M = 3.02, SD = 1.44) did not differ from 
the control frame condition (M = 2.96, SD = 1.32), t(149) = 0.28, p = .78, Cohen’s d = 
0.05. No other main effects were significant (p’s > .23).  
Perceived acceptability. A 2 (target gender: male target, female target) Χ 2 
(scenario type: aggressive, passive) Χ 2 (framing: cleverness/trashiness frame, 
control frame) Χ 2 (participant gender: male, female) between-participants ANOVA 
on the degree to which respondents thought the target’s behavior to be acceptable, 
showed a main effect of scenario type, F(1, 286) = 5.25, p = .02, η² = .02, and a main 
effect of target gender, F(1, 286) = 5.27, p = .02, η² = .02. More importantly, these 
main effects were qualified by the expected three-way interaction between target 
gender, scenario type, and framing, F(1, 286) = 4.59, p = .03, η² = .02. No other main 
or interaction effects were significant (p’s > .16). 
This three-way interaction was first analyzed by running a separate planned 
comparison for the control condition to test for a backlash effect (women being 
punished more for aggressive behavior than men for aggressive behavior). 
Participants found it marginally less acceptable for a female target to be aggressive 
(M = 3.49, SD = 1.33) than for a male target to show that same behavior (M = 4.14, 
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SD = 1.67), t(72) = 1.85, p = .07, Cohen’s d = 0.44. As expected, participants did not 
find it more acceptable for a female target (M = 4.38, SD = 1.31) than for a male 
target (M = 4.41, SD = 1.39) to show passive behavior, t(76) = 0.08, p = .93, Cohen’s d 
= 0.02. In other words, without being pointed to the potential cleverness of gender 
stereotype-inconsistent behavior, the same aggressive behavior by women was seen 
as (marginally) less acceptable than the same aggressive behavior by men, because it 
is gender stereotype-inconsistent for women but consistent for men, replicating the 
backlash effect found by Costrich et al. (1975). 
This three-way interaction was then analyzed by running a separate planned 
comparisons for the aggressive and the passive scenario type. For the aggressive 
scenario type we found that when no frame was given to participants the behavior of 
the female target (M = 3.49, SD = 1.33) was marginally less acceptable than the 
behavior of the male target (M = 4.14, SD = 1.67) as discussed above, p = .07. This 
effect was not present in the cleverness/trashiness framing condition: Specifically, 
providing the cleverness/trashiness frame reduced the backlash effect and 
participants did not find it less acceptable for a female target to behave in an 
aggressive manner (M = 3.81, SD = 1.79) compared to when a male target (M = 3.78, 
SD = 1.27) did so, t(72) = -0.08, p = .94, Cohen’s d = 0.02. Although again no support 
was found for Hypothesis 1 (the behavior a woman who behaves aggressively will be 
seen as more acceptable than that of a man who behaves aggressively), the results do 
seem to indicate that the cleverness frame increased the acceptability of the female 
target acting aggressively and the trashiness frame decreased the acceptability of the 
male target acting aggressively. 
For the passive scenario type when no frame was given to participants, the 
passive behavior of the female target (M = 4.38, SD = 1.31) was not seen as more 
acceptable as that of the male target (M = 4.41, SD = 1.39) as discussed above, p = 
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.93. However, in the cleverness/trashiness framing condition, participants found it 
more acceptable for a male target to use a passive approach (M = 4.39, SD = 1.37) 
compared to when a female target did so (M = 3.61, SD = 1.44), t(74) = 2.45, p = .02, 
Cohen’s d = 0.57. This supports Hypothesis 2 (the behavior a man who behaves 
passive will be seen as more acceptable than that of a woman who behaves passive). 
The results seem to suggest that the cleverness frame did not increase the 
acceptability of the male target acting passively, but that the trashiness frame did 
decrease the acceptability of the female target acting passively. 
General Discussion 
Four studies, using three different scenarios, showed that gender stereotype-
inconsistent behavior was seen as more acceptable than gender stereotype-consistent 
behavior with two caveats: (1) only for men, and (2) only if the behavior was seen as a 
clever and creative way to play with gender roles. More specifically, a male target 
using attractiveness (Study 2.1.1, Study 2.1.2, and Study 2.2) or passive behavior 
(Study 2.3) was seen as more clever, less trashy, and therefore more acceptable, than 
a female target who used the same (gender stereotype-consistent) behaviors. 
Contrary to expectations, the results were not replicated for female targets. Although 
Study 2.1.1 showed that a female target using dominance was seen as more clever, 
less trashy, and therefore more acceptable than a male target who used the same 
(gender stereotype-consistent) behavior, these results were not replicated in the other 
three studies. In those studies, gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior by a woman 
was not seen as more acceptable than the same (but gender stereotype-consistent) 
behavior by a man. However, there was also no backlash effect in Study 2.1.2 and 
Study 2.2. If there had been a backlash effect, then the gender stereotype-inconsistent 
behavior of the woman would be seen as less acceptable than similar behavior by a 
man, instead the gender-stereotype inconsistent behavior of the woman was seen as 
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just as acceptable as similar behavior of a man. In Study 2.3 as expected there was a 
backlash effect against a woman who behaves aggressively (i.e. her behavior was seen 
as less acceptable than the aggressive behavior of a man) but only when participants 
were not pointed to the fact that the behavior was clever. The backlash effect 
disappeared when exactly the same behavior was framed as creative and clever and 
thus provides support for the idea that a woman who engages in a clever gender 
stereotype-inconsistent behavior is less subject to backlash than a woman who 
engages in commonplace gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior. In other words, in 
all studies there was no backlash, although such a backlash effect is well-supported 
(Costrich et al., 1975; Moss-Racusin et al., 2010; Prentice & Carranza, 2002; Rudman 
& Glick, 2001; Thomas, 1959; Vingerhoets, 2011). These results suggest that women 
can engage in gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior without facing a gender 
penalty, with one important caveat–that their behavior is seen as a clever way to 
achieve an end goal. 
It is interesting to note that the results of these studies demonstrate a double 
standard in which it is easier for men to reap the benefits of acting in a gender 
stereotype-inconsistent manner than it is for women. This chapter shows that 
although women can evade the costs associated with acting in a gender stereotype-
inconsistent manner (if observers see that behavior as clever), they do not reap the 
benefits that men gain from doing so. That is, although it is not necessarily negative 
for women to behave in a way that is gender stereotype-inconsistent (if the behavior 
is clever), it is also not positive for them to do so--while for men, it is positive to act 
inconsistent with gender expectations. 
One explanation for these double standards comes from research into the 
psychological effects of social status and power, which has reliably demonstrated that 
people expect members of high-power groups, such as men (Eagly & Steffen, 1984; 
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Schneider, 2004), to behave in an objectively more variable and idiosyncratic way 
than women and other members of subordinate, low-power groups (Brauer, 2001; 
Guinote et al., 2002). As a result, members of dominant and superordinate groups 
are less expected to follow social norms. A position of elevated status and power is 
associated with reduced sensitivity to social norms (Galinsky et al., 2008; Johnson & 
Lammers, 2012) and an increased tendency to violate such social norms (Lammers et 
al., 2010; Piff et al., 2012). Members of high-status and high-power groups are 
allowed to more freely violate social norms, because norms serve to maintain the 
status quo between groups. Given that dominant groups occupy a privileged position, 
there is less need to restrain their behavior than there is to restrain the upward 
tendencies of subordinate groups (Dahrendorf, 1968; Glick & Fiske, 2001). As a 
result, social norms tend to be more strictly enforced for members of subordinate 
groups than for members of dominant groups (see also Foschi, 1996; 2000). Where 
gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior demonstrated by men is seen as playful and 
creative, gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior demonstrated by women may in the 
worst case be interpreted as an attempt at changing the status quo (Eagly & Steffen, 
1984; Westwood, 2002). This of course increases the threshold for deeming such 
behavior as acceptable. 
Heilman (2001) noted that evaluations of transgression of prescriptive norms 
(how men and women should behave) might be more difficult to influence than 
evaluations of transgressions of descriptive norms (what men and women are). This 
chapter shows that the interpretation of gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior as 
clever can be a contextual cue that changes the evaluation of the transgressions of a 
prescriptive norm. Rather than acting gender stereotype-inconsistent for the sake of 
merely acting inconsistent, the behavior is executed to deal with a situation or to 
achieve a certain goal. When such gender stereotype-inconsistent behaviors are 
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judged as clever or creative, these behaviors (transgressions of a prescriptive norm) 
will be seen as acceptable. 
There are some important limitations to the studies conducted in this chapter. 
In Study 2.3 explicit information that the behavior was trashy or clever was provided 
in the scenario. Possibly, this may have led to experimenter demand effects. If 
participants inferred that they were supposed to find clever behavior acceptable and 
trashy behavior unacceptable, then this may explain the results. Second, in all studies 
there was a closed and happy ending to the scenarios. We chose to provide such a 
closed ending in order to avoid any ambiguity and room for interpretation. Future 
research should investigate whether scenarios in which the outcome is unknown or 
negative lead to the same results. Finally, participants were given enough time to 
think about their opinion and no time pressure was posed upon them. It could be that 
under time pressure the gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior is seen as negative 
and therefore we do not find the same effects. We do note, however, that we did look 
at the immediate response in one (unreported) study and found similar results as 
presented here.  
In analyzing these results, participant gender was added as a factor. The 
results of Study 2.1.1 showed that female participants accepted gender stereotype-
inconsistent behavior more than male participants did. This finding fits with the 
notion that women have a stronger interest in a reversal or dissolution of traditional 
gender roles than men, because of their more disadvantaged position in the current 
status quo (Robnett et al., 2012). However, the results of Study 2.1.2 showed the 
opposite, while in Studies 2.2 and 2.3 no gender differences were found, in 
accordance with Heilman (2012) and Hyde (2005) who also found no gender 
differences in evaluations of psychological traits or judgments of gender violations. It 
is therefore not entirely clear whether participant gender plays a role in these issues. 
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An important contribution of the present chapter is that it focuses on the 
perception of gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior as clever and creative. This 
helps to explain why these findings might seem to contradict previous research 
showing that gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior is viewed negatively, as in the 
case of female targets who behaved in an arrogant manner (Prentice & Carranza, 
2002), or who were promiscuous (Thomas, 1959), or male targets who were modest 
(Moss-Racusin et al., 2010), or who cried in public (Vingerhoets, 2011). In these 
studies, gender-inconsistent behavior was evaluated more negatively than gender-
stereotypical behavior; however, in none of these studies did targets use gender 
stereotype-inconsistent behavior in a clever manner.  
Conclusion 
Although gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior is often seen as less 
acceptable, the results show that gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior can also be 
seen as more acceptable, if the behavior is clever. However, these effects were only 
found for male targets and not for female targets which suggests that double 
standards might play a role: Whereas men can reap the benefits of gender stereotype-
inconsistent behavior, this is not the case for women. These results qualify the 
dominant idea that people inherently dislike gender stereotype-inconsistency. When 
it comes to men using these gender roles in a clever way, gender stereotype-
inconsistency can also lead to more acceptance than gender stereotype-consistency. 
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CHAPTER 2  
APPENDIX 
 
Appendix 2A – Scenarios used in Studies 2.1.1 and 2.2 
 
Female target; Attractiveness scenario 
 
Sarah is an attractive 25-year-old woman who studies Geography at a local college. 
The scenario below describes an event that happened to Sarah last week. Please try to 
imagine it in as much detail as possible. Sarah is sitting in the subway when she 
realizes that she left her wallet at home. She has a monthly pass for the subway so 
normally she has a valid ticket, but today she finds herself without. In the distance 
she sees the conductor approaching and notices that he is a man in his thirties. Sarah 
knows that her excuses will not make him overlook the fact that she has no ticket, so 
she decides to use the power of attraction: She unties her hair, unbuttons the top 
button of her blouse, and quickly puts on some lip gloss. When the conductor is close 
to her, Sarah gives him her best smile and she tells him in her sexiest voice that this 
never happens to her, but that she just realized that she forgot her wallet and that she 
only has to ride the subway to the next stop. The conductor is evidently charmed by 
Sarah and turns a blind eye to her ticketlessness. 
 
Female target; Dominance scenario 
 
Sarah is an attractive 25-year-old woman who studies Geography at a local college. 
The scenario below describes an event that happened to Sarah last week. Please try to 
imagine it in as much detail as possible. Sarah is sitting in the subway when she 
realizes that she left her wallet at home. She has a monthly pass for the subway so 
normally she has a valid ticket, but today she finds herself without. In the distance 
she sees the conductor approaching and notices that he is a man in his thirties. Sarah 
knows that her excuses will not make him overlook the fact that she has no ticket, but 
luckily the conductor is a rather small and weak man who seems easy to intimidate. 
Sarah is a tall girl and she knows that some people indeed find her intimidating. 
When the conductor is close to her, Sarah stands upright, straightens her shoulders, 
and expands her chest to appear even taller. She tells him in her most authoritative 
voice that this never happens to her, but that she just realized that she forgot her 
wallet and that she only has to ride the subway to the next stop. The conductor is 
evidently impressed by Sarah and turns a blind eye to her ticketlessness. 
 
Male target; Attractiveness scenario 
 
Simon is an attractive 25-year-old man who studies Geography at a local college. The 
scenario below describes an event that happened to Simon last week. Please try to 
imagine it in as much detail as possible. Simon is sitting in the subway when he 
realizes that he left his wallet at home. He has a monthly pass for the subway so 
normally he has a valid ticket, but today he finds himself without. In the distance he 
sees the conductor approaching and notices that she is a woman in her 
thirties. Simon knows that his excuses will not make her overlook the fact that he has 
no ticket, so he decides to use the power of attraction: He combs his hair with his 
fingers, puts on his blazer, and quickly sprays on some cologne. When the conductor 
is close to him, Simon gives her his best smile and he tells her in his sexiest voice that 
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this never happens to him, but that he just realized that he forgot his wallet and that 
he only has to ride the subway to the next stop. The conductor is evidently charmed 
by Simon and turns a blind eye to his ticketlessness. 
 
Male target; Dominance scenario 
 
Simon is an attractive 25-year-old man who studies Geography at a local college. The 
scenario below describes an event that happened to Simon last week. Please try to 
imagine it in as much detail as possible. Simon is sitting in the subway when he 
realizes that he left his wallet at home. He has a monthly pass for the subway so 
normally he has a valid ticket, but today he finds himself without. In the distance he 
sees the conductor approaching and notices that she is a woman in her 
thirties. Simon knows that his excuses will not make her overlook the fact that he has 
no ticket, but luckily the conductor is a rather small and weak woman who seems easy 
to intimidate. Simon is a tall guy and he knows that some people indeed find him 
intimidating. When the conductor is close to him, Simon stands upright, straightens 
his shoulders, and expands his chest to appear even taller. He tells her in his most 
authoritative voice that this never happens to him, but that he just realized that he 
forgot his wallet and that he only has to ride the subway to the next stop. The 




Appendix 2B – Scenarios used in Study 2.1.2 
 
Female target; Attractiveness scenario 
 
After spending your vacation at the beach, you are waiting in an airplane for the 
doors to close and to start the flight. As this is the holiday period, the aircraft is filled 
with different types of people. The plane is being delayed by another passenger. This 
woman, who seems to be in her thirties, is standing near the door of the airplane that 
is still connected to the fixed walkway. She is clearly trying to persuade the male flight 
attendant to stop the plane from leaving, as her friend is still on the way to the gate 
and probably will not be there in time. The woman is using the power of attraction to 
charm the flight attendant into making the plane wait. This is obvious, as she is 
unbuttoning the top button of her blouse, and winks at and compliments the flight 
attendant. In the end, she succeeds and the plane waits for a couple more minutes 
before leaving. 
 
Female target; Dominance scenario 
 
After spending your vacation at the beach, you are waiting in an airplane for the 
doors to close and to start the flight. As this is the holiday period, the aircraft is filled 
with different types of people. The plane is being delayed by another passenger. This 
woman, who seems to be in her thirties, is standing near the door of the airplane that 
is still connected to the fixed walkway. She is clearly trying to persuade the male flight 
attendant to stop the plane from leaving, as her friend is still on the way to the gate 
and probably will not be there in time. The woman is using her stature and strong 
physique to impress the flight attendant into making the plane wait, stretching to 
look tall while only keeping minimal distance. In the end, she succeeds and the plane 
waits for a couple more minutes before leaving. 
 
Male target; Attractiveness scenario 
 
After spending your vacation at the beach, you are waiting in an airplane for the 
doors to close and to start the flight. As this is the holiday period, the aircraft is filled 
with different types of people. The plane is being delayed by another passenger. This 
man, who seems to be in his thirties, is standing near the door of the airplane that is 
still connected to the fixed walkway. He is clearly trying to persuade the female flight 
attendant to stop the plane from leaving, as his friend is still on the way to the gate 
and probably will not be there in time. The man is using the power of attraction to 
charm the flight attendant into making the plane wait. This is obvious, as he is 
constantly correcting his cuffs and tie, and winks at and compliments the flight 
attendant. In the end, he succeeds and the plane waits for a couple more minutes 
before leaving. 
 
Male target; Dominance scenario 
 
After spending your vacation at the beach, you are waiting in an airplane for the 
doors to close and to start the flight. As this is the holiday period, the aircraft is 
filled with different types of people. The plane is being delayed by another 
passenger. This man, who seems to be in his thirties, is standing near the door of the 
airplane that is still connected to the fixed walkway. He is clearly trying to persuade 
the female flight attendant to stop the plane from leaving, as his friend is still on the 
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way to the gate and probably will not be there in time. The man is using his stature 
and strong physique to impress the flight attendant into making the plane 
wait, stretching to look tall while only keeping minimal distance. In the end, he 
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predicts lower identification with feminism. Manuscript under review. 
56 
 
Despite more than a century of suffrage, progress toward women’s equality has 
been slow and incomplete. For example, women are twice as often illiterate than men 
(United Nations, 2010), and women are underrepresented in the top employment 
positions (The Economist, 2014; U.S. Department of Labor, 2010). In fact, only 15 of 
Fortune’s 500 largest corporations are run by female CEOs (Fortune, 2010). In 2009, 
the Financial Times Stock Exchange Indicator even observed a decline in the number 
of female executive directors in the top 100 companies on the London Stock 
Exchange with the highest market capitalization (Vinnicombe & Sealy, 2013). In 
Europe, while women are somewhat well represented in the parliaments (near 
26.4%), they still on average receive 15% less salary than men in Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] countries (The Economist, 2014). 
And whereas 42% of all PhD-students in Europe are female, only 13% of heads of 
higher education institutions in Europe are women (League of European Research 
Universities, 2012). 
To address these issues, it is important that more women identify with 
feminism. After all, collective action for female equality is key to facilitate progress 
toward gender equality. Identification with the group and commitment to that group 
are essential prerequisites for such collective action to occur (Ellemers et al., 1997; 
Kelly, 1993; Stürmer & Simon, 2004; Yoder et al., 2011). Identification with feminism 
is important because as long as women are unwilling to identify with feminism, they 
are unlikely to engage in the type of collective action that could be beneficial to them 
in the long run (Klandermans, 1997; Klandermans & Oegema, 1987).  
But women are often disinclined to openly identify with feminism. For 
example, when pop singer Katie Perry won the Billboard Women in Music Award 
2012, she stated in her acceptance speech: “I am not a feminist, but I do believe in the 
strength of women”. This was not an isolated incident. Many women who accept the 
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basic tenets of feminist ideology are nonetheless reluctant to call themselves 
feminists (Robnett et al., 2012). One study found that, although over 90% of women 
agreed with at least some tenets of feminist ideology, only 16.6% self-identified as 
feminist (Burn et al., 2000).  
The present chapter offers an explanation for why many women do not identify 
as a feminist – even if they agree with the basic tenets of feminist ideology; they see 
themselves as too dissimilar to (their stereotype of) feminists. In other words, the 
current chapter examines whether identification with feminism is predicted by the 
discrepancy between one’s self-view and one’s view of feminists. 
Why Do Women Not Identify as Feminists 
There are many reasons why women may not identify with feminism. Most 
obviously, a woman might not consider herself a feminist because she does not share 
feminist ideology; that is, some women do not endorse gender equality (Zucker, 
2004; Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2010). Other women might endorse gender equality, but 
not see it as a feminist issue; such women are less likely to identify with feminism 
than are those women who see equality as inseparable from feminist ideology (Fitz et 
al., 2012). Thirdly, women who have never been exposed to feminism, feminist ideas, 
or sexism are less likely to identify with feminism than women with more exposure 
(Leaper & Arias, 2011; Nelson et al., 2008; Reid & Purcell, 2004; Williams & Wittig, 
1997). A fourth reason is that women who do not believe in the benefits of collective 
action are less likely to identify with feminism than are women who do believe 
(Williams & Wittig, 1997). Finally, women who have negative evaluations of feminists 
are less likely to identify with feminism than women who have positive evaluations 
(Houvouras & Scott Carter, 2008; Leaper & Arias, 2011; Redford et al., 2015; Robnett 
et al., 2012). 
In this chapter, we offer an additional explanation, focusing on the discrepancy 
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(versus overlap) between one’s views of the self and one’s views of feminists. That is, 
we aim to examine whether women are not only disinclined to identify with feminism 
because of having a negative view of feminists, but also because their view of 
feminists may not match with how they view themselves.  
In investigating this question, we focus on self-feminist discrepancy on the 
dimensions of warmth and competence, which are the primary dimensions on which 
groups are evaluated and stereotyped (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008; Fiske, Cuddy, 
Glick, & Xu, 2002; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & 
Kashima, 2005; see also Eagly & Steffen, 1984, for evaluations of gender in specific). 
The sterotype content model (SCM; Fiske et al., 2002) also proposes that these 
evaluations are often mixed: A group that is seen as low in warmth (competence) is 
generally also seen as high in competence (warmth). However, there are also certain 
groups that are both seen as low in warmth and in competence (e.g., poor people) and 
groups that are both high in warmth and competence (e.g., middle class; Fiske et al., 
2002). Earlier literature has demonstrated that warmth and competence are also 
central dimensions for evaluation in people’s views of feminists (Berryman-Fink & 
Verderber, 1985; Reid & Purcell, 2004; Suter & Toller, 2006), and that feminists are 
seen as low in warmth but high in competence (Fiske et al., 2002).  
Discrepancy Magnitude 
In this chapter we first of all expect that the magnitude of the discrepancy 
between women’s self-view and their view of feminists will be related to lowered 
identification with feminism. In other words, we expect that seeing oneself as having 
trait X, but seeing feminists as lacking that same trait, or seeing oneself as lacking 
trait X, but feminists as having it, should lead to lowered identification. Support for 
this hypothesis comes from cognitive consistency theories that suggest that people 
strive for consistency between their beliefs, attitudes, identities, and other 
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psychological attributes (Briñol, Petty, & Wheeler, 2006; Festinger, 1957; Gawronski, 
Strack, & Bodenhausen, 2009; Heider, 1958; Howell, Gaither, & Ratliff, 2015; Nosek, 
Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002). Further support for this hypothesis comes from Social 
Categorization Theory (SCT; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) which 
states that groups are partially defined by their stereotypical attributes, and that 
people will self-categorize themselves as a group member in those groups for which 
the stereotypical representation and self-concept overlap (Hogg, 2003). In this way, 
both self-concept and stereotypes are important for predicting group membership.  
Discrepancy Direction 
In addition, we also expect that the direction of the discrepancy between 
women’s self-view and their view of feminists will relate to their identification with 
feminism. In other words, we expect that seeing oneself as being more positive than 
feminists should lead to less identification with feminism. Social Identity Theory 
postulates that people prefer to seek inclusion in groups that confer a positive identity 
on them and from which they can derive a positive self-view (Devos & Banaji, 2003; 
Van Knippenberg & Ellemers, 1990; Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Based on 
this we would expect that women will identify as feminists to a lesser extent if their 
self-view is more positive than their view of feminists.  
Importantly, we expect that the effects of discrepancy will be different for the 
two dimensions of warmth and competence. More specifically, we hypothesize that 
the magnitude of the discrepancy between one’s self-views and feminist-views 
should predict identification with feminism for both the warmth and competence 
dimensions, but also expected that the direction of the discrepancy should only 






One of the most defining gender stereotypes is that women are warm and, as 
such, women are expected to be warm (Abele, 2003; Bakan, 1966; Eagly, 1987; Eagly 
& Steffen, 1984; Fiske et al., 2002; Heilman, 2012; Kite, Deaux, & Haines, 2008; 
Lippa, 2001; Prentice & Carranza, 2002; White & Gardner, 2009). These stereotypes 
are so strong that women may even be penalized if they demonstrate insufficient 
interpersonal warmth (Burgess & Borgida, 1999; Rudman & Glick, 2001). Therefore, 
we expect that, because women want to be seen as warm, they will identify with a 
group—feminists, in this case—if they feel that the group is warm. If they think that 
feminists are colder than they themselves are, we expect that women will not want to 
be associated with the group at all, because doing so will not confer a positive identity 
(Prentice & Carranza, 2002; Tajfel, 1974; White & Gardner, 2009). Put another way, 
as long as a group is thought to be as warm as the self, women will feel positive about 
joining that group. However, if the group is thought to be colder than the self, women 
will not want to join that group on any account. Therefore, we predict that, on the 
warmth dimension, both the magnitude and the direction of the discrepancy between 
women’s self-view and their view of feminists will predict identification with 
feminism, meaning that women are disinclined to identify with feminists if they see 
themselves as different and in particular higher, in warmth. 
Competence 
For competence, we do not expect discrepancy direction to matter. Although 
warmth is considered an unequivocally positive trait for women, competence is not 
(Fiske et al., 2002; Prentice & Carranza, 2002). Whereas men are rewarded 
unconditionally for being competent, evaluations of competent women are more 
ambivalent (Abele, 2003; Bakan, 1966; Eagly & Steffen, 1984; Fiske et al., 2002; Kite 
et al., 2008; Lippa, 2001; Prentice & Carranza, 2002; Spence & Helmreich, 1972). On 
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the one hand, being competent is valuable as it suggests that women can deal with the 
challenges posed to them. The stereotypical perception of women is changing and 
slowly includes more and more competence traits that traditionally are associated 
with men (Diekman & Eagly, 2000; Diekman & Goodfriend, 2006). In addition sex 
differences on the masculine dimension of the Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI; Bem, 
1974) are decreasing over time, indicating that women are increasingly endorsing 
agency traits (Twenge, 1997; Spence & Buckner, 2000). On the other hand, there is 
no shortage of examples of situations in which competent women are evaluated 
negatively (Burgess & Borgida, 1999; Fiske, 1993; Heilman, 2001; 2012; Rudman & 
Glick, 2001; Powell, Butterfield, & Parent, 2002; White & Gardner, 2009). As a 
result, showing agency for women remains a balancing act, between looking 
incompetent and too competent (Cuddy 2009; Cuddy, Kohut, & Neffinger, 2013). For 
the competence dimension, we therefore expect that only the magnitude of the 
discrepancy between women’s self-view and their view of feminists predicts 
identification with feminism. In other words, we expect that women identify with 
feminists if they believe them to be equally competent as they, but not if they think 
feminists are less competent than they, or if they think they are more competent. 
After all, both a very competent and an incompetent group violates gender roles and 
is therefore unattractive in conferring a positive identity (Prentice & Carranza, 2002; 
Tajfel, 1974; White & Gardner, 2009).  
Chapter Overview 
In summary, we predict that for the warmth dimension, both the magnitude 
and the direction of the discrepancy between women’s self-view and their view of 
feminists predicts identification with feminism (following Social Identity Theory; 
Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), while for the competence dimension we expect 
that only the magnitude of the discrepancy between women’s self-view and their view 
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of feminists predicts identification with feminism (following consistency theory and 
Social Categorization Theory; Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1958; Turner et al., 1987). We 
test this in three studies, in which female participants rated themselves and rated 
feminists on a number of traits related to warmth and competence. Next, they 
completed the Self-Identification as a Feminist Scale (SIF; Szymanski, 2004). We 
then computed the magnitude of the discrepancy between self- and feminist-ratings 
(e.g., how differently warm or competent one sees themselves than feminists), and 
the direction of the discrepancy between self- and feminist ratings (i.e., is the 
difference because one sees the self as warmer or more competent because one sees 
the self as colder or less competent).  
The first study was exploratory in nature. In particular, a priori we only 
expected the magnitude of discrepancy to be relevant and not the direction. We 
therefore designed Studies 3.2 and 3.3 to replicate the findings from Study 3.1. 
Furthermore, in Study 3.3 we also aimed to demonstrate that self-feminist 
discrepancy predicts identification with feminism even after controlling for 
endorsement of feminist values. Although identification with feminism and holding 
feminist values are often conflated (Eisele & Stake, 2008; Hurt et al., 2007) they are 
not the same construct. There are women who do not identify as feminist because 
they do not hold feminist values (Zucker, 2004; Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2010), but it is 
likely that there are also women who do not identify as feminist despite holding 
feminist values (because of the described self-feminist discrepancy). Therefore, we 
believe that endorsement of feminst values is only part of the puzzle, and hypothesize 
that the discrepancy between women’s self-view and feminist view will predict 







Participants. Participants were female volunteers recruited at the website of 
Project Implicit (http://implicit.harvard.edu) who were randomly assigned to one of 
approximately ten studies in the research pool. The final sample of participants 
consisted of 387 adult female United States citizens (Mage = 32.1 years, SD = 13.5 
years). This sample size gives us 84% power to find the posteriori smallest effect (R2 
= .03; G*Power 3.1, Faul et al., 2009). 
Materials. 
Predictor measures: self- and feminist-ratings. To measure Self- and 
Feminist-Ratings, participants were given a list of 20 traits for which they rated 
themselves and their “general impression of feminists” on five-point-scales ranging 
from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely). The selection of items was based on combining 
items administered by Berryman-Fink and Verderber (1985), by Reid and Purcell 
(2004) and by Suter and Toller (2006). A factor analysis with Varimax rotation on 
the feminist-ratings and self-ratings yielded a Warmth subscale (concerned with 
appearance, attractive, fun, likeable, nurturing, and open-minded; αfeminist = .81; αself 
= .65) and a Competence subscale (ambitious, independent, intelligent, opinionated, 
and career-oriented; αfeminist = .81; αself = .73). Both subscales had Eigen values > 3 
and accounted for 42.8% of the variance. Nine items were dropped from the analyses 
due to lack of intercorrelation with other scale items. The same two scales were also 
construed for the self-ratings (here, the two factors accounted for 36.5% of the 
variance and had Eigen values > 1.7).  
Dependent measure: self-identification as a feminist. Participants 
completed the Self-Identification as a Feminist scale (α = .88; Szymanski, 2004), 
which consists of four items (“I consider myself a feminist; I identify myself as a 
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feminist to other people; feminist values and principles are important to me; I 
support the goals of the feminist movement”) rated on a five-point-scale ranging from 
1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The mean identification with feminism 
score was 3.33 (SD = 0.91). 
Procedure. Participants first rated their “general impression of feminists” on 
the 20 traits. All items were administered in random order. After completing these 
items, participants indicated for the same items how they rated themselves, also in 
random order. Then, participants completed the self-identification as a feminist 
scale. Participants also completed two exploratory Single-Category IAT’s (SC-IATs; 
Karpinski & Steinman, 2006)—one measuring identification with feminism and one 
measuring evaluations of feminists. The psychometric properties of these measures 
were poor (e.g., low reliabilities, large within-measure order effects) so we were not 
confident in analyzing those measures. 
Results 
Analytic Approach. Following earlier research (Briñol et al., 2006; Howell 
et al., 2015), we first computed two self-feminist discrepancy scores by subtracting 
the self-ratings from the feminist-ratings on each of the two stereotype dimensions 
(warmth and competence). Then, from each of those self-feminist discrepancy scores, 
we created two additional variables. Discrepancy Magnitude is the absolute value of 
the mean-centered discrepancy score; higher scores on this variable indicate that the 
participant sees herself as more different from feminists. Discrepancy Direction was 
created by coding -1 when feminist-ratings were lower than self-ratings, 0 when 
feminist- and self-ratings were equal, and +1 when feminist-ratings were higher than 
self-ratings. We also computed the Magnitude*Discrepancy interaction by 
multiplying the discrepancy magnitude and discrepancy direction scores. This allows 
us to test whether the effect of discrepancy magnitude on identification depends on 
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the direction of that discrepancy. Next, we ran two regression analyses to test 
whether identification with feminism was predicted by the magnitude of the 
discrepancy between feminist-ratings and self-ratings, the direction of the 
discrepancy between feminist-ratings and self-ratings, and the interaction between 
magnitude and direction. We did that for warmth and competence separately. 
Warmth. Of the 387 women, 80 (21%) saw themselves as less warm than 
feminists, 44 (11%) saw themselves as equally warm, and 259 (67%) saw themselves 
as warmer than feminists. The mean warmth score for feminists was 3.25 (SD = 
0.64), for the self-ratings the mean warmth score was 3.67 (SD = 0.49), and the mean 
difference score was -0.41 (SD = 0.68).  
The overall model was significant, F(3, 379) = 26.26, p < .001, and explained 
17% of the variance. Direction of the discrepancy between Feminist-Warmth and Self-
Warmth ratings significantly predicted identification with feminism, B = 0.26, SE = 
0.06, β = .24, t(379) = 4.56, p < .001. The magnitude of that discrepancy was not a 
significant predictor of identification, B = -0.12, SE = 0.16, β = -.07, t(379) = -0.73, p 
= .47. More importantly, as expected these results were qualified by a significant 
interaction between magnitude and direction in predicting identification with 
feminism, B = 0.47, SE = 0.17, β = .25, t(379) = 2.77, p = .006.  
 A simple slopes analysis, performed to interpret that interaction effect, shows 
that, for women who saw feminists are less warm than themselves (higher Self-
Warmth than Feminist-Warmth ratings) there was a significant negative relationship 
between the magnitude of self-feminist discrepancy on identification with feminism, 
B = -0.60, SE = 0.09, β = -.34, t(335) = -6.45, p < .001. But, for those women who 
saw feminists as warmer than themselves (lower Self-Warmth than Feminist-Warmth 
ratings), there was no relationship between discrepancy magnitude and identification 
with feminism, B = 0.22, SE = 0.36, β = .12, t(335) = 0.60, p = .55. To conclude, 
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women identified less strongly with feminism if they saw feminists as less warm than 
themselves and the larger this discrepancy was the less likely they were to identify. If, 
however, women saw feminists as warmer than themselves, there was no relationship 
between the size of that discrepancy and identification.  
Competence. Of the 387 women, 233 (60%) saw themselves as less 
competent than feminists, 53 (14%) saw themselves as equally competent, and 97 
(25%) saw themselves as more competent than feminists. The mean competence 
score for feminists was 4.00 (SD = 0.59), for the self-ratings the mean competence 
score was 3.76 (SD = 0.57), and the mean difference score was 0.25 (SD = 0.67).  
The overall model was significant, F(3, 379) = 4.51, p = .004, and explained 3% 
of the variance. As expected, the magnitude of the discrepancy between Feminist-
Competence ratings and Self-Competence ratings significantly predicted 
identification with feminism, B = -0.38, SE = 0.11, β = -.19, t(379) = -3.63, p < .001, 
meaning that the larger the discrepancy that women experienced in the degree to 
which they see themselves and the degree to which they see feminists as competent, 
the less likely they were to self-identify as a feminist. As also expected, there was no 
relationship between discrepancy direction and identification with feminism, B = -
0.00, SE = 0.06, β = -.00, t(379) = -0.04, p = .97, and also no relationship between 
the interaction of magnitude and discrepancy and identification with feminism, B = 
0.05, SE = 0.12, β = .03, t(379) = 0.45, p = .65. In summary, women were less likely 
to identify as feminist to the extent that they saw themselves as differently competent 
than feminists, regardless of whether that was because they saw themselves as more 
or as less competent than they saw feminists. 
Study 3.2 
The results from Study 3.1 support the general hypothesis that discrepancy 
between one’s views of feminist and views of the self is related to lowered 
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identification with feminism. More specifically, the more women see themselves as 
overlapping with feminists on the competence dimension, the more strongly they 
self-identify as a feminist. This is true regardless of whether they see themselves as 
more or less competent than feminists. On the other hand, the more women see 
feminists as colder than themselves, the less likely they are to self-identify as a 
feminist. If they see feminists as warmer than themselves, feminist identification is 
not related to the self-feminist discrepancy. We did not expect this prior to running 
Study 3.1 as the first study was exploratory in nature, and therefore we designed 
Study 3.2 to replicate the findings from Study 3.1 with a different sample of 
participants. 
Method 
Participants. Participants were recruited on Amazon MTurk and 
participated in return for $0.40. At the beginning of the study, participants were 
given an instructional manipulation check that was designed to screen out inattentive 
participants as recommended by Oppenheimer et al. (2009). Data from 25 
participants were a priori eliminated on the basis of this check. In total, 288 adult 
female United States citizens (Mage = 32.7 years, SD = 11.3 years) completed all study 
materials. This sample size gives us 83% power to find the posteriori smallest effect 
(R2 = .04; G*Power 3.1, Faul et al., 2009). 
Materials and Procedure. The materials and procedure were identical to 
those presented in Study 3.1. The reliability of the self-ratings and feminist-ratings 
subscales was also comparable: Warmth (αfeminist = .87; αself = .73) and Competence 
(αfeminist = .81; αself = .74). The reliability of the Self-Identification as a Feminist scale 






Warmth. Of the 288 women, 66 (23%) saw themselves as less warm than 
feminists, 30 (10%) saw themselves as equally warm, and 191(66%) saw themselves 
as warmer than feminists. The mean warmth score for feminists was 2.92 (SD = 
0.76), for the self-ratings the mean warmth score was 3.45 (SD = 0.61), and the mean 
difference score was -0.53 (SD = 0.90).  
The overall model was significant, F(3, 282) = 36.21, p < .001, and explained 
28% of the variance. Similar to the results found in Study 3.1, direction of the 
discrepancy between Feminist-Warmth ratings and Self-Warmth ratings was a 
significant predictor of identification with feminism, B = 0.50, SE = 0.08, β = .37, 
t(283) = 6.38, p < .001. The magnitude of that discrepancy was not a significant 
predictor, B = -0.10, SE = 0.14, β = -.06, t(283) = -0.75, p = .46. As expected and as in 
Study 3.1, these results were qualified by a significant interaction between magnitude 
and direction in predicting identification with feminism, B = 0.56, SE = 0.14, β = .31, 
t(283) = 3.90, p < .001. 
A simple slopes analysis shows that, for women who saw feminists as less 
warm than themselves (Self-Warmth higher than Feminist-Warmth ratings), there 
was a significant negative relationship between discrepancy magnitude on 
identification with feminism, B = -0.65, SE = 0.09, β = -.40, t(252) = -6.89, p < .001. 
But, for those women who saw feminists as warmer than themselves (Self-Warmth 
lower than Feminist-Warmth ratings), there was no relationship between discrepancy 
magnitude on identification with feminism, B = 0.50, SE = 0.27, β = .31, t(252) = 
1.85, p = .07.  
Competence. Of the 288 women, 199 (69%) saw themselves as less 
competent than feminists, 29 (10%) saw themselves as equally competent, and 59 
(21%) saw themselves as more competent than feminists. The mean competence 
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score for feminists was 3.96 (SD = 0.65), for the self-ratings the mean competence 
score was 3.45 (SD = 0.71), and the mean difference score was 0.52 (SD = 0.79). 
The overall model was again significant, F(3, 282) = 4.22, p = .006, and 
explained 4% of the variance. As expected, magnitude of the discrepancy between 
Feminist-Competence ratings and Self-Competence ratings was a significant 
predictor of identification with feminism, B = -0.48, SE = 0.17, β = -.25, t(282) = -
2.79, p = .006, such that participants were less likely to self-identify as a feminist to 
the extent that the magnitude of the discrepancy between the Feminist-Competence 
ratings and Self-Competence ratings was larger. Unexpectedly, there was also an 
effect of the direction of that discrepancy on identification with feminism, B = 0.23, 
SE = 0.09, β = .17, t(282) = 2.52, p = .01, as such that women who see feminists as 
more competent than themselves are more likely to identify than women who see 
themselves as more competent than feminists. There was no relationship between the 
interaction of magnitude and discrepancy and identification with feminism, B = 0.15, 
SE = 0.19, β = .07, t(282) = 0.80, p = .43.  
Study 3.3 
Studies 3.1 and 3.2 showed that discrepancy is predictive of identification with 
feminism and support the hypothesis that women identify more strongly with 
feminism to the extent that they see themselves as overlapping with feminists in 
warmth and competence. Confirming our hypotheses, the results also indicate that 
the direction of discrepancy predicts identification with feminism only for the 
warmth dimension – if women see themselves as more warm than feminists, a larger 
discrepancy between themselves and feminist-stereotype is related to less 
identification with feminism; if women see themselves as less warm than feminists, 
feminist identification is unrelated to the magnitude of the discrepancy. The results 
of Study 3.2 replicate Study 3.1 in a different participant sample. The purpose of 
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Study 3.3 was to replicate the previous results and to show that discrepancy predicts 
identification while controlling for endorsement of feminist values. Therefore, in this 
study participants were asked to indicate their agreement to three feminist values.  
Method 
Participants. Participants were recruited on Amazon MTurk and 
participated in return for $0.45. In total, 116 adult female United States citizens (Mage 
= 35.3 years, SD = 10.6 years) completed all study materials. This sample size gives us 
68% power to find the posteriori smallest effect (R2 = .07; G*Power 3.1, Faul et al., 
2009). 
Materials. 
Predictor measures. Materials were identical to those presented in Study 
3.1 and 3.2 and the reliability was also comparable: Warmth (αfeminist = .86; αself = 
.75), Competence (αfeminist = .77; αself = .74). In addition we measured endorsement of 
feminist values by means of the 3 items of the Feminist Beliefs and Behavior measure 
(Zucker, 2004; Fitz et al., 2012; “Women and men should be paid equally for the 
same work”, “Women’s unpaid work should be more socially valued”, “Girls and 
women have not been treated as well as boys and men in our society”). 
Dependent measures. Participants completed the Self-Identification as a 
Feminist scale (α = .92; Szymanski, 2004). The mean identification with feminism 
score was 2.73 (SD = 1.05). 
Procedure. Participants first rated their “general impression of feminists” on 
the 20 traits. All items were administered in random order. After completing these 
items, participants indicated for the same items how they rated themselves, also in 
random order. Then, participants completed the self-identification as a feminist scale 





Warmth. Of the 116 women, 27 (23.3%) saw themselves as less warm than 
feminists, 10 (8.6%) saw themselves as equally warm, and 77 (66.4%) saw themselves 
as warmer than feminists. The mean warmth score for feminists was 2.76 (SD = 
0.79), for the self-ratings the mean warmth score was 3.41 (SD = 0.65), and the mean 
difference score was -0.65 (SD = 0.94).  
The overall model was significant, F(3, 110) = 18.48, p < .001, and explained 
34% of the variance. Similar to the results found in Study 3.1 and 3.2, the direction of 
the discrepancy between Feminist-Warmth ratings and Self-Warmth ratings was a 
significant predictor of identification with feminism, B = 0.69, SE = 0.15, β = .56, 
t(110) = 4.54, p < .001. The magnitude of that discrepancy was not a significant 
predictor, B = 0.13, SE = 0.27, β = .09, t(110) = 0.49, p = .63. As expected and as in 
Study 3.1 and 3.2, these results were qualified by a significant interaction between 
magnitude and direction in predicting identification with feminism, B = 0.65, SE = 
0.29, β = .39, t(110) = 2.26, p = .03. 
A simple slopes analysis shows that, for women who saw feminists as less 
warm than themselves (Self-Warmth higher than Feminist-Warmth ratings), there 
was a significant negative relationship between discrepancy magnitude on 
identification with feminism, B = -0.51, SE = 0.14, β = -.36, t(110) = -3.79, p < .001. 
But, for those women who saw feminists as warmer than themselves (Self-Warmth 
lower than Feminist-Warmth ratings), there was a marginal relationship between 
discrepancy magnitude on identification with feminism, B = 0.88, SE = 0.45, β = .61, 
t(110) = 1.95, p = .05.  
Endorsement of feminist values was added to the model and accounted for an 
additional 6.6% of the variance, ΔR2 = .07, ΔF(1, 109) = 12.07, p = .001; B = 1.22, SE 
= 0.35, β = .27, t(109) = 3.48, p = .001. Magnitude of the discrepancy between 
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Feminist-Warmth ratings and Self-Warmth ratings was again not a significant 
predictor of identification with feminism, B = 0.18, SE = 0.26, β = -.12, t(109) = 0.67, 
p = .50. More importantly, the effect of discrepancy direction on identification with 
feminism remained significant, B = 0.66, SE = 0.15, β = .53, t(109) = 4.52, p < .001, 
and the interaction of magnitude and discrepancy on identification with feminism 
turned marginally significant, B = 0.56, SE = 0.28, β = .33, t(109) = 2.02, p = .05.  
Competence. Of the 116 women, 83 (71.6%) saw themselves as less 
competent than feminists, 6 (5.2%) saw themselves as equally competent, and 25 
(21.6%) saw themselves as more competent than feminists. The mean competence 
score for feminists was 3.96 (SD = 0.63), for the self-ratings the mean competence 
score was 3.39 (SD = 0.69), and the mean difference score was 0.57 (SD = 0.86). 
The overall model was again significant, F(3, 110) = 2.92, p = .04, and 
explained 7% of the variance. Unexpectedly and in contrast to the results found in 
Study 3.1 and 3.2, magnitude of the discrepancy between Feminist-Competence 
ratings and Self-Competence ratings was not a significant predictor of identification 
with feminism, B = -0.45, SE = 0.24, β = -.27, t(110) = -1.92, p = .06. There was an 
effect of discrepancy direction on identification with feminism, B = 0.36, SE = 0.13, β 
= .28, t(110) = 2.71, p = .008, as such that women who see feminists as more 
competent than themselves are more likely to identify than women who see 
themselves as more competent than feminists. There was no relationship between the 
interaction of magnitude and discrepancy and identification with feminism, B = 0.21, 
SE = 0.25, β = .11, t(110) = 0.83, p = .41.  
Endorsement of feminist values was added to the model and accounted for an 
additional 17.1% of the variance, ΔR2 = .17, ΔF(1, 109) = 24.60, p < .001; B = 1.96, SE 
= 0.40, β = .44, t(109) = 4.96, p < .001. Magnitude of the discrepancy between 
Feminist-Competence ratings and Self-Competence ratings was again not a 
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significant predictor of identification with feminism, B = -0.35, SE = 0.22, β = -.20, 
t(109) = -1.61, p = .11, and there was again no relationship between the interaction of 
magnitude and discrepancy on identification with feminism, B = -0.13, SE = 0.24, β = 
-.07, t(109) = -0.56, p = .58. The effect of discrepancy direction on identification with 
feminism remained significant, B = 0.28, SE = 0.12, β = .22, t(109) = 2.35, p = .02.  
Discussion 
In summary, these results replicate Study 3.1 and 3.2 by showing that women 
identify less with feminists if they see feminists as less warm than themselves. 
However, in this study we find that women identify more as a feminist if they see 
feminists as more competent than themselves. In addition, endorsement of feminist 
values significantly predicted identification with feminism, but discrepancy predicted 
feminist identification even when statistically controlling for endorsement of feminist 
values. These results provide evidence that self-feminist discrepancy has predictive 
power, above and beyond feminist values alone, in understanding identification with 
feminism. 
General Discussion 
Three studies supported the hypothesis that greater discrepancy between 
women’s self-view and feminist-view on two dimensions—warmth and competence—
is related to weaker identification with feminism. For the warmth dimension, the 
direction of the discrepancy plays an important moderating role. More specifically, 
the magnitude of self-feminist discrepancy predicts identification with feminism for 
those women who see feminists as being less warm than the self, but not for women 
who see feminists as being warmer than the self. For competence, only the magnitude 
of the discrepancy predicts identification with feminism and the direction of the 
discrepancy is irrelevant; women identify less with feminism to the extent that they 
see themselves as differently competent than feminists, regardless whether that is 
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more or less competent than feminists.  
In all studies the explained variance was larger for the discrepancy between 
women’s self-views and feminist views of warmth (17%, 28%, and 34% in Studies 3.1-
3.3, respectively) than for the discrepancy of competence (3%, 4%, and 7%, 
respectively). This difference in explained variance is most likely due to the fact that 
whereas warmth is seen an unequivocally positive trait for women, competence is 
more ambivalent. Thus whereas it is very clear for women that they should not want 
to identify with feminists who for them are lacking warmth, differences in 
competence have more ambiguous implications. This also suggests that interventions 
targeting stereotypes of feminists as being cold can be particularly effective. Not only 
will they avoid the risk of backfiring—as might be the case for competence, given that 
women may not identify as feminists if they see feminists as too competent—but also 
will these interventions based on warmth be likely to produce the strongest effect. 
Developing such interventions to increase identification with feminism can be 
very helpful for women—both as individuals and as a collective. It can improve 
outcomes for women collectively, given that identification as a feminist can also lead 
to individuals’ willingness to engage in collective action and seek to improve the 
status of women (Klandermans, 1997; Klandermans & Oegema, 1987). At the 
individual level, identification with feminism is important because it is related to a 
variety of positive outcomes. Women who self-identify as feminists experience higher 
personal self-efficacy than women who do not—even if they do endorse feminist 
attitudes (Eisele & Stake, 2008). They also have better coping responses, such as 
seeking social support when confronted with sexism or sexual harassment (Leaper & 
Arias, 2011), they have better psychological well-being (Saunders & Kashubeck-West, 
2006), and they experience less body shame, engage less in body surveillance, show 
less symptoms of depression, and enjoy higher self-esteem (Hurt et al., 2007). 
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Finally, self-reported feminist identification positively predicts relationship health, 
relationship stability, and sexual satisfaction among women and among men with 
feminist partners (Backus & Mahalik, 2011; Rudman & Phelan, 2007; Yoder et al., 
2007). In sum, we believe it is important to increase identification with feminism and 
feel that the current results, that help to get a better understanding of the 
psychological dynamic behind identification with feminism, are important. 
The results of Study 3.3 also show that the discrepancy between women’s self-
views and feminist views predicts identification with feminism while controlling for 
endorsement of feminist values. Feminist values are certainly an important piece of 
feminist identification, explaining 6.6% (warmth) and 17.1% (competence) of the 
variance in identification with feminism. Endorsement of feminist values is related to 
greater identification with feminism. However, discrepancy between self-ratings and 
feminist-ratings is important above and beyond feminist values, predicting an 
additional 7% (competence) and 34% (warmth) in the variance in identification with 
feminism. Study 3.3 shows that there are different pieces of the puzzle why women do 
not identify with feminism: Both endorsement of feminist values and discrepancy 
between self-ratings and feminist-ratings are important in predicting identification 
with feminism. We believe these two predictors may tap into different components of 
social identification (Ellemers, Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 1999). On the one hand 
there is the reasoned and cold cognitive explanation about perceived disagreement on 
the values that feminism endorses. On the other hand there is the hot emotional 
explanation about discrepancy between one’s self-views and one’s feminist views that 
is based on people’s feelings. These two components work together to predict 
identification with feminism. 
Based on our findings, we believe that future research should examine how the 
changing status of feminists influences women’s identification with feminism. Prior 
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research shows that the status of the group is important in identification (Doosje, 
Spears, & Ellemers, 2002; Ellemers et al., 1997), such that people are more likely to 
identify with higher-status groups than lower-status groups. In contemporary society, 
feminists are generally viewed as a low status group (Houvouras & Carter, 2008; 
Leaper & Arias, 2011; Robnett et al., 2012). It is possible that this low status explains, 
in part, why women do not identify (Doosje et al., 2002; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 
2002). However, as more and more high-status women—Beyoncé, Taylor Swift, 
Emma Watson—openly self-identify as feminists (Duca, 2014; Gray, 2014; UN 
Women, 2014), the status of the group could rise. And if group status of feminists is 
rising, women should have more positive evaluations of the group, leading to greater 
identification. 
Purely theoretically, feminism is an interesting group to study because it is 
ambivalent—women might endorse gender equality but feel that the stereotype of 
feminists does not fit them. We might expect that the same process would be at work 
with other such ambivalent groups. For example, someone might have a favorable 
attitude toward science, but only identify as a scientist—and possibly only choose a 
science-oriented career—if there is little discrepancy between their self-views and 
their view of scientists. Future research could explore this idea that, to the extent that 
one is ambivalent toward a group, the discrepancy between self-views and group-
views will predict identification.  
Conclusion 
The present chapter demonstrates that women’s self-view is an important 
factor in predicting identification with feminism and one that explains more variance 
than purely endorsement with feminist values. Specifically, the discrepancy between 
women’s self-view and women’s view of feminists strongly predicts their 
identification with feminists, so that women identify more with feminists if they see 
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feminists as warmer or as similarly competent than themselves. These findings are 
important in understanding why some women fail to identify with feminists and—
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Many women who have feminist beliefs do not explicitly identify as feminists 
(Burn et al., 2000; Robnett et al., 2012). This reluctance is problematic because 
identification with feminism is crucial for engaging in collective action to achieve 
progress toward gender equality (Ellemers et al., 1997; Kelly, 1993; Klandermans, 
1997; Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; Nelson et al., 2008; Stürmer & Simon, 2004; 
Yoder et al., 2011). In addition, identification with feminism can have beneficial 
individual effects for women, such as greater relationship health, stability, and sexual 
satisfaction (Rudman & Phelan, 2007), better mechanisms for coping with sexism 
(Leaper & Arias, 2011), and higher self-efficacy (Eisele & Stake, 2008). It is therefore 
important to understand why women are so reluctant to identify themselves as 
feminists. In the current chapter, we explore one reason why women may make a 
deliberate choice not to identify as a feminist—because labeling themselves restricts 
their view of themselves as an independent actor.  
This idea is inspired by the notion of motivated independence, which has been 
used in political science to explain why so many voters are unwilling to explicitly 
identify with a single party (Hawkins & Nosek, 2012; Pew Research Center, 2010; 
Wattenberg, 1981). Motivated independence is the notion that some people want to 
be independent actors: They value individualism and objectivity, do not want to be 
constrained by groups or social movements, and want to be seen as independent 
thinkers rather than making their judgments based on group membership (Dennis, 
1988b; Hawkins & Nosek, 2012). Around 34-40% of the American voters do not 
identify with either the Democratic or the Republican Party (or a third party), but 
instead call themselves independents (Hawkins & Nosek, 2012). These independent 
voters are, in fact, motivated to be independent; it is not merely that they do not 
consider themselves Republican or Democrat, but they make a deliberate choice to 
identify as independent. For example, over two thirds of these voters agree with 
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statements that they “do not like to label themselves”, “are independent by nature”, 
and “prefer to think for themselves” (Hawkins & Nosek, 2012) and they overtly self-
identify as an independent because they positively identify themselves with the 
“citizenly ideal of independence” (Dennis, 1988a).  
The strive to become autonomous and to exercise free will is growing and 
people want responsibility across all kinds of contexts of life—not merely in politics 
(Dennis, 1988b). These feelings of motivated independence may be further 
strengthened by the fact that, in Western cultures, individualism is seen as a sign of 
success, emancipative values are encouraged (Hofstede et al., 2010; Tajfel & Turner, 
1979; Welzel & Inglehart, 2010), and objectivity and independence are valued 
(Hawkins & Nosek, 2012). We propose that, in general, identification with a group—
as for instance feminists—violates feelings of independence and individualism. The 
motivation to be independent in combination with this violation will, as a result, lead 
to people disidentifying with feminism. 
In this chapter, we thus propose that the desire for motivated independence 
might hold not only for disidentification with political parties, but also for 
disidentification with feminism. When female celebrities are asked about feminism, 
their answers often imply such motivated independence: For example, Beyoncé said 
(before she declared herself a feminist at the VMA 2014): “Why do you have to choose 
what type of woman you are? Why do you have to label yourself anything?” 
(Sheridan, 2013) and Carrie Underwood said: “I wouldn’t go so far as to say I am a 
feminist, […]. My parents raised me to be pretty independent.” (Bang Showbiz, 2012). 
The only female CEO of a Dutch stock market listed company also states: “I don’t 
believe in labeling. […] I see myself as me.” (Bijlsma, 2014). Empirical evidence for 
this idea of motivated independence is also found in the analysis of qualitative 
interviews about identification with feminism in which participants showed a general 
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unwillingness to label themselves (e.g. “I’m not a big labels person”; Suter & Toller, 
2006). In addition, women who do not label themselves a feminist but do endorse 
feminist values tend to endorse more individualistic values than women who do label 
themselves feminist (Bay-Cheng & Zucker, 2007).  
Importantly, feminism has led to the empowerment of women in which 
empowerment is defined as “a process by which individuals with lesser power gain 
control over their lives and influence the organizational and societal structures within 
which they live” (Segal, Silverman, & Temkin, 1995, p. 215). Women have increased 
self-esteem, self-efficacy, and power and control over resources (Bay-Cheng, 2012; 
Peterson, Grippo, & Tantleff-Dunn, 2008; Riger, 1993). This road to economic 
independence might also lead to feelings of motivated independence because women 
do not want to be seen as part of group but as an individual that can pull her own 
weight. The positive consequences of feminism—women getting empowered and 
becoming economically independent—can have the ironic result of women identifying 
less with feminism just because they are motivated to be independent. This idea is 
supported by research showing that feelings of power increase the feelings of self-
sufficiency (Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten, 2012). 
Further inspiration for the idea that motivated independence might occur with 
feminism comes from the literature on social identity. The idea of social identity 
theory (SIT; Tajfel, 1974) is that an individual’s self-concept is based on the groups 
that the individual belongs to and on the knowledge, attitudes, value, and emotions 
that go with that group membership. Regarding feminism, labeling oneself as part of 
a larger collective stresses group membership—feminist—at the expense of individual 
identity—me—which can have positive effects on self-esteem (Tajfel, 1974). If, 
however, individual identity—independence—is valued more than collective identity–
feminism–, then identifying with a group does not bring any positive self-esteem and 
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hence, self-labeling will be reduced (see also Green (2004) for social identity in 
relation to political independents). 
Finally, the relation between motivated independence and identifying as a 
feminist is driven by the literature on psychological reactance. Psychological 
reactance is an aversive state experienced as a result of the perception that one’s 
freedom and autonomy are being constrained (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981). 
Women eschew the feminist label (Suter & Toller, 2006) because they feel that 
labeling themselves as a feminist limits their individual freedom. This reasoning is 
strengthened by the idea that when identifying with a certain group you have to 
behave according to the social norms of that group (Hogg, 2003; Tajfel & Turner, 
1986). 
To sum up, we expect that women’s motivation to be independent is negatively 
related to identification with feminism, and that an increase in motivated 
independence is related to less feminist identification. Study 4.1 examines reasons for 
not identifying with feminism among Dutch students who state that they are not 
feminists, showing that motivated independence is an important reason for not 
identifying. Study 4.2 replicates these results and further supports this idea with 
analyses of motivated independence predicting the extent of feminist identification as 
a continuous variable. Study 4.3 uses an experimental design in which independence 
is manipulated and identification with feminism and agreement with a feminist 
message is measured.  
Study 4.1: Motivated Independence 
 Before testing the underlying mechanism or the model to explain a 
phenomenon, it is central to give a description of the properties of a phenomenon 
(Rozin, 2001) and thus explaining the functional relationship between variables is 
valuable in itself (Rozin, 2009). In Study 4.1 we therefore merely measured whether 
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people identified as a feminist and what the reasons were if they did not identify as a 
feminist. We hypothesized that motivated independence would be an important 
reason—the reason that would be endorsed most—to not identify as a feminist. In 
addition, we measured three other potential reasons for not identifying with 
feminism: perceived disagreement with feminist values, negativity toward feminism 
and feminists, and potential for social rejection.  
Method 
Participants and design. Dutch participants were recruited on Facebook 
and participated voluntarily. As many participants as possible were recruited in the 
period of one week. In total 153 participants completed the survey. Of those, 114 
participants (43 male, 71 female, Mage = 33.4, SD = 17.5) indicated that they did not 
identify as a feminist and therefore completed the statements about not identifying as 
a feminist.  
Materials and procedure. Participants were first asked whether they self-
identified as a feminist. Participants who did not identify were asked to rate 34 
statements on a five-point-scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree) about why they were not willing to identify as a feminist (adapted from earlier 
studies; Alexander & Ryan, 1997; Hall & Rodriguez, 2003; Hawkins & Nosek, 2012; 
Liss & Erchull, 2010; Riley & Scharff, 2012; Roy et al., 2007; Suter & Toller, 2006; 
Twenge & Zucker, 1999; Williams & Wittig, 1997). The underlying structure of the 34 
statements was analyzed with a factor analysis with Varimax rotation. Four factors 
(with Eigen values > 2) were identified as underlying the used traits and accounted 
for 45.0% of the variance. Reliability analyses showed four reliable scales with a total 
of 18 items.4 Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 4.1. 
                                                          





Descriptive statistics in Study 4.1 
 
 M (SD) 
Motivated independence  
 I’d rather think for myself than support the beliefs of 
an ideology-based group 
3.89 (1.05) 
 I find it more important to be independent than to 
belong to an ideology-based group 
3.75 (0.92) 
 I do not want to commit myself to a certain belief 3.61 (1.08) 
 It is natural for me to resist being pigeonholed (being 
labeled or categorized) 
3.61 (1.07) 
 I dislike ideology-based groups in general  2.85 (0.94) 
Negativity toward feminism and feminists  
 I see feminists as a group of women who are unable 
to solve their own personal problems 
2.73 (1.26) 
 I dislike feminists  2.39 (1.16) 
 I dislike feminism 2.35 (1.12) 
 I am offended when someone calls me a feminist 2.76 (1.14) 
Perceived disagreement with feminist values  
 Feminism beliefs are too extreme for me  3.50 (0.98) 
 Feminism does not adequately reflect my beliefs 3.49 (0.97) 
 Feminists are trying too hard to be right  3.59 (1.05) 
 Feminism won’t help me in achieving equal rights 3.28 (1.02) 
 I disagree with what feminism stands for 2.86 (0.98) 
 I think feminism focuses too much on women  3.55 (1.09) 
Potential for social rejection  
 Society has a negative image of feminism 2.07 (0.90) 
 I do not want others to know that I am a feminist 2.21 (0.94) 
 Feminism is not consistent with my lifestyle 2.58 (0.99) 
  M (SD) 
Motivated independence 3.54 (0.65) 
Negativity toward feminism and feminists 2.55 (0.99) 
Perceived disagreement with feminist values 3.38 (0.69) 
Potential for social rejection 2.29 (0.71) 
Note. 1= strongly disagree to 5= strongly agree 
Motivated independence. The motivated independence scale consisted of 
five reasons (α = .65) based on Hawkins and Nosek (2012): “I’d rather think for 
myself than support the beliefs of an ideology-based group”, “I find it more important 
to be independent than to belong to an ideology-based group”, “I do not want to 
commit myself to a certain belief”, “It is natural for me to resist being pigeonholed 
(being labeled or categorized)”, and “I dislike ideology-based groups in general”. 
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Negativity toward feminism and feminists. The negativity toward 
feminism and feminists scale consisted of four reasons (α = .86; “I see feminists as a 
group of women who are unable to solve their own personal problems”, “I dislike 
feminists”, “I dislike feminism”, “I am offended when someone calls me a feminist”). 
Perceived disagreement with feminist values. The perceived 
disagreement with feminist values scale consisted of six reasons (α = .77; “Feminism 
beliefs are too extreme for me”, “Feminism does not adequately reflect my beliefs”, 
“Feminists are trying too hard to be right”, “Feminism won’t help me in achieving 
equal rights”, “I disagree with what feminism stands for”, and “I think feminism 
focuses too much on women”. 
Potential for social rejection. The potential for social rejection scale 
consisted of three reasons (α = .62; “Society has a negative image of feminism”, “I do 
not want others to know that I am a feminist”, and “Feminism is not consistent with 
my lifestyle”).  
Results 
A repeated measures ANOVA with the four reasons as a within subject factor 
and participant gender as between subject factor showed that there were significant 
differences in the endorsement of these reasons, Wilks’ Lambda = .31, F(3, 110) = 
81.43, p < .001, η2 = .69, and an interaction of the endorsement of reasons and 
participant gender, Wilks’ Lambda = .90, F(3,110) = 4.01, p = .009, η2 = .10. To better 
understand the differences between endorsement of the reasons, paired sample t-
tests compared motivated independence to the other three reasons, separately for 
men and women.  
For male participants, motivated independence (M = 3.62, SD = 0.71) was seen 
as a more important reason for not identifying with feminism than negativity toward 
feminism and feminists, (M = 3.01, SD = 0.97), t(42) = 3.08, p = .004, Cohen’s d = 
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0.95, or potential for social rejection (M = 2.35, SD = 0.84), t(42) = 7.24, p < .01, 
Cohen’s d = 2.23. Motivated independence was an equally important reason for not 
identifying with feminism as perceived disagreement with feminist values (M = 3.58, 
SD = 0.65), t(42) = 0.29, p = .77, Cohen’s d = 0.09. For female participants, 
motivated independence (M = 3.49, SD = 0.62) was seen as a more important reason 
for not identifying with feminism than negativity toward feminism and feminists (M 
= 2.28, SD = 0.89), t(70) = 10.38, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 2.48, potential for social 
rejection, (M = 2.25, SD = 0.62), t(70) = 11.45, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 2.74, or 
perceived disagreement with feminist values (M = 3.25, SD = 0.69), t(70) = 2.53, p = 
.01, Cohen’s d = 0.60.  
Study 4.1 showed that both men and women indicate that motivated 
independence is an important factor in the decision to not identify with feminism; 
moreover, for women, it is a more important factor than negativity towards feminism 
and feminists, than potential for social rejection, and than perceived disagreement 
with feminist values. 
Study 4.2: Motivated Independence predicts Feminist Labeling 
Study 4.2 is a replication of Study 4.1 (that were found in a Dutch sample) 
using a US sample instead. In Study 4.1, we simply examined reasons for 
disidentification among people who stated that they do not identify with feminism. In 
Study 4.2, we perform that same analysis, but also include a continuous measure of 
the extent of feminist identification. For the latter measure, we expect that motivated 
independence will predict the extent of identification with feminism even while 
controlling for endorsement of the other three reasons. 
Method 
Participants and design. Participants were recruited from Amazon’s 
MTurk and participated in return for $0.30. In total 307 participants (197 male, 111 
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female, Mage = 31.4, SD = 9.5) completed the statements about identifying as a 
feminist. 
Materials and procedure. Materials and procedures were the same as in 
Study 4.1 except that the statements were translated into English and a seven-point 
scale was used in the reasons endorsement items. Participants were asked to rate the 
four scales with the 18 statements from Study 4.1 as reasons why they did or did not 
identify as feminist: Motivated independence (α = .82), negativity toward feminism 
and feminists (α = .90), perceived disagreement with feminist values (α = .93), and 
potential for social rejection (α = .48). Finally, all participants completed the Self-
Identification as a Feminist (SIF) scale (α = .95; Szymanski, 2004), which consists of 
four items (“I consider myself a feminist”; “I identify myself as a feminist to other 
people”; “feminist values and principles are important to me”; “I support the goals of 
the feminist movement”) rated on a five-point-scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
Results 
Reasons. Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 4.2. A repeated 
measures ANOVA on the four reasons as within subjects factor and participant 
gender as between subjects factor showed again that there were significant 
differences in the endorsement of these reasons, Wilks’ Lambda = .44, F(3, 300) = 
136.39, p < .001, η2 = .56, and an interaction effect between the endorsement of 
reasons and participant gender, Wilks’ Lambda = .92, F(3, 300) = 8.87, p < .001, η2 = 
.08. To better understand the differences between endorsement of the reasons, paired 
sample t-tests again compared motivated independence to the other three reasons, 
separately for men and women.  
For male participants, motivated independence (M = 4.78, SD = 1.11) was seen 








Motivated independence  
 I’d rather think for myself than support the beliefs of 
an ideology-based group 
5.45 (1.23) 
 I find it more important to be independent than to 
belong to an ideology-based group 
5.43 (1.28) 
 I do not want to commit myself to a certain belief 4.45 (1.56) 
 It is natural for me to resist being pigeonholed (being 
labeled or categorized) 
5.12 (1.34) 
 I dislike ideology-based groups in general  4.68 (1.48) 
Negativity toward feminism and feminists  
 I see feminists as a group of women who are unable 
to solve their own personal problems 
3.63 (1.77) 
 I dislike feminists  3.55 (1.71) 
 I dislike feminism 3.85 (1.71) 
 I am offended when someone calls me a feminist 3.69 (1.74) 
Perceived disagreement with feminist values  
 Feminism beliefs are too extreme for me  4.79 (1.72) 
 Feminism does not adequately reflect my beliefs 4.93 (1.47) 
 Feminists are trying too hard to be right  4.60 (1.69) 
 Feminism won’t help me in achieving equal rights 4.83 (1.50) 
 I disagree with what feminism stands for 3.73 (1.67) 
 I think feminism focuses too much on women  4.22 (1.75) 
Potential for social rejection  
 Society has a negative image of feminism 4.84 (1.36) 
 I do not want others to know that I am a feminist 3.28 (1.56) 
 Feminism is not consistent with my lifestyle 4.88 (1.58) 
  M (SD) 
Motivated independence 5.02 
(0.96) 
Negativity toward feminism and feminists 3.68 
(1.43) 
Perceived disagreement with feminist values 4.52 
(1.28) 
Potential for social rejection 4.33 
(1.08) 
Note. 1= strongly disagree to 7= strongly agree 
 
feminism and feminists (M = 3.37, SD = 1.51), t(195) = 14.06, p < .001, Cohen’s 
d = 2.01, than perceived disagreement with feminist values (M = 4.15, SD = 1.50), 
t(195) = 6.56, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.94, and than potential for social rejection (M = 
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4.09, SD = 1.17), t(195) = 8.62, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.23. For female participants, 
motivated independence (M = 4.40, SD = 1.30) was also seen as a more important 
reason for not identifying with feminism than negativity toward feminism and 
feminists, (M = 2.73, SD = 1.58), t(108) = 11.99, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 2.31, than 
perceived disagreement with feminist values (M = 3.25, SD = 1.67), t(108) = 8.77, p < 
.001, Cohen’s d = 1.69, and than potential for social rejection (M = 3.87, SD = 1.14), 
t(108) = 4.93, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.95. 
Identification. We conducted a hierarchical regression analysis with 
identification with feminism as the outcome. The predictors were participant gender, 
motivated independence, negativity toward feminism and feminists, perceived 
disagreement with feminist values, potential for social rejection (the four factors), 
and interactions between each of the four factors and participant gender (nine total 
predictors). In Step 1 participant gender, perceived disagreement with feminist 
values, negativity towards feminism and feminists, potential for social rejection, and 
the three interaction terms of these three factors with participant gender were 
entered in the model (seven predictors). The overall model was significant, F(7, 302) 
= 58.05, p < .001, and explained 57.9% of the variance in identification with 
feminism.  
Participant gender was a significant predictor of identification with feminism, 
B = 0.80, SE = 0.35, β = .33, t(302) = 2.30, p = .02, perceived disagreement with 
feminist values also predicted identification with feminism, B = -0.47, SE = 0.07, β = 
-.66, t(302) = -6.80, p < .001, and the interaction term between participant gender 
and perceived disagreement with feminist values was also significant, B = -0.26, SE = 
0.12, β = -.41, t(302) = -2.17, p = .03. There were no other significant effects, p > .34. 
Simple slope analyses showed that for both male participants, B = -0.43, SE = 0.04, β 
= -.59, t(302) = -11.70, p < .001, and female participants, B = -0.65, SE = 0.04, β = -
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.90, t(302) = -14.72, p < .001, the relation of perceived disagreement with feminist 
values and identification with feminism was significant, but it was stronger for female 
participants. For both genders there was a negative relationship indicating that more 
perceived disagreement with feminist values was related to less identification with 
feminism. 
In Step 2 motivated independence and the interaction term of motivated 
independence and participant gender were added to the model (nine predictors). The 
overall model was significant, F(9, 302) = 53.84, p < .001, and the addition of 
motivated independence explained 4.4% of the variance in identification with 
feminism, ∆F(2, 293) = 17.03, p < .001. Consistent with the hypothesis, motivated 
independence was a significant predictor of identification with feminism, B = -0.31, 
SE = 0.06, β = -.32, t(302) = -5.51, p < .001, and there was no interaction of 
motivated independence and participant gender, B = 0.17, SE = 0.09, β = .33, t(302) 
= 1.89, p = .06. The relation of participant gender and identification with feminism 
turned not significant, B = 0.22, SE = 0.39, β = .09, t(302) = 0.58, p = .57, whereas 
the other relations remained the same. The negative relationship between motivated 
independence and identification with feminism indicates that for both men and 
women an increase in feelings of motivated independence is related to a decrease in 
identification with feminism. 
Study 4.3: Manipulating Motivated Independence 
Study 4.1 and Study 4.2 show us that both men and women experience 
motivated independence as an important reason in the decision to not identify with 
feminism. Motivated independence was seen as a more important factor than 
negativity towards feminism and feminists, than potential for social rejection, and 
than perceived disagreement with feminist values. Moreover, Study 4.2 found that 
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motivated independence predicts identification with feminism for both men and 
women even while controlling for endorsement of these other three reasons. 
 The purpose of Study 4.3 was to manipulate feelings of independence to 
determine its causal effect on identification with feminism and agreement with the 
feminist message. To do that, participants recalled a situation in which they were 
independent of others and/or had control over others. To test whether feelings of 
independence did not lead to disagreement in general—that is, disagreeing with every 
message participants read—we manipulated whether participants read a feminist 
message (career is important and should be pursued) or whether they read a non-
feminist message (family is important and should be pursued) that was relevant to 
our target sample that were Dutch university students. Based on the relation between 
independence and identification with feminism from Studies 4.1 and 4.2, we 
hypothesize that women with an independent mindset would identify less with 
feminism. In addition, we expect them to in particular disagree with a feminist 
message compared to the non-feminist message. 
In addition to manipulating disagreement with a feminist or non-feminist 
message, we also measured disagreement in two other ways: Reactance towards 
persuasive messages in general and trait psychological reactance. We expected that 
women with an independent mindset would not show more reactance towards 
persuasive messages and not show more psychological reactance in general–but that 
the effect would be specific for feminist messages. 
Method 
Participants and design. Two hundred and twenty five participants (154 
women and 71 men, Mage = 20.6 years, SD = 3.0 years) were recruited on the Tilburg 
University campus and participated in return for course credit or 5 Euros. 
Participants were randomly assigned across the conditions of a 2 (Mindset: 
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Independent, Dependent) Χ 2 (Message Type: Feminist, Non-Feminist) between-
participants design with participant gender as an extra factor. 
Materials.  
Manipulations. To manipulate motivated independence, participants 
completed a recall task in which they either recalled a situation in which they were 
independent of others and/or had control over others (independent mindset 
condition) or a situation in which they were dependent of others and/or were 
controlled by others (dependent mindset condition). This manipulation was based on 
the power recall manipulation by Galinsky, Gruenfeld, and Magee (2003), but the 
word ‘power’ was omitted to match with our focus to solely manipulation motivated 
independence. 
To manipulate the type of message participants received, participants either 
read a short scenario describing a recent poll showing either that parents find it 
important that their children raise a happy family and that raising a family should 
be pursued in life (non-feminist message type condition) or that parents find it 
important that their children have successful careers and that a successful career 
should be pursued in life (feminist message type condition). We modeled these 
messages on work by Inesi and Rios (2013) who found that power in particular 
increases reactance towards close significant others, such as parents.  
Measures.  
Disagreement. Disagreement was measured with two items; one of those items 
varied between the message type conditions and the other was the same in both 
message type conditions. Participants who read the non-feminist message were asked 
“To what extent to you also want a family?”. Participants who read the feminist 
message were asked “To what extent to you also want a career?”. Participants in both 
message conditions were asked “To what extent to you want to do other things in 
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your life?”. To analyze the extent to which participants showed disagreement we 
calculated the difference score between whether they also wanted a career or family 
and whether they wanted to do other things in life by subtracting the first score from 
the latter: Positive scores on this measure indicate that participants disagree with the 
message given (and thus want something else in life), whereas negative scores on this 
measure indicated that participants agree with the message given (and thus also want 
either a career or family). 
Identification with feminism. The Self-Identification as a Feminist (SIF) scale 
from Study 4.2 was administered (α = .85; Szymanski, 2004). 
Reactance towards persuasive messages. Then, participants completed the 
reactance towards persuasive messages scale to measure whether they felt reactance 
towards our specific message (α = .85; Reinhart, Marshall, Feeley, & Tutzauer, 2007). 
It consists of four items and was adapted towards our specific message (“I feel 
uncomfortable when/I do not like it when/I feel irritated when/I dislike that I am 
being told how to feel about the future”).  
Trait psychological reactance. Participants also completed the 12 items of 
Hong’s trait psychological reactance scale that measures psychological reactance in 
general (α = .84; Hong & Faedda, 1996; e.g., “Advice and recommendations induce 
me to do just the opposite”). 
Manipulation check. Finally, participants completed a 6 item manipulation 
check to test how independent or dependent they felt in the situation that they had to 
recall in the recall task (α = .92; “I felt independent/ in control/ being a leader/ 
dependent [reversed]/ unimportant [reversed]/ subordinate [reversed]”). 
Procedure. Participants first recalled a situation in which they felt 
independent or dependent. Then, depending on condition they either received a 
feminist message or a non-feminist message. Finally, they completed all measures in 
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a fixed order: disagreement, feminist identification, reactance towards persuasive 
messages, trait psychological reactance, and the manipulation check.  
Results 
 Manipulation check. A 2 (Mindset: Independent, Dependent) Χ 2 (Message 
Type: Feminist, Non-Feminist) Χ 2 (Participant Gender: Male, Female) ANOVA on 
the manipulation check found, as expected, a main effect of mindset, F(1, 217) = 
174.11, p < .001, η2 = .45, in which participants who recalled a situation in which they 
felt independent (M = 5.46, SD = 0.82) felt more independent than participants who 
recalled a situation in which they felt dependent (M = 3.34, SD = 1.31). There were no 
other significant effects, p > .09. 
Disagreement. A 2 (Mindset: Independent, Dependent) Χ 2 (Message Type: 
Feminist, Non-Feminist) Χ 2 (Participant Gender: Male, Female) ANOVA on the 
difference score showed a main effect of participant gender, F(1, 217) = 6.83, p = .01, 
η2 = .03, and an interaction effect between message type and participant gender, F(1, 
217) = 6.18, p = .01, η2 = .03. Female participants who read the feminist message 
disagreed more with the message (M = -0.92, SD = 1.63; p = .001) than female 
participants who read the non-feminist message (M = -2.04, SD = 2.05). Male 
participants did not differ in disagreement whether they read the non-feminist 
message (M = -0.54, SD = 2.61) or the feminist message (M = -0.88, SD = 1.64; p = 
.51).  
The expected three way interaction between mindset, message type, and 
participant gender was not significant, F(1,217) = 2.38, p = .13, η2= .01. For 
exploratory purposes, simple effects were performed: Female participants who 
recalled a situation in which they felt independent disagreed more with the a feminist 
message (M = -0.80, SD = 1.62) than with the non-feminist message (M = -2.40, SD 
= 1.69), t(73) = -4.16, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.97. This difference in disagreement with 
96 
 
the message was not found for female participants who recalled a situation in which 
they felt dependent, t(77) = -1.37, p = .18, Cohen’s d = 0.31, and also not for male 
participants regardless whether they recalled a situation in which they felt 
independent, t(36) = 0.82, p = .42, Cohen’s d = 0.27, or dependent, t(31) = -0.12, p = 
.90, Cohen’s d = 0.04. There were no other significant effects, p > .16. 
 Identification with feminism. A 2 (Mindset: Independent, Dependent) Χ 
2 (Message Type: Feminist, Non-Feminist) Χ 2 (Participant Gender: Male, Female) 
ANOVA on identification with feminism found a main effect of participant gender, 
F(1, 217) = 42.23, p < .001, η2 = .16, and an interaction effect of participant gender 
and mindset, F(1, 217) = 3.98, p = .05, η2 = .02.  
When participants who recalled a situation in which they felt independent, 
female participants identified more with feminism (M = 2.98, SD = 0.82) than did 
male participants (M = 2.47, SD = 0.88; p = .001, η2 = .05). However, when they 
recalled a situation in which they felt dependent, this effect was much larger with the 
effect size almost tripling and female participants identified even more with feminism 
(M = 3.12, SD = 0.71) than male participants (M = 2.14, SD = 0.77; p < .001, η2 = .14). 
Crucially, we did not find that female participants in an independent mindset 
identified less with feminism (M = 2.98, SD = 0.82) than female participants in a 
dependent mindset (M = 3.12, SD = 0.71; t(146.36) = 1.13, p = .26, Cohen’s d = 0.19). 
Male participants in an independent mindset (M = 2.47, SD = 0.88) did not differ 
from male participants in a dependent mindset (M = 2.14, SD = 0.77; t(69) = -1.67, p 
= .10, Cohen’s d = 0.40). There were no other significant effects, p > .39. 
Reactance towards persuasive messages. A 2 (Mindset: Independent, 
Dependent) Χ 2 (Message Type: Feminist, Non-Feminist) Χ 2 (Participant Gender: 
Male, Female) ANOVA on reactance towards the message found only an interaction 
effect of participant gender and message type, F(1, 217) = 5.39, p = .02, η2 = .02. 
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Female participants who read the feminist message (M = 4.85, SD = 1.23; p = .02) 
showed more reactance towards the persuasive messages than female participants 
who read the non-feminist message (M = 4.38, SD = 1.24). In contrast, there was no 
difference in reactance for male participants after reading the non-feminist message 
(M = 4.79, SD = 1.20) compared to the feminist message (M = 4.44, SD = 1.16; p = 
.22). There were no other significant effects, p’s > .63. 
 Trait psychological reactance. A 2 (Mindset: Independent, Dependent) Χ 
2 (Message Type: Feminist, Non-Feminist) Χ 2 (Participant Gender: Male, Female) 
ANOVA on reactance towards the message found a main effect of participant gender, 
F(1, 217) = 4.36, p = .04, η2 = .02. In general, male participants (M = 4.14, SD = 0.72) 
showed more state psychological reactance than female participants (M = 3.90, SD = 
0.78). There were no other significant effects, p > .22. 
Discussion 
 The results of Study 4.3 suggest that women with an independent mindset 
indeed disagree more with a feminist message than with a non-feminist message. 
Thus when women feel independent and read that they should pursue a career, they 
disagree more compared to when they read a message that they should pursue a 
family. This difference was not found for women who felt dependent and for male 
participants. In addition, as expected women with an independent mindset did not 
show more trait psychological reactance or reactance towards persuasive messages in 
general. Our hypothesis that women in an independent mindset would identify less 
with feminism was not supported.  
General Discussion 
In this chapter we investigated whether motivated independence—defined as 
valuing individualism, not wanting to be constrained by groups or social movements, 
and wanting to be seen as an independent thinker rather than making judgments 
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based on group membership—was negatively related to identification with feminism. 
Studies 4.1 and 4.2 indeed found that both men and women experience motivated 
independence. In addition, Study 4.2 showed that this predicts identification with 
feminism: An increase in motivated independence is related to a decrease in 
identification with feminism. Finally, Study 4.3 showed that women in an 
independent mindset disagree more with a feminist message than with a non-
feminist message.  
These results suggest that men and women have the idea that being an 
independent actor and being a feminist are mutually exclusive concepts. In other 
words, they feel that women cannot be independent if they identify as a feminist and 
therefore identification with feminism is less likely to happen if independence is 
valued.  
Notably, there were no gender differences in Studies 4.1 and 4.2; both men and 
women experienced motivated independence and for both genders it was a significant 
predictor of identification with feminism in Study 4.2. These results are in line with 
research showing that the unequal gender distribution among people who identify as 
political independents (Dennis, 1988a; Norrander, 1997) has in fact disappeared 
throughout the years (Pew Research Center, 2010). And because women have 
increased power and control over their lives (Bay-Cheng, 2012; Peterson et al., 2008; 
Riger, 1993), they might also be more likely to be motivated to be independent.  
In contrast to Studies 4.1 and 4.2, gender differences were found in Study 4.3: 
In Study 4.3 we did not measure motivated independence as we did in Studies 4.1 and 
4.2, but we manipulated it by means of a recall task. Furthermore, in Study 4.3 
whether participants read a feminist—career should be pursued—or a non-feminist 
message—family should be pursued—was also manipulated. Only women with an 
independent mindset showed more disagreement with feminist messages than with 
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non-feminist messages. For men this message might cause less possibility for 
disagreement, because for male student participants pursuing a career might be the 
default option for their future. For female student participants, pursuing a career is 
probably not default and therefore, especially when feeling independent, they will 
disagree more with this feminist message.  
Study 4.3 thus shows some evidence that the feelings of independence makes 
women disagree with feminist messages. However, this study does not yet test the 
idea that the positive consequences of feminism—women becoming independent—
have the negative result of women identifying less with feminism. A future study 
should directly manipulate these positive feelings associated with feminism, for 
example by reminding women the progress that has been made possible by the 
women’s movement, and test whether this reminder increases feelings of motivated 
independence and decreases identification with feminism. Future research could also 
investigate whether non-identification with feminism increases over time, because 
women are expected to be and are actually becoming more economically independent 
than they were before (Council of the European Union, 2014).  
Increases in power are not only related to feelings of self-sufficiency and 
distance towards others (Lammers et al., 2012; Lee & Tiedens, 2001; Magee & Smith, 
2013), but also to a decrease in affiliative motives (Case, Conlon, & Maner, 2015). 
Because closeness to others and commonalities between yourself and others is 
important in social identification (Hogg, 2003), this increased social distance and 
decrease in affiliative motives could lead to women identifying less as part of a larger 
collective, for example feminists. Future research should investigate whether 
increases in feelings of independence indeed lead to less identification via the process 
of increased social distance and decreased affiliative motives.  
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Research on political independents has shown that identifying as a political 
independent does not necessarily result in negative feelings towards the political 
parties or political uninvolvement (Dennis, 1988a; Miller & Wattenberg, 1983; 
Wattenberg, 1981). In fact, political independents often do have political preferences 
and their political engagement and voting behavior can be reliably predicted on the 
basis of these preferences (Dennis, 1988a; Hawkins & Nosek, 2012; Klar, 2014; Miller 
& Wattenberg, 1983). These results might indicate a less negative image of 
disidentification with feminism, because although women are not willing to identify 
as feminist, they might not be necessarily negative towards feminism or the women’s 
movement and might still be willing to be involved in feminist issues.  
Three studies show that motivated independence is an important reason to not 
identify with feminism. To increase identification with feminism among these men 
and women it is therefore important to emphasize that feminism and dependence do 
not have to be related. In fact, neoliberal feminism that especially female celebrities 
promote states that feminism is mostly about choice for women and girls, about 
individual action, and about personal responsibility (Keller & Ringrose, 2015). 
Furthermore, more and more independent and strong women—Beyoncé, Taylor 
Swift, Emma Watson—openly self-identify as feminists (Duca, 2014; Gray, 2014; UN 
Women, 2014) and show that one can be independent and a feminist at the same 
time. Maybe these examples show to other women that independence and feminism 
are not mutually exclusive and that motivated independence does not necessarily 
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Imagine a woman who mentions that she is a feminist. Do others think she is 
warm? Do they think she is competent? Many studies have shown that feminists 
generally receive negative evaluations (Ramsey et al., 2007). More specifically, they 
are seen as aggressive, whiny, bitchy, and crazy (Houvouras & Carter, 2008). But is 
this evaluation due to negative associations with feminists as a group, or with the 
content of the feminist message? In other words, is the woman who labels herself a 
feminist judged as more negative than a woman who labels herself as someone who 
believes in gender equality? In this chapter, we suggest that she is and we ran six 
studies to test whether this may be the case.  
There are multiple reasons to expect that a woman who labels herself a 
feminist will be seen as more negative than a woman who believes in gender equality 
who does not use the feminist self-label. A first reason to predict that adopting the 
feminist label would lead to negative evaluations is that feminists as a group are 
evaluated negatively (Robnett et al., 2012). Feminists are seen as complaining, as 
taking advantage of the possibility for discrimination (Roy et al., 2009), as being 
unattractive (Rudman & Fairchild, 2007) and as lesbian, bitchy, aggressive, and 
whiny (Houvouras & Carter, 2008). Also measured indirectly, people have been 
shown to implicitly associate feminists with negativity and masculinity (Jenen et al., 
2009). Furthermore, it seems that the feminism label is perceived to be particularly 
damaging when it is adopted by women. For example, Anderson (2009) found that 
both men and women rated feminist women as less favorable, and as higher in 
masculinity, than non-feminist women (but see Breen & Karpinski, 2008). In 
summary, adopting the label of feminism in particular can lead to negative 
evaluations. 
A second reason why adopting the feminist label may lead to negative 
perceptions of the labeler is that people negatively evaluate groups that call for social 
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change (Bashir, Lockwood, Chasteen, Nadolny, & Noyes, 2013) and feminists are by 
definition a group that call for social change (Houvouras & Carter, 2008; Suter & 
Toller, 2006). People have a negative stereotype of activists regardless the domain of 
activism, partially because they have negative attitudes towards social change in 
general or towards the social issue at hand. Activism is seen as an attempt at 
aggressively promoting change and therefore activists, including feminists, are 
quickly associated with militancy and hostility (Bashir et al., 2013). Explicit usage of 
the feminist label indicates the politicizing of gender equality beliefs (Duncan, 2010) 
and the label suggests active engagement in political or collective action (Bay-Cheng 
& Zucker, 2007; Downing & Roush, 1985; Duncan, 2010; Zucker, 2004). In summary, 
people have negative views of those who adopt any label associated with social 
change—including that of feminism. 
A third and final reason for why a woman who labels herself a feminist may be 
perceived as negative, is because she may be seen as holding stronger gender equality 
beliefs than a woman who does not label herself as a feminist. Feminist beliefs have 
been shown to correlate with engagement in collective action (Nelson et al., 2008; 
Yoder et al., 2011; Zucker, 2004) and because, as discussed before, activism is seen as 
negative (Bashir et al., 2013). Therefore, having stronger feminist beliefs is also seen 
as negative. This impression that a woman who labels herself a feminist has stronger 
gender equality beliefs than a woman who does not label herself might not be 
erroneous; some research shows that labeled feminists do indeed have stronger 
gender attitudes than non-labelers and non-feminists (Aronson, 2003; Smith, 1999). 
And when comparing self-identified feminists with women who do not label 
themselves as feminists, but who agree with feminist values, the former group has 
higher levels of feminist consciousness (Zucker, 2004; but see Liss, O’Connor, 
Morosky, & Crawford, 2001; Quinn & Radtke, 2006; Roy et al., 2007). Because there 
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is a difference between labelers and non-labelers in strength of feminist beliefs, and 
perceivers might know this, it could be that negative evaluations of the feminist label 
are in fact due to perceived differences in perceived strength of gender equality 
beliefs.  
In the current chapter, we focus in particular how feminist identity affects 
perceptions of warmth and competence. We focus specifically on these two 
dimensions—warmth and competence—because these are seen as the most important 
dimensions in person perception (Bakan, 1966; see also Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; 
Cuddy et al., 2008; Eagly & Steffen, 1984; Fiske et al., 2002; Fiske et al., 2007; Judd 
et al., 2005). Warmth and competence have been also shown to be particularly 
relevant for the stereotype of feminists (Berryman-Fink & Verderber, 1985; Reid & 
Purcell, 2004; Suter & Toller, 2006; see also Chapter 3). In particular, the stereotype 
of feminists is generally seen as being high in competence, but low in warmth (Fiske 
et al., 2002; MacDonald & Zanna, 1998; Twenge & Zucker, 1999). In this chapter we 
however do not focus on the evaluations of feminists as a group, but on feminist self-
labeling. That is, we do not test perceptions of feminists as a whole, but of individuals 
who label themselves as a feminist (also see Van Osch, Blanken, Meijs, & Van 
Wolferen, 2015, for differences in group and individual evaluations). 
Warmth and competence have been shown to be important factors in hiring 
decisions in which an increase in warmth in usually associated with a decrease in 
hiring chances (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2004; Cuddy, Glick, & Beninger, 2011; 
MacDonald & Zanna, 1998; Masser, Grass, & Nesic, 2007; Phelan, Moss-Racusin, & 
Rudman, 2008). In addition, when forming first impressions, people also form 
judgments of warmth and competence fairly quickly and reliably (Bergmann, Eyssel, 
& Kopp, 2012; Fiske et al., 2007; Holoien & Fiske, 2013; Lydon, Jamieson, & Zanna, 
1988; Willis & Todorov, 2006).  
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Many women are reluctant to self-identify as a feminist although they agree 
with at least some tenets of feminism (Robnett et al., 2012). And for some women the 
negative connotations of the feminist stereotype are especially important because 
they fear being negatively evaluated themselves (Burn et al., 2000; Charter, 2015; 
McCabe, 2005; Suter & Toller, 2006). Therefore we believe it is important to test 
whether this hesitation is justified by investigating whether explicit labeling as a 
feminist indeed has an effect on evaluations of warmth and competence. We do this 
by means of the two paradigms of hiring decisions and first impression formation. 
Chapter Overview 
In six studies we test the overall hypothesis that a woman who labels herself a 
feminist will be seen as less warm and more competent than a woman who believes in 
gender equality but who does not label herself as a feminist. Study 5.1 shows that that 
labeling as a feminist leads to higher competence and lower warmth ratings than 
merely stating one’s belief in gender equality. Evidence from a manipulation check 
also showed that the feminist label lead to perceptions of stronger gender equality 
beliefs than simply stating one’s belief in gender equality. Therefore, in Studies 5.2-
5.6 we test whether this strength-of-belief explanation can indeed explain why 
feminist self-labeling leads to perceptions of lower warmth and higher competence 
than expressing gender equality beliefs alone.  
Study 5.1 
In Study 5.1 we test the hypothesis that a woman applying for a job who labels 
herself as feminist on her resume will be seen as more competent and less warm than 
a woman who merely believes in gender equality but does not label herself a feminist. 
This hypothesis is based on previous research showing that feminists, as a group, are 
seen as warmer and less competent than non-feminists (Fiske et al., 2002). We also 
measure perceived strength of the target’s feminist beliefs to test whether a woman 
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who labels herself a feminist is seen as having stronger gender equality beliefs than a 
woman who states only that she believes in gender equality.  
Method 
 Participants and design. A hundred and sixty nine students from Tilburg 
University (34 male, 135 female, Mage = 19.65) participated in return for course credit. 
A target sample size of 150 was chosen in order to have 80% power to find a medium 
effect (G*Power 3.1, Faul et al., 2009). Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
three conditions (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, control). 
Manipulation of feminist self-label. Participants were instructed to 
imagine that they were part of a hiring committee to fill the position of a laboratory 
manager of the psychology department. They read a description of the 
responsibilities of the laboratory manager and one of three fictional resumes. In all 
conditions, participants received a resume of a female applicant. Depending on 
condition, this female applicant either stated having gender equality beliefs and 
labeled herself as a feminist (feminist-labeled), or she merely expressed gender 
equality beliefs without labeling herself as a feminist (feminist-content-only), or she 
expressed neither those beliefs, nor did she adopt the label (control). Specifically, in 
the feminist-labeled condition, the applicant listed her research interest as gender 
equality and wrote: “As a feminist, I am fascinated with the link between theories in 
social psychology and gender research.” Additionally, she listed her academic minor 
as women’s studies. In the feminist-content-only condition, the applicant’s resume 
was exactly the same as in the feminist-labeled condition, except that the three words 
“as a feminist” were omitted. Her research interest and academic minor were the 
same. In the control condition, the applicant wrote “I am fascinated with the link 
between theories in social psychology and behavioral economics” and she listed 
economics as her academic minor. 
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Measures and Procedure.  
Warmth and competence. After viewing the resume, participants 
evaluated the applicant on Warmth (concerned with appearance, attractive, fun, 
likeable, nurturing, and open-minded; α = .76) and Competence (ambitious, 
independent, intelligent, opinionated, and career-oriented; α = .88; Berryman-Fink & 
Verderber, 1985; Reid & Purcell, 2004; Suter & Toller; 2006; also see Chapter 3). All 
items were rated in random order and on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 5 
 Beliefs. Participants indicated the extent to which they perceived the 
applicant held feminist beliefs on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 
(extremely). 
Manipulation check. Finally, as a manipulation check participants 
indicated whether the applicant identified as a feminist on a five-point scale ranging 
from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely) to test whether participants indeed thought the 
woman who labeled herself a feminist would be more likely to identify as a feminist 
than the woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs without labeling 
herself as a feminist and the woman in the control condition.  
Results 
 Manipulation check. An one-way (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-
content-only, control) between-participants ANOVA with three conditions on 
identification as a feminist showed that the manipulation worked, F(2, 167) = 44.13, p 
< .001, η² = .35. Participants thought the woman who labeled herself a feminist (M = 
4.96, SD = 1.96) identified more as a feminist than the woman who only expressed 
                                                          
5 Other measures that were not directly relevant for our hypotheses were included in this study, Study 




gender equality beliefs (M = 3.25, SD = 1.62), t(107.97) = 5.08, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 
0.98, and than the woman in the control condition (M = 2.23, SD = 0.98), t(111.98) = 
8.85, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.67. The woman who only expressed gender equality 
beliefs was also seen as identifying more as a feminist than the woman in the control 
condition, t(111) = 4.06, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.77. 
Warmth. To test the hypothesis that a woman who labels herself as feminist 
will be seen as less warm than a woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs 
without labeling herself as a feminist and than a woman who expressed neither those 
beliefs nor adopt the label, we conducted an one-way (labeling type: feminist-labeled, 
feminist-content-only, control) between-participants ANOVA with three conditions 
on the level of warmth. It showed a significant main effect of labeling type, F(2, 167) = 
4.17, p = .02, η² = .05. Simple comparisons showed that participants thought the 
woman who labeled herself a feminist (M = 4.25, SD = 0.80) to be marginally less 
warm compared to the woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs (M = 
4.54, SD = 0.82), t(111) = -1.89, p = .06, Cohen’s d = 0.36, and significantly less warm 
than the woman in the control condition (M = 4.67, SD = 0.76), t(112) = -2.87, p = 
.005, Cohen’s d = 0.54. The woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs was 
seen as equally warm as the woman in the control condition, t(111) = -0.89, p = .38, 
Cohen’s d = 0.17.  
Competence. To test the hypothesis that a woman who labels herself as 
feminist will be seen as more competent than a woman who merely expressed gender 
equality beliefs without labeling herself as a feminist and than a woman who 
expressed neither those beliefs nor adopt the label, we conducted an one-way 
(labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, control) between-participants 
ANOVA with three conditions on the level of competence. It showed a significant 
main effect of labeling type, F(2, 167) = 3.38, p = .04, η² = .04. Participants thought 
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the woman who labeled herself a feminist (M = 6.08, SD = 0.85) was more competent 
than the woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs (M = 5.59, SD = 1.22) 
t(98.54) = 2.52, p = .01, Cohen’s d = 0.51, and marginally more competent than the 
woman in the control condition (M = 5.76, SD = 1.00), t(112) = 1.83, p = .07, Cohen’s 
d = 0.35. The woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs was seen as 
equally competent to the woman in the control condition, t(111) = -0.86, p = .39, 
Cohen’s d = 0.16.  
Beliefs. To test whether that the woman who labels herself as feminist will be 
seen as having stronger feminist beliefs than a woman who merely expressed gender 
equality beliefs without labeling herself as a feminist and than a woman who 
expressed neither those beliefs nor adopt the label, we conducted an one-way 
(labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, control) between-participants 
ANOVA with three conditions on the level of feminist beliefs. It showed a main effect 
of labeling type, F(2, 167) = 38.88, p < .001, η² = .32. Participants thought the 
woman who labeled herself a feminist (M = 5.12, SD = 1.52) had stronger feminist 
beliefs than the woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs (M = 4.09, SD 
= 1.58), t(111) = 3.54, p = .001, Cohen’s d = 0.67, who in turn had stronger feminist 
beliefs than the woman in the control condition (M = 2.58, SD = 1.55), t(111) = 5.14, p 
< .001, Cohen’s d = 0.98. 
Discussion 
The results of Study 5.1 showed that women who label themselves as feminists 
are seen as slightly less warm, and as significantly more competent, than women who 
do not label themselves as feminists but merely express gender equality beliefs. In 
addition, women who label themselves as feminists are seen as having stronger 
feminist beliefs than women who label themselves as merely believing in gender 
equality. This suggests that the feminist label indeed has an effect on judgments of 
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warmth and competence, but that it might be because the feminist label cues strength 
of feminist beliefs. If perceptions of warmth and competence are influenced by the 
feminist label in itself and not by the strength of feminist beliefs however, we would 
expect to see that women who express feminist beliefs will be seen as equal in warmth 
and competence compared to women who do not label themselves a feminist and do 
not express gender equality beliefs. The remainder of the studies tests this prediction. 
Study 5.2 
In Study 5.2 we first aim to replicate the results of Study 5.1 (conducted with a 
Dutch sample) in an US sample. As in Study 5.1, we aim to show that a woman who 
labels herself a feminist is seen as less warm, more competent, and as having stronger 
feminist beliefs than a woman who merely expresses gender equality beliefs. In 
addition, we also manipulate the type of advertised job. When competence is an 
important characteristic of the job, women who label themselves as feminists may be 
seen as more suitable—because the feminist stereotype is related to high 
competence—and therefore evaluated more positively. However, when warmth is an 
important characteristic of the job, the feminist stereotype may not match the job and 
those women who label themselves as feminists may evaluated more negatively 
(MacDonald & Zanna, 1998) To rule out that the advertised job cues a focus on either 
competence or warmth and that this focus causes a difference in perceptions of 
warmth and competence, in Study 5.2 we manipulated the job type that was 
advertised. We aim to show that this manipulation does not affect the effect of 
feminist labeling on warmth and competence ratings.  
Method 
 Participants and design. Six hundred and ten United States citizens (360 
male, 250 female, Mage = 32.44) were recruited from Amazon’s MTurk and 
participated in return for $0.30. A target sample size of 600 was chosen in order to 
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have 95% power to find a medium effect (Faul et al., 2009). Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of six conditions of a 3 (labeling type: feminist-labeled, 
feminist-content-only, control) Χ 2 (job type: warmth, competence) between-subjects 
design. 
Manipulation. All materials were identical to those presented in Study 5.1 
except that they were translated into English and that we now manipulated the 
description of the job. Specifically, the position of laboratory manager was either 
described as “the daily operations include managing participant recruitment, 
welcoming and instructing participants, and coordinating staff meetings” (high 
warmth) or as “the daily operations include assisting with multiple projects, 
performing data analysis, and programming experiments” (high competence). A pre-
test (N = 197) confirmed that the warm job type (M = 5.32, SD = 1.07) was seen as 
warmer than the competent job type (M = 3.41, SD = 1.46), t(155.39) = 10.26, p < 
.001, Cohen’s d = 1.65. The competent job type (M = 5.70, SD = 1.01) was seen as 
equally competent to the warm job type (M = 5.81, SD = 0.97), t(195) = -0.77, p = .44, 
Cohen’s d = 0.11.  
Measures and Procedure. Participants first indicated their perceptions of 
warmth and competence, then indicated whether the applicant held feminist beliefs, 
and finally whether the applicant identified as a feminist. Both Warmth (α = .77) and 
Competence (α = .71) had an acceptable reliability. 
Results 
 Manipulation check. A 3 (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-
only, control) Χ 2 (job type: warmth, competence) between-participants ANOVA on 
identification as a feminist showed a main effect of labeling type, F(2, 595) = 178.12, p 
< .001, η² = .37, no effect of job type, F(1, 595) = 0.05, p = .83, η² < .001, nor an 
interaction effect of labeling type and job type, F(2, 595) = 0.16, p = .85, η² = .001. 
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Participants thought the woman who labeled herself a feminist (M = 4.24, SD = 1.04) 
would identify more as a feminist than the woman who merely expressed gender 
equality beliefs (M = 3.35, SD = 1.35), t(377.89) = 7.41, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.76, 
who in turn would identify more as a feminist than the woman in the control 
condition (M = 2.10, SD = 0.97), t(365.92) = 10.63, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.11. 
Warmth. A 3 (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, control) 
Χ 2 (job type: warmth, competence) between-participants ANOVA on the level of 
warmth showed a main effect of labeling type, F(2, 599) = 11.78, p < .001, η² = .04, 
no effect of job type, F(1, 599) = 3.51, p = .06, η² = .006, nor an interaction effect of 
labeling type and job type, F(2, 599) = 0.20, p = .82, η² = .001. Participants rated the 
woman who labeled herself a feminist (M = 4.19, SD = 0.83) as less warm than the 
woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs (M = 4.48, SD = 0.68), t(401) = 
-3.77, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.38, and less warm than the woman in the control 
condition (M = 4.50, SD = 0.65), t(376.37) = -4.29, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.44. The 
woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs and the woman in the control 
condition did not significantly differ from each other, t(403) = -0.50, p = .62, Cohen’s 
d = 0.05.  
Competence. A 3 (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, 
control) Χ 2 (job type: warmth, competence) between-participants ANOVA on the 
level of competence showed a main effect of labeling type, F(2, 600) = 8.31, p < .001, 
η² = .03, no effect of job type, F(1, 600) = 0.25, p = .62, η² < .001, nor an interaction 
effect of labeling type and job type, F(2, 600) = 1.87, p = .16, η² = .006. Participants 
rated the woman who labeled herself a feminist (M = 5.54, SD = 0.66) and the 
woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs (M = 5.46, SD = 0.73) as 
equally competent, t(402) = 1.17, p = .24, Cohen’s d = 0.12. The woman who labeled 
herself a feminist and the woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs were 
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seen as more competent than the woman in the control condition (M = 5.25, SD = 
0.81), t(400) = 3.93, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.39, and t(404) = 2.73, p = .007, Cohen’s 
d = 0.27 respectively. 
Beliefs. A 3 (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, control) Χ 
2 (job type: warmth, competence) between-participants ANOVA on the level of 
feminist beliefs showed a main effect of labeling type, F(2, 595) = 123.40, p < .001, η² 
= .29, no effect of job type, F(1, 595) = 0.03, p = .85, η² < .001, nor an interaction 
effect of labeling type and job type, F(2, 595) = 1.25, p = .29, η² = .004. Participants 
thought the woman who labeled herself feminist (M = 4.63, SD = 0.87) had stronger 
feminist beliefs than the woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs (M = 
3.92, SD = 1.45), t(330.06) = 5.97, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.66, who in turn had 
stronger feminist beliefs than the woman in the control condition (M = 2.67, SD = 
1.39), t(400.51) = 8.84, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.88.  
Discussion 
These results show that, as in Study 5.1, women who label themselves as 
feminists are seen as less warm and more competent than women who merely 
express gender equality beliefs. Furthermore, Study 5.2 again found that the feminist 
label indicated stronger gender equality beliefs than merely expressing them. In 
addition, whereas in Study 5.1 we found that women who merely expressed gender 
equality beliefs were seen as just as warm and competent as women in the control 
condition, in this study we find that women who expressed gender equality beliefs are 
seen as more competent and just as warm as women in the control condition. This 
strengthens our reasoning that the feminist label cues strength of feminist beliefs 
which causes changes in perceptions of warmth and competence, because now we 
find that merely expressing beliefs also causes changes in perceptions of competence. 
Finally, we did not find any effects of the type of job that was advertised indicating 
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that it is not a certain focus on either warmth or competence that changes perception, 
but it is the feminist label. 
Study 5.3 
In Study 5.3 we seek to replicate the results found in Study 5.1 and 5.2 with 
judgments of first impressions in an interpersonal situation rather than on a resume. 
The dimensions of warmth and competence have been shown to be important in first 
impressions and people reliably and quickly make judgments of warmth and 
competence (Bergmann et al., 2012; Fiske et al., 2007; Holoien & Fiske, 2013; Lydon 
et al., 1988; Willis & Todorov, 2006).  
In addition, Study 5.3 tested whether a feminist label produces more perceived 
competence and less perceived warmth when it is applied by another person or only 
when it is applied to the self. The feminist label conveys information about the social 
identity of the woman (Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 1987); this 
might be especially true when it is self-labeling (“I am a feminist”) compared to when 
another person labels a woman (“She is a feminist”). This would suggest that self-
labeling should lead to stronger effects than being labeled by someone else. If, 
however, strength of feminist beliefs is conveyed by means of the feminist label, it 
could be that labeling as a feminist is seen as a cue of strength of feminist beliefs 
regardless whether that label is used by the self or by another person. We test this 
idea by introducing the woman either by herself or by another (mutual) friend. 
Method 
 Participants and design. Three-hundred-and-two United States citizens 
(166 male, 136 female, Mage = 33.7, SD = 12.0) were recruited from Amazon’s MTurk 
and participated in return for $0.30. A target sample size of 300 was chosen in order 
to have 80% power to find a medium effect (Faul et al., 2009). Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the conditions of a 3 (labeling type: feminist-labeled, 
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feminist-content-only, control) Χ 2 (introduction method: self-introduction, other-
introduction) between-participants design. 
Manipulation. Participants were asked to imagine having a drink with 
coworkers after their first day of a new job. When a woman named Jenny is 
introduced, the topic of Jenny’s blog is discussed. Depending on condition, Jenny 
either stated writing about gender equality and labeled herself as a feminist (feminist-
labeled), or she merely wrote about gender equality without labeling herself as a 
feminist (feminist-content-only), or she wrote about gender equality nor did she 
adopt the label (control). Specifically, in the feminist-labeled condition, Jenny was 
introduced as “As a feminist, she mostly writes about gender equality and other 
gender issues.” In the feminist-content-only condition “As a feminist” was omitted 
from the introduction, but Jenny did write about gender equality, whereas in the 
control condition Jenny wrote about “current literature and films”. In the self-
introduction condition, Jenny herself discusses her blog and in the other-
introduction condition, a coworker discusses the blog.  
Measures and Procedure. First, participants rated their perceptions of 
warmth and competence and participants then indicated whether Jenny held feminist 
beliefs and finally whether she identified as a feminist. The reliability of Warmth (α 
= .91) and Competence (α = .82) was acceptable.  
Results 
 Manipulation check. A 3 (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-
only, control) Χ 2 (introduction method: self-introduction, other-introduction) 
between-participants ANOVA on identification as a feminist showed a main effect of 
labeling type, F(2, 296) = 91.57, p < .001, η² = .38. Participants thought the woman 
who labeled herself a feminist (M = 5.88, SD = 1.65) identified more as a feminist 
than the woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs (M = 4.97, SD = 1.70), 
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t(198,67) = 3.87, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.55, who in turn identified more as a feminist 
than the woman in the control condition (M = 2.88, SD = 1.51), t(195,96) = 9.21, p < 
.001, Cohen’s d = 1.32. No other main and interaction effects were significant, p’s > 
.10. 
Warmth. A 3 (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, control) 
Χ 2 (introduction method: self-introduction, other-introduction) between-
participants ANOVA on the level of warmth showed a main effect of labeling type, 
F(2, 296) = 7.90, p < .001, η² = .009. Participants thought the woman who labeled 
herself a feminist (M = 4.78, SD = 0.83) and the woman who merely expressed 
gender equality beliefs (M = 4.94, SD = 0.90) were less warm than the woman in the 
control condition (M = 5.23, SD = 0.72), t(200) = -4.11, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.58 
and t(199) = -2.56, p = .01, Cohen’s d = 0.36. The woman who labeled herself a 
feminist was equally warm as the woman who merely expressed gender equality 
beliefs, t(199) = -1.28, p = .20, Cohen’s d = 0.18. No other main and interaction 
effects were significant, p’s > .10.  
Competence. A 3 (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, 
control) Χ 2 (introduction method: self-introduction, other-introduction) between-
participants ANOVA on the level of competence showed no main effect of labeling 
type, F(2, 296) = 0.80, p = .45, η² = .005. No other main and interaction effects were 
significant, p’s > .11.  
Beliefs. A 3 (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, control) Χ 
2 (introduction method: self-introduction, other-introduction) between-participants 
ANOVA on the level of feminist beliefs showed a main effect of labeling type, F(2, 
296) = 86.87, p < .001, η² = .37. Participants thought the woman who labeled herself 
a feminist (M = 4.09, SD = 0.78) had stronger feminist beliefs than the woman who 
merely expressed gender equality beliefs (M = 3.74, SD = 0.90), t(194,54) = 2.95, p = 
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.004, Cohen’s d = 0.42, who in turn had stronger feminist beliefs than the woman in 
the control condition (M = 2.51, SD = 0.99), t(199) = 9.22, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.31. 
No other main and interaction effects were significant, p’s > .33. 
Discussion 
 In contrast to Study 5.1 and Study 5.2, in Study 5.3 we find that women who 
label themselves as feminists and women who merely expressed gender equality 
beliefs are seen as less warm than women in the control condition. In addition we do 
not find any differences in perceptions of competence. We do find support that 
women who label themselves as feminists are seen as having stronger feminist beliefs 
than women who merely express believing in gender equality. These results imply 
that it is not the feminist label that stands out and causes changes in perceptions of 
warmth, but that the strength of feminist beliefs triggers these changes in perceptions 
of warmth. This is endorsed by the fact this pattern of the strength of feminist beliefs 
is found in all three studies.  
Study 5.4 
 In the first three studies, participants judge a woman who labels herself as a 
feminist who also states that she studies or writes about gender equality. Therefore in 
Study 5.4, to more explicitly and strictly test whether the feminist label by itself 
influences the ratings of warmth and competence, we disentangled the feminist label 
and feminist beliefs. To do so, we added a condition in which a woman uses the 
feminist label, but does not express feminist beliefs. With this condition we test 
whether the feminist label in itself has an effect on perceptions of warmth and 
competence. It could be that the feminist label without the mentioning of feminist 
beliefs cues that the woman has feminist beliefs and therefore there is still an, but 





 Participants and design. Four hundred and three United States citizens 
(244 male, 159 female, Mage = 33.38) were recruited from Amazon’s MTurk and 
participated in return for $0.30. A target sample size of 400 was chosen in order to 
have 95% power to find a small effect (Faul et al., 2009). Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of four conditions (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-
only, mere-feminist-labeled, control). 
Manipulation. The same manipulation was used as in Study 5.3, but an extra 
condition was added in which the feminist label was presented, but there was no 
reference to gender equality beliefs (the mere-feminist-condition). Specifically, Jenny 
in this condition introduced herself by “Although I am a feminist, I mostly write 
about wildlife and nature documentaries.” The control condition was changed to “I 
mostly write about wildlife and nature documentaries.”, because writing about 
current literature might imply to participants that the woman wrote about feminist 
literature.  
Measures and Procedure. Participants first rated Jenny on warmth and 
competence and then indicated whether the Jenny held feminist beliefs and finally 
whether she identified as a feminist. The reliability of the Warmth (α = .76), and 
Competence scales (α = .71) was acceptable.  
Results 
Manipulation check. An one-way (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-
content-only, mere-feminist-labeled, control) between-participants ANOVA with four 
conditions on identification as a feminist showed a main effect of labeling type, F(3, 
397) = 131.14, p < .001, η² = .50. Participants thought the woman who labeled herself 
a feminist (M = 4.53, SD = 0.71) identified more as a feminist than the woman who 
merely expressed gender equality beliefs (M = 4.01, SD = 0.87), the woman who 
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merely labeled herself as feminist (M = 4.18, SD = 0.77), and the woman in the 
control condition (M = 2.40, SD = 0.96), p’s < .02. The woman who merely expressed 
gender equality beliefs and the woman who merely labeled herself as feminist were 
perceived to identify themselves equally as a feminist, p =.48, but more than the 
woman in the control condition, p’s < .001. 
Warmth. An one-way (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, 
mere-feminist-labeled, control) between-participants ANOVA with four conditions on 
the level of warmth showed a main effect of labeling type, F(3, 399) = 5.07, p = .002, 
η² = .04. Participants rated the woman who labeled herself a feminist (M = 4.70, SD 
= 0.83), the woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs (M = 4.78, SD = 
0.67), and the woman who merely labeled herself as feminist (M = 4.78, SD = 0.76) as 
equally warm, p’s > .46. These three women were all seen as less warm than the 
woman in control condition (M = 5.07, SD = 0.60), p’s < .004. 
Competence. An one-way (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-
only, mere-feminist-labeled, control) between-participants ANOVA with four 
conditions on the level of competence showed a main effect of labeling type, F(3, 399) 
= 8.68, p < .001, η² = .06. Participants rated the woman who labeled herself a 
feminist (M = 5.71, SD = 0.66) and the woman who merely expressed gender equality 
beliefs (M = 5.60, SD = 0.66) as equally competent, t(200) = 1.22, p = .22, Cohen’s d 
= 0.17. The woman who labeled herself a feminist was seen as more competent than 
the woman who merely labeled herself as feminist (M = 5.51, SD = 0.65) and the 
woman in the control condition (M = 5.25, SD = 0.68), p’s < .03. The woman who 
merely expressed gender equality beliefs was not seen as more competent than the 
woman who merely labeled herself as feminist, t(195) = 0.97, p = .33, Cohen’s d = 
0.14, but was seen as more competent than the woman in the control condition, 
t(198) = 3.58, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.51. Finally, the woman who merely labeled 
122 
 
herself as feminist and the woman in control condition also significantly differed 
from each other, t(199) = -2.66, p = .009, Cohen’s d = 0.38. 
Beliefs. An one-way (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, 
mere-feminist-labeled, control) between-participants ANOVA with four conditions on 
the level of feminist beliefs showed a main effect of labeling type, F(3, 397) = 110.84, 
p < .001, η² = .46. Participants thought the woman who labeled herself a feminist (M 
= 4.50, SD = 0.66) had stronger feminist beliefs than the woman who merely 
expressed gender equality beliefs (M = 4.04, SD = 0.80), the woman who merely 
labeled herself as feminist (M = 3.93, SD = 0.80), and the woman in the control 
condition (M = 2.55, SD = 0.95), p’s < .001. The woman who merely expressed 
gender equality beliefs and the woman who merely labeled herself as a feminist were 
seen as equal in beliefs, p =.77, but as higher in beliefs than the woman in the control 
condition, p’s < .001. 
Discussion 
Study 5.4 again confirms that women who label themselves as feminists are 
seen as having stronger gender equality beliefs than women who merely express 
gender equality beliefs. In contrast to the previous studies both women are seen as 
equally warm and competent. The women who merely label themselves as feminists 
but do not express any gender equality beliefs (“I am a feminist, but I write about 
nature documentaries”) are seen as equally competent, equally warm, and having 
equally strong gender equality beliefs in comparison to women who express gender 
equality beliefs. In this study we thus find evidence that the mere usage of the 
feminist label implies some adherence to feminist ideology—as the results on strength 






In Study 5.5 we further explore the effect of feminist labeling by testing 
whether denial of the feminist label has a reverse effect on warmth and competence 
ratings—and thus an increase in warmth and a decrease in competence compared to 
using the feminist label. We based this on the idea that some women actively distance 
themselves from the feminist label. For example, when pop singer Katie Perry won 
the Billboard Women in Music Award 2012, she stated in her acceptance speech: “I 
am not a feminist, but I do believe in the strength of women” (Hampp, 2012). When 
Salma Hayek was honored for her battle in women’s rights at the Make Equality 
Reality Event in 2014 she said: “I am not a feminist […] I believe in equality” and 
there are many more examples to be found in the media (e.g., Elison, 2013; 
Luscombe, 2013; Setoodeh, 2012).  
The plethora of these examples might indicate that these women see 
advantages of not using the feminist label and indeed, it could be argued that if the 
feminist label has negative consequences on warmth and competence that the active 
denial of the label could have positive consequences. Actively distancing from the 
feminist label could possibly attenuate the negative effects of the label on warmth and 
competence. Study 5.5 tests whether rejecting the feminist label causes an increase in 
warmth and a decrease in competence compared to expressing gender equality 
beliefs. In addition, we contrast the evaluations of women who accept or reject the 
feminist label to the evaluations of women who accept or reject the non-feminist label 
in order to test whether there is something specific about the feminist label or 
whether labeling in general cues strength of beliefs. 
Method 
 Participants and design. Six hundred and thirty one United States citizens 
(419 male, 212 female, Mage = 31.39) were recruited from Amazon’s MTurk and 
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participated in return for $0.30. A target sample size of 600 was chosen in order to 
have 95% power to find a small effect (Faul et al., 2009). Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of six conditions in a 3 (labeling type: labeled, content-only, 
rejection-labeled) Χ 2 (classification: feminist, non-feminist) between participants 
design. 
Manipulation. The feminist classification conditions were the same as the 
manipulations of Study 5.4: Jenny either stated believing in gender equality and 
labeled herself as a feminist (feminist-labeled) or that she merely believed in gender 
equality (feminist-content-only). In the added rejection-labeled condition, Jenny 
stated that that she believed in gender equality, but did not call herself a feminist 
(feminist-rejection-labeled). In the non-feminist classification conditions, Jenny 
either stated not believing in gender equality and labeled herself as a non-feminist 
(non-feminist-labeled), that she did not believe in gender equality (non-feminist-
content-only), or that she did not believe in gender equality, but did not call herself a 
non-feminist (non-feminist-rejection-labeled).  
Measures. Participants followed the same procedure and materials as in 
Study 5.4. Participants first indicated warmth and competence and then whether 
Jenny held feminist beliefs and as finally whether she identified as a feminist or as a 
non-feminist. The same dependent measures as in the other studies were 
administered and showed acceptable reliability: Warmth (α = .84), and Competence 
(α = .78).  
Results 
Manipulation check. A 3 (labeling type: labeled, content-only, rejection-
labeled) Χ 2 (classification: feminist, non-feminist) between-participants ANOVA on 
the level of feminist identification showed a main effect of labeling type, F(2, 603) = 
144.98, p < .001, η² = .33, no effect of classification, F(1, 603) = 0.78, p = .38, η² = 
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.001, and an interaction effect of labeling type and classification, F(2, 603) = 6.45, p = 
.002, η² = .02. Simple effects showed that regarding the feminist classification, 
participants thought the woman who labeled herself feminist (M = 4.30, SD = 0.79) 
would identify more as a feminist than the woman who merely expressed gender 
equality beliefs (M = 3.67, SD = 1.10) who in turn would identify more than the 
woman who rejected the feminist label (M = 2.11, SD = 1.16), p’s < .001. Regarding 
the non-feminist classification, participants thought the woman who labeled herself a 
non-feminist (M = 4.17, SD = 1.04) would identify more as a non-feminist than the 
woman who merely expressed in terms of gender equality beliefs (M = 3.51, SD = 1.5) 
who in turn would identify more than the woman who rejected the non-feminist label 
(M = 2.65, SD = 1.27), p’s < .001. 
Warmth. A 3 (labeling type: labeled, content-only, rejection-labeled) Χ 2 
(classification: feminist, non-feminist) between-participants ANOVA on the level of 
warmth showed no main effect of labeling type, F(2, 603) = 1.84, p = .16, η² = .006, a 
main effect of classification, F(1, 603) = 34.45, p < .001, η² = .05, but no interaction 
effect of labeling type and classification, F(2, 603) = 1.95, p = .14, η² = .006. 
Participants thought the woman in the feminist classification condition (M = 4.83, SD 
= 0.81) was higher in warmth than the woman in the non-feminist classification 
condition (M = 4.38, SD = 1.03).  
 Competence. A 3 (labeling type: labeled, content-only, rejection-labeled) Χ 2 
(classification: feminist, non-feminist) between-participants ANOVA on the level of 
competence showed no main effect of labeling type, F(2, 603) = 0.64, p = .53, η² = 
.002, a main effect of classification, F(1, 603) = 73.39, p < .001, η² = .11, but no 
interaction effect of labeling type and classification, F(2, 603) = 0.78, p = .46, η² = 
.003. Participants thought the woman in the feminist classification condition (M = 
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5.41, SD = 0.78) was higher in competence than the woman in the non-feminist 
classification condition (M = 4.81, SD = 0.94). 
Beliefs. A 3 (labeling type: labeled, content-only, rejection-labeled) Χ 2 
(classification: feminist, non-feminist) between-participants ANOVA on the level of 
feminist beliefs showed a main effect of labeling type, F(2, 603) = 32.94, p < .001, η² 
= .10, no effect of classification, F(1, 603) = 0.06, p = .81, η² < .001, and no 
interaction effect, F(2, 603) = 2.24, p = .11, η² = .007. Participants thought the 
woman who labeled herself (M = 4.05, SD = 0.92) had stronger beliefs than the 
woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs (M = 3.70, SD = 1.12) who in 
turn had stronger beliefs than the woman who rejected the label (M = 3.24, SD = 
1.02), p’s < .001.  
Discussion 
Study 5.5 confirms that women who label themselves as feminists are seen as 
having stronger gender equality beliefs than women who merely express gender 
equality beliefs. Importantly, it did not matter whether the label used was the 
feminist label or the non-feminist label: In both cases usage of the label cued having 
stronger beliefs. Furthermore, we find no evidence that rejecting the feminist label 
has positive consequences: Women who express gender equality beliefs, but reject the 
feminist label are seen as equally warm and competent as women who merely express 
gender equality beliefs.  
Study 5.6 
In Study 5.6 we directly examined the influence of strength of feminist beliefs 
on the ratings of warmth and competence. Hence, by means of experimental causal 
chain design (Spencer et al., 2005) strength of feminist beliefs is manipulated 
directly. Therefore, in Study 5.6 there was no mentioning of the feminist label, but 




 Participants and design. Two hundred and fourteen United States citizens 
(141 male, 73 female, Mage = 32.42) were recruited from Amazon’s MTurk and 
participated in return for $0.30. A target sample size of 200 was chosen in order to 
have 95% power to find a small effect (Faul et al., 2009). Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of two conditions (beliefs: strong, weak). 
Manipulation. In the manipulation in this study there was no blog 
mentioned, because the fact that the person had a blog might be a cue to the strength 
of her beliefs. Therefore, it was merely mentioned whether Kate had strong beliefs in 
feminism (“I believe in all tenets of feminism and strongly believe in gender 
equality”) or weak beliefs in feminism (“I believe in some tenets of feminism, but 
disagree with others, and to some degree believe in gender equality”). 
Measures. Participants followed the same procedure and materials as in 
Study 5.4. Participants first evaluated warmth and competence and then indicated 
whether Kate held feminist beliefs and whether she identified as a feminist. The 
reliability of Warmth (α = .81), and Competence (α = .77) was acceptable. 
Results 
Manipulation checks. 
Beliefs. An independent samples t-test showed that the woman in the strong 
beliefs condition (M = 4.11, SD = 0.88) was seen as having stronger feminist beliefs 
than the woman in the weak beliefs condition (M = 3.07, SD = 0.73), t(198) = -9.15, p 
< .001, Cohen’s d = 1.30. 
Identification. An independent samples t-test showed that the woman in the 
strong beliefs condition (M = 4.12, SD = 0.91) was seen as more likely to identify as a 
feminist than the woman in the weak beliefs condition (M = 2.84, SD = 0.92), t(198) 
= -9.88, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.40. 
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Warmth. An independent samples t-test showed that the woman in the 
strong beliefs condition (M = 4.61, SD = 1.02) was not seen as less warm than the 
woman in the weak beliefs condition (M = 4.75, SD = 0.68), t(198) = 1.09, p = .28, 
Cohen’s d = 0.15. 
 Competence. An independent samples t-test showed that the woman in the 
strong beliefs condition (M = 5.50, SD = 0.82) was seen as more competent than the 
woman in the weak beliefs condition (M = 5.21, SD = 0.66), t(198) = -2.83, p = .005, 
Cohen’s d = 0.40. 
Discussion 
 In Study 5.6 we directly manipulated strength of feminist beliefs instead of 
cueing this by means of the feminist label. We found that indeed women with strong 
feminist beliefs are seen as more competent than women with weak feminist beliefs. 
We did not find that women with strong beliefs are seen as less warm than women 
with weak feminist beliefs. 
Integrative Data Analysis of Studies 
 Three of the first five studies above show support for the idea that women who 
label themselves as a feminist are seen as more competent and less warm than 
women who merely express gender equality beliefs. In Study 5.3 and 5.5 however, we 
do not find support for this hypothesis regarding competence (Study 5.3) or both 
(Study 5.5). In order to investigate these differences in studies, we combined the data 
from the first five studies in an aggregated dataset to perform an integrative data 
analysis. Every study uses the same type of manipulation and the same dependent 
measures (warmth and competence). If the effect that a woman who labels herself a 
feminist is seen as more competent and less warm than a woman who merely 
expresses gender equality beliefs is present in the combined dataset, then the effect 




An analysis across the first five studies (N = 1587; 714 women and 872 men) 
was run. The overall one-way (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, 
control) between-participants ANOVA with three conditions on the level of warmth 
showed a main effect of labeling type, F(2, 1565) = 23.47, p < .001, η² = .029, in 
which the woman who labeled herself a feminist (M = 4.51, SD = 0.88) was seen as 
less warm than the woman who merely expresses gender equality beliefs (M = 4.68, 
SD = 0.77; p = .001) who in turn was seen as less warm than the woman in the 
control condition (M = 4.81, SD = 0.73; p = .002).  
The overall one-way (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, 
control) between-participants ANOVA with three conditions on the level of 
competence showed a main effect of labeling type, F(2, 1565) = 14.53, p < .001, η² = 
.018, in which the woman who labeled herself a feminist (M = 5.56, SD = 0.76) was 
seen as more competent than the woman who merely expressed gender equality 
beliefs (M = 5.44, SD = 0.79; p = .001) who in turn was seen as more competent than 
the woman in the control condition (M = 5.28, SD = 0.82; p = .04). 
The overall one-way (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, 
control) between-participants ANOVA with three conditions on the level of feminist 
beliefs showed a main effect of labeling type, F(2, 1570) = 367.85, p < .001, η² = .32, 
in which the woman who labeled herself a feminist (M = 4.34, SD = 0.84) was seen as 
having stronger beliefs than the woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs 
(M = 3.82, SD = 1.16; p < .001) who in turn was seen as having stronger beliefs than 
the woman in the control condition (M = 2.55, SD = 1.19; p < .001). 
Participant gender. The integrative data analysis strategy provides us with 
enough statistical power to conduct exploratory analyses of these results with 
participant gender as an additional between-subjects factor. The 3 (labeling type: 
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feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, control) Χ 2 (participant gender: male, 
female) between-participants ANOVA on the level of warmth showed a main effect of 
labeling type, F(2, 1572) = 18.76, p < .001, η² = .02, a main effect of participant 
gender, F(1, 1572) = 19.82, p < .001, η² = .01, and no interaction effect of labeling 
type and participant gender, F(2, 1572) = 2.11, p = .12, η² = .003. We found the same 
pattern as described above for the effect of labeling type on warmth. Furthermore, 
female participants rated all targets as higher in warmth (M = 4.76, SD = 0.76) than 
male participants (M = 4.58, SD = 0.84). 
For competence, the 3 (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, 
control) Χ 2 (participant gender: male, female) between-participants ANOVA showed 
a main effect of labeling type, F(2, 1573) = 15.67, p < .001, η² = .02, a main effect of 
participant gender, F(1, 1573) = 42.30, p < .001, η² = .03, and no interaction effect of 
labeling type and participant gender, F(2, 1573) = 0.44, p = .65, η² = .001. We found 
the same pattern as described above for the effect of labeling type on competence. 
Furthermore, female participants rated all targets as higher in competence (M = 5.58, 
SD = 0.79) than male participants (M = 5.32, SD = 0.77). 
Finally, the 3 (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, control) 
Χ 2 (participant gender: male, female) between-participants ANOVA on the level of 
strength of beliefs showed a main effect of labeling type, F(2, 1566) = 366.46, p < 
.001, η² = .32, a main effect of participant gender, F(1, 1566) = 19.24, p < .001, η² = 
.01, and no interaction effect of labeling type and participant gender, F(2, 1566) = 
0.95, p = .39, η² = .001. We found the same pattern as described above for the effect 
of labeling type on strength of beliefs. Again, female participants rated all targets as 




Mediation. A mediation analyses was conducted to test whether the effect of 
labeling type on warmth and competence was mediated by strength of feminist 
beliefs. That is, labeling as a feminist or believing in gender equality causes an 
increase in the strength of feminist beliefs and that in turn causes a decrease in 
warmth and an increase in competence. To test this, a regression analysis according 
to the specifications of PROCESS for SPSS using Model four with 5000 bootstrap 
resamples (Hayes, 2013) was employed with labeling type entered as two dummy 
variables. The analyses for warmth revealed that beliefs indeed mediated the effect of 
labeling type on warmth, B = -0.06, SE = 0.02, p = .0002, CI = [-0.09, -0.03]. The 
direct effect of labeling type on warmth turned not significant for the dummy variable 
differentiating the feminist-content-only condition, B = 0.06, SE = 0.05, p = .23, CI = 
[-0.04, 0.15] but not for the dummy differentiating the control condition, B = 0.12, SE 
= 0.05, p = .03, CI = [0.01, 0.22]. For competence, the analyses revealed that beliefs 
mediated the effect of labeling type on competence, B = 0.09, SE = 0.02, p < .0001, 
CI = [0.06, 0.13]. The direct effect of labeling type on competence turned not 
significant for both dummy variables, B = -0.07, SE = 0.05, p = .14, CI = [-0.16, 0.02] 
and B = -0.05, SE = 0.05, p = .33, CI = [-0.15, 0.05]. 
Discussion 
 The integrative data analysis shows that overall women who label themselves 
as a feminist are seen as less warm, more competent, and having stronger gender 
equality beliefs than women who merely express gender equality beliefs. Participant 
gender did not influence any of these results, but we did find that female participants 
rated all targets consistently higher on all dimensions. Finally, the mediation analysis 
shows that strength of feminist beliefs mediates for both warmth and competences 
evaluations in the main comparison between women who labels themselves as a 




In this chapter we give an answer to the question whether women who label 
themselves as feminists are judged as more negative than women who merely express 
gender equality beliefs. An integrative data analysis across five studies shows that 
indeed women who label themselves as feminists are seen as less warm and more 
competent than women who express gender equality beliefs but do not label 
themselves as feminists. This difference in evaluations is caused by the idea that 
women who label themselves as feminists are seen as having stronger gender equality 
beliefs than other women. This is also confirmed in the sixth study that found that 
women with strong feminist beliefs are seen as more negative than women with weak 
feminist beliefs. Hence, this research shows that in addition to the negative 
evaluations of the feminist stereotype (Anderson, 2009; Houvouras & Carter, 2008; 
Jenen et al., 2009; Robnett et al., 2012; Roy et al., 2009; Rudman & Fairchild, 2007), 
the feminist label might cue strong gender equality beliefs towards an observer that 
in turn might also cause negative evaluations.  
The finding that women who label themselves a feminist are perceived as 
having stronger gender equality beliefs than women who merely express gender 
equality beliefs makes sense: Research has shown that self-reports of feminist-
labelers indicate they indeed have stronger gender- and feminist beliefs than non-
labelers (Aronson, 2003; Smith, 1999; Zucker, 2004). It seems that our results match 
the findings of these self-reports: Observers of the feminist label also infer a 
difference in strength of feminist beliefs and consequently make judgments based on 
the strength of these beliefs. A recent study also found that both self-labeled feminists 
and women who actively engage in feminist behavior (e.g., confront sexism at work) 
are evaluated more negatively than women who do not engage is such behaviors 
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(Anastosopoulos & Desmarais, 2014) indicating that negative evaluations are not only 
about the feminist label, but also about strength of feminist beliefs and/or behaviors.  
All studies, but Study 5.5, showed that the feminist label influenced 
perceptions of warmth and competence. In Study 5.5 we manipulated whether the 
target labeled herself a feminist, only expressed gender equality beliefs, or whether 
the target simply denied the feminist label. This study showed no effects of whether 
you label yourself a feminist or whether you deny the feminist label on evaluations of 
warmth and competence. In fact, although denial of the feminist label lowers the 
perception of the strength of feminist beliefs, the expected benefits of denial of the 
feminist label—for example increase in warmth and decrease in competence ratings–
were not found.  
We think consistency principles might play a role in the fact that no benefits of 
denial of the feminist label were found. People like to be able to predict the world 
(Schneider, 2004) and strive for consistency (Festinger, 1957; Gawronski et al., 2009; 
Heider, 1958; Nosek et al., 2002), but a statement such as “I believe in gender 
equality, but I am not a feminist” is contradictory. Therefore, it could also be argued 
that denying the feminist label while at the same time adhering to feminist values 
leads to negative evaluations because the target is seen as being inconsistent. 
Although many female celebrities see the advantages of denial of the feminist label 
(Elison, 2013; Hampp, 2012; Luscombe, 2013; Setoodeh, 2012), these results show 
that denial of the feminist label in fact does not lead to more positive evaluations.  
The integrative data analysis showed that both male and female participants 
thought women who label themselves as feminists have stronger feminist beliefs, are 
less warm, and are more competent than women who merely express gender equality 
beliefs. Although both men and women showed this same pattern, women 
consistently rated all targets higher on warmth, competence, and feminist beliefs. 
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These higher ratings might be attributed to in-group bias or in-group favoritism in 
which liked in-group members are rated especially positive (Brewer, 1979; Marques & 
Yzerbyt, 1988; Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 
1971). 
An important caveat is the first impression paradigm that was used in Studies 
5.3 to 5.6. Self-presentation motives play an important role in first impressions as 
people generally try to construct a desired, beneficial, and believable identity 
(Schlenker, 2003). Observers are often aware of these self-presentation motives 
(Schlenker, 2003) and thus it could be that participants took these motives into 
account when evaluating our target. Or, as one participant commented: “I feel that 
you can't judge someone on a first impression and they might be bull shitting you on 
hot topics to see how and where you stand”. If indeed our participants assumed that 
the feminist label was merely mentioned to get positive evaluations in a first 
impression, it means that the (feminist) label factually provides fewer information 
than we think is the case and experimenter demand effects might play a role. 
To conclude, it seems that the feminist label does not only directly influence 
evaluations of warmth and competence, but that the feminist label cues strength of 
feminist beliefs to observers. An increase in these feminist beliefs in turn causes a 
decrease in warmth evaluations and an increase in competence evaluations. This 
means that a woman who labels herself a feminist will be seen as more negative 
compared to a woman who merely expresses gender equality beliefs, because it is 
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With this dissertation I aimed to better understand the psychological processes 
of identification with feminism. I investigate why women are so hesitant to label 
themselves a feminist and examine whether this hesitation is justified. From 
Chapters 3-5 I can conclude that a) greater perceived discrepancy between women’s 
self-view and feminist-view on the dimensions of competence and warmth is related 
to weaker identification with feminism, b) motivated independence is an important 
reason to not identify as a feminist, c) although women who label themselves a 
feminist are seen as less warm and more competent, this is not a consequence of the 
feminist label, but a consequence of the perceived strength of their gender equality 
beliefs. Furthermore, in Chapter 2 I found that although gender stereotype-
inconsistency is in some specific cases seen as acceptable behavior, it still arouses 
disapproval especially for women who act in a stereotypical male manner. Together, 
these findings not only help us to gain a better understanding of why women are 
reluctant to identify as a feminist, but also help us to move toward a deeper 
psychological understanding of how this disidentification can be changed. 
Chapter 2 
People do not like violations of gender roles (Moss-Racusin et al., 2010; 
Prentice & Carranza, 2002; Rudman et al., 2012; Thomas, 1959; Vingerhoets, 2011) 
and men and women who act in ways that are inconsistent with their gender roles 
experience a ‘backlash effect’ (Rudman & Glick, 2001) in which their behavior is seen 
as less acceptable than the behavior of men and women who act in line with their 
gender roles. However, Chapter 2 finds first evidence that this is not always the case. 
By means of four studies and three different scenarios this chapter finds that an 
individual who behaves in a way that is gender stereotype-inconsistent is judged less 
negatively than an individual who behaves in a way that is gender stereotype-
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consistent with two important qualifiers: a) This only holds for men and b) this only 
holds if the gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior is seen as clever.  
Study 2.1.1 found that the behavior of a woman who uses dominance 
(consistent with the male stereotype) and the behavior of a man who uses 
attractiveness (consistent with the female stereotype) are seen as more acceptable 
than their gender stereotype-consistent counterparts. Specifically, this study found 
that when these behaviors are used to get away with a ticket, the behavior of the actor 
who uses gender stereotype-inconsistency is seen as more clever than the behavior of 
the actor who uses stereotype-consistency. These ratings of cleverness mediate the 
effect of gender stereotype-inconsistency on acceptability of the behavior. In Study 
2.1.2 the actors used the same behaviors but in a different scenario: The actor tries to 
delay a plane to allow a friend who is late to still board. In this study the behavior of 
the actor who uses gender stereotype-inconsistency is seen as more acceptable than 
the behavior of the actor who uses gender stereotype-consistency, but only if the 
inconsistent behavior is performed by a male target. Study 2.2 tested the idea that 
gender stereotype-inconsistent acts are seen as isolated or incidental events–if these 
acts are merely perceived as a one-time error, then this can account for the idea why 
these behaviors are seen as more acceptable. Study 2.2 found again that only the 
gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior of the male actor was seen as acceptable. 
Moreover, it found that whether the behavior was a recurring or an isolated event did 
not matter for the evaluations, indicating that gender stereotype-inconsistent 
behaviors are not seen as a ‘glitch’. Finally, Study 2.3 found that when gender 
stereotype-inconsistent behavior is not interpreted as clever, a backlash effect occurs, 
but when the same gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior is framed as being clever, 
the behavior is seen as more acceptable than gender stereotype-consistent behavior. 
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In all these studies, except Study 2.1.1, I found that only men can get away with 
gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior, whereas this is more difficult for women. 
That is, although it is not negative for women to behave in a way that is clever and 
gender stereotype-inconsistent, it is also not positive for them to do so. For men 
however it is positive and they reap the benefits of acting inconsistent with their 
gender role. Thus, although these results show some initial evidence that gender 
stereotype-inconsistency is seen as an acceptable way to act, it also shows a double 
standard. To me, this indicates that feminism and collective action towards gender 
equality might still be preferable. Both men and women should be allowed to behave 
as they want and not only as gender norms prescribe them: If men and women are 
seen more in equal lights, this might promote that indeed both men and women 
experience less disapproval when they violate gender roles. 
Antecedents of identification with feminism 
Chapter 3 
In Chapter 3 I found that perceived discrepancy between a woman’s view of 
herself and her view of feminists–on the dimensions of warmth and competence–is 
an important predictor in identification with feminism. In three studies I found that 
to better understand why women are reluctant to identify as a feminist not only 
feminist stereotyping must be taken into account, but also whether women see 
themselves as being different from feminists. The focus of this chapter was on the 
perceived discrepancy of warmth and competence, because these are the primary 
dimensions on which groups, such as feminists, are evaluated (Cuddy et al, 2008; 
Fiske et al., 2002; Fiske et al., 2007; Judd et al., 2005; see also Eagly & Steffen, 1984, 
for evaluations of gender in specific). 
Study 3.1 was exploratory in nature and found that women identify less with 
feminism the greater they perceive the difference in competence with feminists–
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regardless whether they see themselves as being more or less competent. Women also 
identify less with feminism when they see themselves as being warmer than 
feminists; however, if they see themselves as being colder than feminists, then the 
extent of this perceived discrepancy in warmth is not related to identification with 
feminism. Study 3.2 was a confirmatory study and replicates these findings in a 
different sample. Finally, Study 3.3 replicated the results of Studies 3.1 and 3.2 and 
found that perceived discrepancy predicts identification with feminism for both the 
warmth dimension and the competence dimension even after controlling for 
endorsement of feminist values. In summary, these three studies find that perceived 
discrepancy between how women see themselves and how they see feminists on 
warmth and competence predicts identification with feminism and that this factor is 
distinct from endorsement of feminist values.  
With these findings of Chapter 3 we better understand why women are 
reluctant to identify as a feminist. This trend of non-identification with feminism 
might seemingly be in contrast with Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1974) and Social 
Categorization Theory (Turner et al., 1987) that states that people want to belong to 
groups and get part of their self-esteem from identification with groups. However, an 
important precondition of identification with groups in both of these theories is that 
groups should be positively valued–which is not always the case for the group of 
feminists (Robnett et al., 2012). When a group can positively differentiate from other 
groups, identification with that group is more likely and identification with that 
group can cause positive self-esteem (Devos & Banaji, 2003; Tajfel, 1987; Turner et 
al., 1987). This idea is further explored by Greenwald, Banaji, Rudman, Farnham, 
Nosek, and Mellott (2002) who in their unified theory of social cognition state that 
there should always be balance-congruity between the self, components of the self-
concept, and identity. That is, if people see themselves as positive and do not see 
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feminists as positive, the resulting imbalance-dissonance makes identification less 
likely (Devos & Banaji, 2003).  
Because feminists are seen as cold, but competent women (Fiske et al., 2002), 
it is a positive development that, in general, competence for women is seen as a more 
desirable trait. For example, women are increasingly endorsing agency traits 
(Twenge, 1997; Spence & Buckner, 2000) and competence traits are slowly being 
included in the stereotypical perception of women (Diekman & Eagly, 2000; 
Diekman & Goodfriend, 2006). Because feminists are associated with high 
competence (Fiske et al., 2002) and competence is becoming more acceptable for 
women, the stereotypical perception of feminists might also become more positive. As 
said before, identification with groups that are positively valued is more likely and 
thus this development could mean an increase in identification with feminism.  
Furthermore, people are also more likely to identify with high status groups in 
comparison to low status groups (Doosje et al., 2002; Ellemers et al., 1997). 
Unfortunately, feminists, although high in competence, are generally seen as a low 
status group (Houvouras & Carter, 2008; Leaper & Arias, 2011; Robnett et al., 2012). 
However, the group status of feminists might be on the rise, because more and more 
high-status and positively valued women—Beyoncé, Taylor Swift, Emma Watson—
openly self-identify as feminists (Duca, 2014; Gray, 2014; UN Women, 2014). If this 
association between feminism and positivity indeed increases the status of feminists 
as a social group this naturally occuring event could lead to greater identification with 
feminism as well (Doosje et al., 2002; Ellemers et al., 2002). This is especially likely 
because in general in-groups are seen as having high status (Fiske et al., 2002; see 
also Pekaar, Meijs, Janssen, & Lammers, 2015 on the relation of thinness and status). 
If feminists are also seen as a high status group, then the perceived discrepancy 
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between a woman’s view of herself and her view of feminists decreases, making 
identification more likely. 
Another intervention that is especially relevant to the findings of Chapter 3 is 
the campaign ‘This is what a feminist looks like’ (www.fawcettsociety.org.uk). This 
campaign was launced in 2014 by magazine ELLE UK and Fawcett, the United 
Kingdom’s largest campaigning group for equality, and asked men and women to 
wear a T-shirt with the text ‘This is what a feminist looks like’. This campaign was a 
great success and many people joined in. Not only a diverse group of general public, 
but also UK Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg, UK Labour Party leader Ed Miliband, 
and famous actors such as Benedict Cumberbatch and Emma Watson put on the t-
shirt. Campaigns like this make the diversity of men and women identifying with 
feminism visible. Exposure to the diversity of feminists might change the definition 
that people have of a feminist and lead people to redefine what a feminist is. 
Interventions like this could therefore show that the discrepancy between a woman’s 
view of herself and her view of feminists is smaller than she perceives it is and hence 
promote identification with feminism.  
Another important finding of Chapter 3 is that perceived discrepancy on the 
warmth dimension predicted more variation in identification with feminism than 
perceived discrepancy on the competence dimension. In Chapter 3 I explained this 
difference with the idea that warmth is seen as a positive trait for women (Abele, 
2003; Bakan, 1966; Eagly, 1987; Eagly & Steffen, 1984; Fiske et al., 2002; Heilman, 
2012; Kite et al., 2008; Lippa, 2001; Prentice & Carranza, 2002; White & Gardner, 
2009), but that competence can be seen as a positive and a negative trait for women 
(Burgess & Borgida, 1999; Cuddy 2009; Cuddy et al., 2013; Diekman & Eagly, 2000; 
Diekman & Goodfriend, 2006; Fiske, 1993; Heilman, 2001; 2012; Powell et al., 2002; 
Rudman & Glick, 2001; Spence & Buckner, 2000; Twenge, 1997; White & Gardner, 
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2009). Because warmth is unequivocally seen as positive, an increase in the level of 
warmth of feminists will automatically be associated with an increase in identification 
with feminism. However, an increase in the level of competence of feminists can be 
associated with both an increase and a decrease in identification with feminism. This 
depends on whether the increase in level of competence causes a larger of a smaller 
perceived discrepancy for women. The difference in predictive power for 
identification with feminism between the warmth and the competence dimensions 
indicates that interventions that focus on the level of warmth of feminists might 
actually be more effective than interventions focusing on the level of competence of 
feminists. Given that warmth is unequivocally seen as a positive trait for women, the 
chance that an intervention targeting the ‘cold’ feminist stereotype will backfire is 
smaller than for an intervention targeting the ambivalent trait of competence. 
Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 highlighted another antecedent to identification with feminism that 
has been overlooked in the literature: motivated independence. In this chapter I 
argued that women do not want to identify as a feminist, because doing so restricts 
their view of themselves as an independent person. Study 4.1 found–in a Dutch 
sample–that both men and women indeed experience motivated independence: They 
value being an independent thinker instead of belonging to a group, and they do not 
like to label themselves. This motivated independence is an important reason to not 
identify as a feminist, and is seen as more important than three other reasons not to 
identify as a feminist: perceived disagreement with feminist values, negativity 
towards feminism and feminists, and potential for social rejection. Study 4.2 
replicated the effect that motivated independence is an important reason and is more 
important than three other reasons in a US sample. Moreover, this study found that 
motivated independence predicts identification with feminism for both men and 
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women while controlling for endorsement of perceived disagreement with feminist 
values, negativity towards feminism and feminists, and potential for social rejection. 
Study 4.3 used an experimental design in which an independent mindset is 
manipulated instead of measured. To test whether participants only disagree with 
feminism or whether they disagree with anything they encounter, I manipulated 
whether participants received a feminist message that said they should pursue a 
career or a non-feminist message that said they should pursue raising a family. Only 
women with an independent mindset show more disagreement with the feminist 
message than with the non-feminist message. This difference in disagreement was 
not found for men and not found for women with a dependent mindset. Together, 
these three studies found that motivated independence is an important factor in 
identification with feminism. 
 The findings of Chapter 4 suggest that disidentification can be changed by 
tackling the idea of incongruency between feminism and motivated independence 
that men and women have. As mentioned before, not only do many independent and 
strong women—Beyoncé, Taylor Swift, Emma Watson—identify as feminists 
nowadays (Duca, 2014; Gray, 2014; UN Women, 2014), they also emphasize that 
feminism is mostly about individual action and personal responsibility (Keller & 
Ringrose, 2015). These women show that it is possible to be both an independent 
actor and a feminist at the same time. Moreover, exposure to such successful female 
role models has also been shown to lead to women’s empowerment and better self-
evaluations (Latu, Mast, Lammers, & Bombari, 2013).  
Consequences of Identification with Feminism 
Chapter 5 
Feminists are evaluated negatively (Anderson, 2009; Houvouras & Carter, 
2008; Jenen et al., 2009; Robnett et al., 2012; Roy et al., 2009; Rudman & Fairchild, 
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2007) and so are groups that call for social change–such as feminists (Bashir et al., 
2013; Houvouras & Carter, 2008; Suter & Toller, 2006). Because of these negative 
connotations, some women are reluctant to identify as a feminist out of fear of being 
evaluated negatively themselves (Burn et al., 2000; Charter, 2015; McCabe, 2005; 
Suter & Toller, 2006). In Chapter 5 I investigated whether a woman who explicitly 
labels herself a feminist is seen as more negative than a woman who merely expresses 
gender equality beliefs. This chapter thus tests whether the reluctance towards 
identification with feminism is justified by investigating whether explicit labeling as a 
feminist indeed has an effect on evaluations. I tested this on the same dimensions 
used in Chapter 3: warmth and competence.  
Study 5.1 found that Dutch participants who read a resume of a woman who 
labels herself a feminist (“As a feminist, I am interested in researching gender 
equality”) evaluate her as being less warm, but more competent, than a woman who 
merely expresses gender equality beliefs (“I am interested in researching gender 
equality”). Study 5.2 replicated the results that the woman who labels herself a 
feminist is seen as less warm and more competent than the woman who merely 
expresses gender equality beliefs in a US sample. In addition, this study found that 
giving participants a focus on warmth or on competence does not affect these results. 
Study 5.3 used a different paradigm in which the feminist label was not made explicit 
in a resume, but in a first impression formation scenario: A woman either introduces 
herself as being a feminist (“I am a feminist, and I write about gender equality 
issues”) or as believing in gender equality (“I write about gender equality issues”). 
Again, I found that the feminist label leads to a decrease in warmth evaluations. The 
competence evaluations are not affected in this study. 
These first three studies thus found that indeed women who explicitly label 
themselves as feminist are seen as less warm and more competent than women who 
147 
 
merely express gender equality beliefs. Study 5.4 explicitly tested whether the 
feminist label in itself influences evaluations of warmth and competence by 
disentangling the feminist label from feminist beliefs. In this study a condition was 
added in which a woman introduces herself and merely labels herself a feminist but 
does not express any gender equality beliefs (“I am a feminist, but I write about 
nature documentaries”). This woman that only uses the feminist label is seen as 
equally competent, equally warm, and having equally strong gender equality beliefs to 
woman who expresses gender equality beliefs. Study 5.5 tested whether denial of the 
feminist label (“I believe in gender equality, but I am not a feminist”) has a reverse 
effect on warmth and competence ratings— but I found no evidence that denial of the 
feminist label has any positive consequences: The woman who expressed gender 
equality beliefs, but rejected the feminist label is seen as equally warm and competent 
to the woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs. These five studies all 
found that the woman who labeled herself a feminist and expressed gender equality 
beliefs is seen as having stronger feminist beliefs than the woman who merely 
expressed gender equality beliefs. Therefore, in Study 5.6 I directly manipulated 
strength of feminist beliefs to test whether strength has an influence on warmth and 
competence ratings. I indeed found that a woman with strong feminist beliefs is seen 
as more competent than a woman with weak feminist beliefs, but found no effects on 
warmth evaluations.  
Finally, an integrative data analysis across Studies 5.1 to 5.5 tested whether the 
effect that a woman who labels herself a feminist is seen as more competent and less 
warm than a woman who merely expresses gender equality beliefs is robust (Curran 
& Hussong, 2009) and whether the effect of labeling on evaluations is mediated by 
perceptions of strength of feminist beliefs. This data analysis showed that indeed the 
woman who labels herself a feminist is seen as less warm and more competent than 
148 
 
the woman who merely expresses gender equality beliefs and that this effect is 
mediated by strength of feminist beliefs. This means that a woman who labels herself 
a feminist is seen as more negative compared to a woman who merely expresses 
gender equality beliefs, because it is inferred that the feminist labeler in fact has 
stronger gender equality beliefs. 
These results seem to resonate in the current media landscape as well: Women 
who label themselves a feminist or show feminist behavior are especially seen as cold. 
For example, when Dutch female journalists said something in public about a sexist 
commercial–a commercial that promoted a toy vacuum cleaner for girls and said ‘be 
just as good as your mother’–they were immediately characterized as cold (bitter and 
whiny) and overly competent (feeling exalted) (Bosch, 2013). More generally 
speaking, women who identify as a feminist and are also seen as likeable and 
attractive, experience backlash and receive comments that feminism and warmth do 
not go together (Rudman & Fairchild, 2007; Van der Poel & Tuenter, 2014).  
In addition to feminists being evaluated negatively, it seems that campaigns 
that are interpreted as being ‘feminist’ also experience negative consequences. For 
example, in March 2015 the German government introduced a gender quota that 30% 
of supervisory board of publicly traded companies should be women by 2016 (ANP, 
2015). Although many were in favor of this quota, there were some protests as well: 
For example, the political party ‘Alternative for Germany (AfD)’ introduced a 
campaign against this quota called ‘I am not a feminist’ (White, 2014). Thus, it seems 
that the negative consequences of feminist labeling are not only applicable to women 
who label themselves feminist, but also to campaigns that relate to feminist ideology.  
As said before, if there are more and more positive examples of feminist self-
labeling (Duca, 2014; Gray, 2014; Holmgren, 2013; UN Women, 2014), there might 
be a more diverse view of what a feminist is. Consequently, women might experience 
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less discrepancy between their self-view and their view of feminists (see Chapter 3) 
and experience less motivated independence (see Chapter 4) which in turn might 
increase identification with feminism. In my opinion, an increase in identification 
with feminism itself might be an important factor in decreasing the consequences of 
the feminist label. The effects of feminist labeling on, for example, warmth and 
competence might decrease if the group of feminists becomes larger and more 
diverse.  
Future directions 
In my dissertation as well as in other work on feminism, the focus has been on 
white women in western countries (but see Robnett et al., 2012). Future research 
should definitely look into for example black feminism in the United States (Swim & 
Hyers, 2009) or think about feminism in other non-western countries. Malala 
Yousafzai is a great example of a feminist who stands up for women and girl rights in 
her country Pakistan. Focus on non-western countries is especially important because 
feminism is needed in these countries: Child marriage is still prevalent in many South 
Asian and sub-Saharan African countries, with up to 77 percent of women (in 
contrast to only 5 percent of men) being married before the age of 18 (United Nations 
Children’s Fund [UNICEF], 2014). Over 35% of women worldwide have experienced 
violence in their lifetime (World Health Organization [WHO], 2014) and women are 
being murdered for marrying out of free will (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 
2014) or being raped for merely riding the bus (Kambou, 2014).  
Although the results from Chapter 5 indicate that feminist labeling and merely 
expressing gender beliefs cue having stronger gender equality beliefs, future research 
should investigate whether disidentification with feminism might be influenced by 
the notion that believing that men and women should be equals has become part of 
the mainstream culture and might even have become normative (McCabe, 2005). If 
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you believe men and women should be equal, you are considered ‘normal’; you are 
not having any radical beliefs (McCabe, 2005). In accordance with that, some people 
view the world as naturally evolving: They believe that men and women will naturally 
be equals to each other in time and that you should not push that (Edley & Wetherell, 
2001). Therefore, it could be that labeling has become especially important for groups 
that are seen as having opinions that deviate from the mainstream opinion. That is, 
although in contrast with the findings from Chapter 5—it could be that feminist 
labeling is becoming less important and informative, because implicitly it is assumed 
that all people believe men and women should be equal.  
Conclusion 
To sum up, in this dissertation I found that although men receive benefits of 
acting in gender stereotype-inconsistent ways, for women these benefits are not 
present. Furthermore, I found that both perceived discrepancy with feminists and 
motivated independence are important reasons to not identify as a feminist and that 
women who label themselves feminists indeed experience negative effects because 
they are seen as less warm and more competent. 
Given the recent changing image of feminists in the media and the fact that 
there is no decline in support for the women’s movement over the last years (Duncan, 
2010; Huddy et al., 2000), it does seem that the stereotype of feminists is broadening 
and becoming more positive. However, the question to identify or to not identify as a 
feminist remains. And whereas some will identify and are proud to be a feminist 
regardless of any consequences (Holmgren, 2013), others will always have 
misconceptions about what a feminist is and will never identify as a feminist 
(womenagainstfeminism.tumblr.com). With this dissertation I have shed some light 
on identification with feminism and have given some suggestions how to have more 
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Vrouwen zijn terughoudend om zichzelf een feminist te noemen. In dit 
proefschrift onderzoek ik waarom dit zo is en of deze terughoudendheid 
gerechtvaardigd is.  
In hoofdstuk 2 heb ik gekeken naar mannen en vrouwen die zich inconsistent 
gedragen met hun gender stereotype. In het algemeen vinden mensen het 
onacceptabel als anderen zich niet volgens hun gender rollen gedragen en worden 
deze mensen negatief beoordeeld. In hoofdstuk 2 vind ik dat dit echter niet altijd zo 
is: Wanneer het inconsistente gedrag wordt uitgevoerd door een man (dus een man 
die zich vrouwelijke gedraagt) en dit gedrag wordt gezien als slim, dan wordt het 
gedrag acceptabel gevonden. Om meer specifiek te zijn vond ik in 4 studies dat het 
gedrag van mannen die flirten en van mannen die zich passief gedragen (allebei 
rollen die met vrouwen worden geassocieerd) als acceptabel wordt gezien als ze dit 
gedrag gebruiken om iets gedaan te krijgen, zoals het vermijden van een boete of het 
beïnvloeden van een mentor voor een hoger cijfer. Vrouwen die zich mannelijk 
gedragen (een vrouw die assertief of agressief is) hebben echter niet dit voordeel. 
Hoofdstuk 2 laat dus zien dat er nog steeds met twee maten wordt gemeten: Hoewel 
mannen wel de voordelen hebben van inconsistent gedrag, geldt dat niet voor 
vrouwen.  
In hoofdstukken 3 en 4 heb ik me meer direct gefocust op de voorspellers van 
identificatie met feminisme. In hoofdstuk 3 laat ik zien dat wanneer vrouwen een 
zichzelf als anders zien dan het stereotype van feministen, ze zich minder snel een 
feminist noemen. Dit heb ik gedaan door te kijken naar twee dimensies die belangrijk 
zijn in de perceptie van personen, namelijk competentie (hoe intelligent, ambitieus en 
onafhankelijk ben je?) en warmte (hoe vriendelijk, open-minded, en verzorgend ben 
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je?). Drie studies laten zien dat als vrouwen zichzelf als anders zien in competentie 
dan feministen (ongeacht of ze zichzelf als meer of minder competent zien), ze 
zichzelf minder snel identificeren als feminist. Daarnaast identificeren ze zich minder 
met feminisme als ze zichzelf als warmer zien dan feministen. Als vrouwen denken 
dat feministen warmer zijn dan zichzelf, dan heeft dit geen invloed op identificatie. 
Omdat feministen stereotypisch worden gezien als hoog in competentie en laag in 
warmte, resulteert dit in lagere identificatie met feminisme. Echter, competente 
vrouwen wordt meer en meer geaccepteerd door de maatschappij en steeds meer 
vrouwen zien zichzelf als competent. Deze verandering kan er voor zorgen dat het 
stereotiepe beeld van de feminist positiever wordt en meer vrouwen zichzelf een 
feminist noemen.  
Hoofdstuk 4 kijkt naar een andere voorspeller van identificatie met feminisme, 
namelijk gemotiveerde onafhankelijkheid (motivated independence). In dit 
hoofdstuk laat ik zien dat sommige vrouwen zichzelf geen feminist willen noemen, 
omdat ze dan geen onafhankelijk persoon meer kunnen zijn. In twee studies laat ik 
zien dat zowel mannen als vrouwen gemotiveerde onafhankelijkheid ervaren: Ze 
vinden het belangrijk om onafhankelijk na te denken en vinden het niet fijn om een 
label op zichzelf te plakken. Deze gemotiveerde onafhankelijkheid was een 
belangrijke voorspeller voor identificatie met feminisme (en belangrijker dan of je 
feministen negatief vindt, of je het eens bent met feministen, en of je bang bent 
buitengesloten te worden als je jezelf een feminist noemt). In een derde studie heb ik 
mannen en vrouwen zichzelf onafhankelijk (of afhankelijk) van anderen laten voelen. 
Daarna heb ik gevraagd of ze het eens zijn met een feministische boodschap en of ze 
een feminist zijn. Wat blijkt, alleen vrouwen die zich onafhankelijk voelden waren het 
meer oneens met deze boodschap. Echter, er was geen verschil in identificatie met 
feminisme tussen de twee verschillende groepen vrouwen. Deze bevindingen lijken te 
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suggereren dat vrouwen de ideeën van feminisme niet kunnen verenigen met 
onafhankelijk zijn. Tegenwoordig zijn er veel sterke onafhankelijke vrouwen in de 
media die laten zien dat je wel degelijk feminist en onafhankelijk kunt zijn; denk aan 
Beyoncé, Taylor Swift, en Emma Watson. Het blijkt dat blootstelling aan zulke 
rolmodellen ervoor zorgt dat je jezelf ook onafhankelijk voelt en dus kunnen deze 
mediavrouwen er misschien op den duur voor zorgen dat meer vrouwen zich 
identificeren als feminist.  
In het laatste hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift heb ik gekeken naar de 
consequenties van jezelf een feminist noemen: Is het gerechtvaardigd om 
terughoudend te zijn met identificatie als een feminist? Ik heb opnieuw gekeken naar 
de dimensies warmte en competentie die ook in hoofdstuk 3 aan bod komen. In zes 
studies laat ik zien dat wanneer een vrouw zich een feminist noemt in een eerste 
kennismaking of op een curriculum vitae, deze vrouw als minder warm, maar als 
meer competent wordt gezien dan een vrouw die alleen uit dat ze voor gelijke rechten 
is. Verder laat ik zien dat het expliciet ontkennen van het feministische label (“Ik 
geloof in gelijke rechten, maar ik ben geen feminist”) geen positieve effecten heeft: De 
vrouw die dit deed in een eerste kennismaking werd als even warm en competent 
gezien als de vrouw die geloofde in gelijke rechten. In een analyse van al deze studies 
samen laat ik zien dat het verschil in warmte en competentie tussen de feminist en de 
vrouw die gelooft in gelijke rechten komt doordat mensen denken dat de feminist een 
sterkere mening heeft dan de andere vrouwen.  
Deze resultaten kun je ook vinden in de hedendaagse media. Toen een 
journaliste bij Pauw en Witteman vertelde dat ze de reclames van Bart Smit 
seksistisch vond (een speelgoed stofzuiger reclame met ‘ wordt net zo goed als 
mama’), werd ze bitter en een zeur genoemd (niet warm) en verheven (wel 
competent). In het algemeen wordt gezegd dat warmte en feminisme niet samen 
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gaan. Echter, de eerder genoemde mediavrouwen laten zien dat warmte en feminisme 
wel samen kunnen gaan en kunnen er daardoor misschien voor zorgen dat de 
negatieve effecten van het feministische label minder worden.  
Om te concluderen, in dit proefschrift laat ik zien dat vrouwen zichzelf geen 
feminist noemen omdat ze een afstand voelen tussen zichzelf en feministen en door 
effecten van gemotiveerde onafhankelijkheid. Daarnaast laat ik zien dat feministische 
vrouwen worden gezien als minder warm, maar meer competent, omdat gedacht 
wordt dat ze een sterke mening hebben over gelijke rechten. Als laatste laat ik zien 
dat mannen wel voordeel kunnen halen uit inconsistent gedrag, maar dat dit voor 
vrouwen nog niet geldt.  
Het lijkt alsof de maatschappij langzaam aan het veranderen is en dat het 
feministische stereotype positiever wordt. En hoewel sommigen vrouwen zich nooit 
zullen identificeren als feminist, heb ik met dit proefschrift enkele suggesties gegeven 
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